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General introduction
1.1 Conflict in protected area management in Benin
Benin and Togo are two West African countries situated in a dry corridor called 
the Dahomean Gap. This corridor is characterized by specific environmental 
conditions that make these two countries drier than the other countries of 
coastal West Africa and consequently the rainforest belt from Guinea to Cam-
eroon skipped Benin and Togo (Siebert and Elwert 2004). To protect the very 
limited vegetation in these countries, protected areas were established by the 
colonial administration to avoid the complete depletion of the ecosystems. 
Most of Benin’s protected areas were created during the colonial period be-
tween 1940 and 1960. During this period, about 59 such areas were created 
covering an area of 2,179,418 ha, representing about 20% of the country’s total 
area. The colonial administration established them by confiscating rural land 
and putting it under government control without the consent of the local com-
munities, who considered that their land had been expropriated. From the time 
that they were created until the early 1990s (El-Hadj Issa 2001; Tchiwanou 2001; 
Zoundoh 2001; Arouna 2006), these protected areas were managed solely by 
government officials. Local communities were considered as undesirable in the 
management of these resources and were kept away from them by force and 
repression. Forests rangers (FRs) who received military training were deployed 
around these protected areas and were charged with preventing any human 
activity from taking place on these lands. Thus, many conflicts set the FRs and 
local communities in opposition to each other in relation to access to, and use 
of, the resources in the protected areas. This management system also proved 
to be inefficient in terms of conservation of these protected areas, where degra-
dation increased over time (El-Hadj Issa 2001; Tchiwanou 2001; Arouna 2006).
In 1993, participatory management of protected areas was enacted in Benin. 
This was motivated by the country’s political and economic liberalization in 
1990 and the Rio de Janeiro Summit held in 1992, which recognized the im-
portance of environmental degradation and local communities’ involvement in 
natural resources management. The government issued the new forest law No 
93-009 on 2 July 1993, which opened the management of the protected areas 
to the local communities (Djohossou 2000). With the support of donors, ef-
forts have been made since then by the government and national and interna-
tional NGOs to implement several participatory protected area management 
projects, and some are still in progress. The aim is to make the interventions 
in protected area management more effective by fostering the participation of 
local communities in forest resource management. This will, as a result, enable 
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the local communities to continue the activities developed under the projects 
after the projects themselves have ceased. However, despite many efforts of 
government and non-government agencies to stimulate local community par-
ticipation in sustainable forest management projects, the results are not sat-
isfactory (El-Hadj Issa 2001; Tchiwanou 2001; Zoundoh 2001). Several studies 
revealed that the lack of success of the forestry reforms of the early 1990s was 
mainly due to the failure to implement a participatory approach in the manage-
ment of the protected areas (MDR and PGFTR 1999; Siebert and Elwert 2004). 
Timber resources are still illegally logged for the timber market and charcoal 
production, farmers continue to expand their farms deeper into the protected 
areas, and the pastoralists are still using the forests as areas for grazing, with 
little respect for the regulations, violating the agreements set during the project 
implementation phase. Even the people involved in the management of the 
projects engage in some practices that run counter to the sustainability of the 
natural resources (Tchiwanou 2001; Arouna 2006). 
Some deficiencies have been noted in the participatory projects implemented, 
such as the limited interest of local communities in project activities during 
project implementation, and, moreover, just after the end of the projects, local 
communities and the other stakeholders reverted to their old ‘bad’ forest re-
sources exploitation in the project areas (Tchiwanou 2001). Local organizations 
which were supposed to continue the tasks carried out by the projects have 
broken down, and the agreements reached between the stakeholders during 
the project implementation phase have been called into question (Tchiwanou 
2001). Moreover, conflicts have re-emerged between the FRs and local commu-
nities and even among stakeholder groups within local communities involved 
in the management of these protected areas (Tchiwanou 2001; Zoundoh 2001; 
Arouna 2006; Mongbo 2008). After nearly two decades of struggling with par-
ticipatory management of protected areas in Benin, how and why the process 
evolved to the current situation had to be investigated.
 
Thus, this thesis investigated the emergence of cooperation and conflict in the 
participatory management of natural resources in Benin. The study has both 
societal and scientific relevance. Its societal relevance stems from the fact that 
it aims to contribute to the improvement of participatory processes by provid-
ing a better understanding of the interactions among the stakeholders involved, 
especially how and why cooperation and conflict have emerged. In some cases, 
participation has led to cooperation among the stakeholders, and in others its 
implementation is characterized by conflicts or the continuous alternation of 
cooperation and conflict. Unravelling the reasons for such differences in out-
15
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comes will enable a better implementation of participatory processes and as a 
consequence the sustainable management of the natural resources, to which 
this study also aims to contribute. 
The scientific relevance of this thesis derives from its aim of contributing to 
knowledge generation in the field of framing and conflict in collaborative gover-
nance settings. More specifically, a framing perspective was used to investigate 
the participatory management of natural resources processes to better under-
stand the emergence and co-construction of cooperation and conflict. Framing 
plays an important role in the creation, evolution, and perpetuation of environ-
mental conflict (Gray 2003). Generating knowledge on how framing groups 
people together and how different frames play against each other in interac-
tion can provide insights to better understand negotiation processes, especially 
processes relating to the participatory management of natural resources (Agne 
2007; Brummans et al. 2008). 
1.2  Participation and conflict in natural resources 
management
A top-down approach to managing natural resources was advocated for many 
decades throughout the twentieth century. Natural resources were managed 
through rigorous law enforcement and human exclusion (Stoll-Kleemann et 
al. 2010). The resources belonged to the state, which used power and repres-
sion to draw the boundaries of protected areas and defend them from people. 
However, because local communities depended on forest resources for their 
livelihoods, this approach had catastrophic effects on their living conditions 
and was not effective in terms of conservation (Kerkhof 2000; Masozera et al. 
2006). The involvement of local communities in natural resources manage-
ment has therefore been recognized as critical for its success for more than two 
decades (Torquebiau and Taylor 2009; Rodriguez-Izquierdo et al. 2010). Public 
participation is seen as a necessary tool for the sustainable management of 
natural resources (Leskinen 2004). 
Participatory management of natural resources refers to processes and mecha-
nisms that enable those people who have a direct stake in resources to be 
part of the decision making about their management at different levels, from 
managing resources to formulating and implementing institutional frame-
works (Schreckenberg et al. 2006). Almost every country in the world is cur-
rently experimenting with some form of participatory resources management 
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by devolving power to the community to use and manage the resources located 
within the area occupied or used by the community (Edmonds 2002). Several 
arguments are evoked in favour of the use of a participatory approach in the 
management of natural resources. They can be summarized in four main cat-
egories: pragmatic arguments, ideological and normative arguments, political 
arguments, and accountability arguments (Leeuwis 2004; Vandenabeele and 
Goorden 2007). 
Pragmatic arguments, also called substantive arguments by Fiorino (1990), 
stress that participation is needed in order to be effective as it results in a 
greater legitimacy of policy and thus enhances the effectiveness of governance 
(Leeuwis 2004; Vandenabeele and Goorden 2007; Coenen 2009). Participation 
enables access to all sorts of relevant knowledge, insights, experiences, and/
or creativity regarding the history of the management of natural resources, the 
problems that emerge, and their possible solutions (Leeuwis 2004). It facili-
tates contacts with relevant networks of stakeholders, resources, and people 
that may support the initiatives and thus it lessens the chance of policies being 
subsequently contested (Vandenabeele and Goorden 2007). The breadth and 
depth of the information underlying decision making and the quality of the 
decisions made are enhanced (Stirling 2006). Participation also creates the 
degree of mental, emotional, and/or physical involvement necessary for people 
to feel concerned about the policy (Leeuwis 2004). From such problem owner-
ship, people may feel responsible for contributing to the implementation of the 
solution.
Normative arguments of participation advocators are based on the idea that 
citizens have a wish, a moral right, and/or a duty to be actively involved in the 
policies that shape their own future (Leeuwis 2004). Normative arguments are 
supported by the belief that citizens are ready to participate and share their 
political agendas with bureaucrats as long as they are offered appropriate op-
portunities and as long as bureaucrats are willing to listen and respond (Corn-
wall and Coelho 2007). According to these arguments, the management of 
natural resources is everybody’s business because their conservation and de-
velopment is essential for our common future (Vandenabeele and Goorden 
2007). The involvement of the public in decision-making processes for natural 
resources management will increase awareness and ultimately result in behav-
ioural change by the participants (Coenen 2009). Participation is used as an 
instrument to mobilize public commitment, support, and trust for policy in the 
management of natural resources (Stirling 2006). 
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Participatory management is also justified with political arguments. As the 
management of natural resources concerns all the stakeholders, participation 
can help to emancipate and empower local communities in the management of 
these resources (Leeuwis 2004). Through their involvement in management, 
local communities can build upon the skills, insights, and resources necessary 
to manage natural resources. They will learn of the environmental problems 
that society faces, and they will network, advocate, negotiate, and persuade 
government representatives (Irvin and Stansbury 2004; Coenen 2009). 
Participation is also advocated in the management of natural resources to en-
hance the accountability of those in charge of the implementation of the con-
servation project vis-à-vis the stakeholders involved. Thus, the stakeholders 
have a certain amount of control over the budget and activities, rendering the 
interventions not only more effective but also more legitimate from an ethical 
perspective (Leeuwis 2004). Participation is likely to be effective when the con-
stituents come to exercise accountability as a countervailing power (Agrawal 
and Ribot 1999; Ribot 2001). 
Although the involvement of local communities in the management of nat-
ural resources is seen as important in light of the above arguments, it var-
ies widely in different contexts from protectionist conservation mechanisms 
implemented by government representatives to programmes driven by local 
communities (see Leeuwis 2004; Torquebiau and Taylor 2009; Rodriguez-Iz-
quierdo et al. 2010). The empirical outcomes of such devolution of the use 
and management of resources are also mixed, and the reasons for differences 
in performances and outcomes are still not fully understood. In many cases, 
conflicts have emerged between the stakeholders involved (Hellström 2001; 
Yasmi 2003; Hares 2009; Yasmi et al. 2009). Thus, the academic debate about 
participation is moving away from questions about different types of participa-
tion and ways to organize them towards the actual effects of participation in 
practice in order to understand how and why participation leads sometimes to 
unintended consequences such as conflicts (Turnhout et al. 2010). This is the 
starting point of our study.
In natural resources management, conflicts are considered as inevitable, ubiq-
uitous, and persisting for the foreseeable future (Buckles and Rusnak 1999; 
Castro and Nielson 2003; Hares 2009; Mola-Yudego and Gritten 2010). In the 
participatory management of natural resources, several factors are mentioned 
as the basis for the development of conflicts in the involvement of stakehold-
ers. Most of them pertain to the issue of power. Critics of participation often fo-
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cus on power relations between the stakeholders (see among others Chambers 
1997; Cooke and Kothari 2001; Hickey and Mohan 2004; Parfitt 2004; Williams 
2004; Aarts and Leeuwis 2010; Rodriguez-Izquierdo et al. 2010; Turnhout et 
al. 2010). According to Aarts and Leeuwis (2010), many of the problems and 
dilemmas relating to participatory policymaking and citizens’ participation can 
be traced back to lack of clarity about the role of government and power in the 
context of participatory policymaking. They argue that we have to accept that 
differences in power, displays of power, power struggles, and the use of all kind 
of empowering strategies are phenomena that are found structurally wherever 
people organize themselves and work together. From Chambers’ perspective, 
power is seen as a negative influence, a force that those who have the advan-
tage use to repress those who are less advantaged (Parfitt 2004). In order to 
correct this, power must be eliminated or reversed, and this is often a source 
of conflict. With regard to power relations, participatory management is con-
sidered to be exclusive because it creates different categories of citizens (Turn-
hout et al. 2010). Turnhout et al. (2010) have pointed out that participation will 
always be exclusive in some way because it restricts the scope of negotiation 
and who should be involved, and it defines the assumptions about the issue at 
stake, the expectations about the outcome of the participatory process, what 
the participants should do, and how they should behave. However, the analy-
sis of community participation in the management of natural resources must 
move beyond just an analysis of power-sharing arrangements to understand 
the roles of the relevant stakeholders and the interactional context (Carlsson 
and Berkes 2005; Rodriguez-Izquierdo et al. 2010). Participation should then 
be considered as context-specific interactions between participatory initiatives 
and the expectations of the stakeholders on the one hand, and participants and 
the needs, identities, and views that they articulate on the other (Turnhout et al. 
2010). The aim of this thesis is to contribute to the current debate and provide 
new knowledge about, and insights into, the nature and the course of participa-
tory processes in forest management. Thus, the objective of this thesis is:
To understand why and how conflicts emerge and evolve in negotia-
tion among the stakeholders involved in the participatory manage-
ment of protected areas in Benin. 
Conflicts arise and develop on the basis of the meaning and interpretation peo-
ple attach to events and on-going actions in which they are involved (Pinxten 
and Verstraete 1998). People’s construction of meanings and their interpreta-
tion of events and actions are associated with framing (Entman 1993; Gray 
2003; Dewulf 2005; Aarts and van Woerkum 2006; Dewulf et al. 2009). In this 
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study, the framing perspective is used to investigate the emergence and evolu-
tion of conflicts in protected area management in Benin. 
 1.3  Theoretical approach: the art of framing
In this study, we start from the idea that institutions as well as organizations 
are socially constructed realities that exist in the process of conversations and 
discourses that constitute them (see Ford 1999; Ford et al. 2002). People con-
struct social realities through language by interpreting, constructing, enacting, 
and maintaining realities they know (Ford 1999). To create a new reality, they 
deconstruct and reconstruct existing realities through discourses in interaction 
(Ford 1999). Thus, social processes such as participation and negotiation ex-
ist in the discourses and conversations co-constructed by the stakeholders in 
interaction.
In line with this thinking, participation in natural resources management is a 
constructed reality involving stakeholders with different interests, backgrounds, 
and perspectives about the natural resources (Cornwall 2004). Since stake-
holders involved in natural resources management have diverse backgrounds, 
interests, opportunities, and activities linked to these resources, their concep-
tions of the threats to these resources and the necessary solutions are different 
as well (see Aarts and van Woerkum 2002). Stakeholders enter the process 
with fields of vision or frames of reference that help them construct meanings 
or make sense of the situation (Putnam and Holmer 1992). These frames of 
the stakeholders are deconstructed and reconstructed in interaction through 
discourses (Ford 1999). The frames they construct from the various possible 
frames influence how they understand and evaluate problems and their neces-
sary solutions (Nabi 2003). Frames and framing play an important role in nego-
tiation and conflict management involving multiple actors (Gray 2003; Dewulf 
et al. 2005; Aarts and van Woerkum 2006; Dewulf et al. 2009). 
The concepts of frame, framing, and reframing have been used in various re-
search domains such as decision making, conflict management, social man-
agement, innovation and change, policy making, and negotiation (Dewulf et al. 
2005). However, the definition, use, and operationalization of these concepts 
have generated considerable divergences among researchers and practitioners. 
Goffman (1974:10), one of the most cited scholars in the framing movement, 
stated to define the concept of frame:
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I assume that definitions of a situation are built up in accordance with 
principles of organization which govern events […] and our subjective 
involvement in them; frame is the word I use to refer to such of these 
basic elements as I am able to identify. 
According to this definition, frames are cognitive devices that govern our char-
acterization of a situation. Frames are what govern our perception and repre-
sentation of the situation in which we are acting. In Goffman’s view, a frame is 
a schema of interpretation that enables individuals to locate, perceive, identify, 
and label phenomena. Frames help us to organize our knowledge and find out 
and interpret the meaning of new information (Tannen 1993). They are also 
‘structures of expectations’ ‘that is, that, on the basis of one’s experience of 
the world in a given culture (or combination of cultures), one organizes knowl-
edge about the world and uses this knowledge to predict interpretations and 
relationships regarding new information, events, and experiences’ (Tannen 
1993:16). The frames adopted are not immune to real world events as they can 
change with the context and the situation. This is well emphasized by Gitlin 
(1980:6) who argued that ‘frames are principles of selection, emphasis and 
presentation composed of little tacit theories about what exists, what happens, 
and what matters’. This is also corroborated by Entman (1993:52) who stated:
To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make 
them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to pro-
mote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral 
evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation. 
Although this definition still considers frames as cognitive devices, it shows 
the shift towards a principle of selection and salience and the notion of context 
in framing. In other words, the frames people construct in interaction show 
aspects of context as far as the speaker considers these relevant. Thus, in ne-
gotiation or interaction processes, the choice of a frame also depends on the 
signals one receives from the others in the process (Gray 2003). 
Other scholars in framing research focus rather on frames as constructed and 
negotiated in interactions according to the context. In this case, frames are 
defined as communication devices used by individuals or groups to negotiate 
how to interpret and understand the on-going interaction (Dewulf et al. 2009). 
Frames are not devices readily available beforehand that people only select and 
use in interaction; rather, they are co-constructed and legitimized in interaction 
by linking text to context (Chenail 1995; Aarts and van Woerkum 2006). 
21
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Although scholars differ in the exact definition of frame, framing, and refram-
ing, they agree that framing refers to what we use to make sense, to construct 
meaning, or to understand the world around us, whereas the frame represents 
the issues; in others words, how we understand and interpret the world around 
us (Gray 2003; Aarts and van Woerkum 2006; Dewulf 2006). The framing pro-
cess is connected with a person’s specific sets of values, norms, objectives, 
interests, convictions, and knowledge at a particular time in a particular situ-
ation that enable and/or stimulate him to give meaning according to these 
factors (Aarts and van Woerkum 2006). It is the way an individual formulates a 
problem according to his norms, habit, interests, and personal characteristics 
(Putnam and Holmer 1992). Framing works to shape and alter audience mem-
bers’ interpretations and preferences by raising the salience of the apparent 
importance of certain ideas, and by activating schemas that encourage target 
audiences to think, feel, and decide in particular way (Entman 2007). 
Different frames are mobilized for diverse purposes in different contexts. In 
environmental conflicts for example, frames are used to define issues, shape 
what action should be taken and by whom, protect oneself, justify a stance be-
ing taken on an issue, and mobilize people to take or refrain from action on 
issues (Gray 2003). In environmental conflicts, some frames that stakeholders 
construct in interactions have been identified (see Lewicki et al. 2003). 
When people realize that they interpret the issues differently than other people, 
because they have different backgrounds, histories, interests, perspectives, 
etc., then they are able to change their frame in order to get a broader picture 
to connect with the others. Reframing is a step towards a new way of framing; 
this means that people begin to realize that they have a different understand-
ing or meaning of their situation, interests, and actions, and that they should 
broaden their view in order to become connected to others (Aarts and van 
Woerkum 2006). Reframing has been also recognized as a possible way of link-
ing and turning different kinds of frame (Dewulf et al. 2005). Thus, a common 
problem initially framed differently by stakeholders can be reframed by making 
a connection between the frames of the stakeholders to make them compatible 
or integrative for all of them. Reframing appears in this context as a deliber-
ate method to arrive at an integrated solution to a problem. Reframing occurs 
through frame alignment in interaction. Frame alignment refers to the linkage 
of different frames of people or groups through interactive and communica-
tive processes such that their individual interests, values, and beliefs become 
congruent and complementary (Snow et al. 1986). Frame alignment is possible 
through frame bridging, frame amplification, frame extension, and frame trans-
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formation (see Snow et al. 1986). Frame bridging refers to the linkage of two 
or more ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames regarding 
a particular issue or problem; frame amplification means the clarification and 
invigoration of an interpretive frame that bears on a particular issue, problem, 
or set of events; through frame extension, individual frames are taken into ac-
count in defining and formulating the frame of the group for a particular is-
sue or problem; and frame transformation means the redefinition of activities, 
events, and biographies that are already meaningful from a standpoint of some 
primary framework, in terms of another framework, such that they are now 
seen by the people concerned as something quite else (Snow et al. 1986). 
In a process of negotiation or conflict management among stakeholders, the 
act of framing and reframing is decisive, and understanding the process from a 
framing perspective may give relevant insight into the nature and course of the 
process. To understand the local dynamics of participatory management of nat-
ural resources, analysing the framing of the stakeholders involved in different 
interaction settings is thus important. Frame analysis enables the sorting out 
of underlying logics, situating frames in contexts, and bringing to the surface 
politics, subjugated voices, ideologies, and contradictions (Creed et al. 2002). 
It investigates the way the negotiators understand and interpret the situation 
according to their background, norms, interests, and perspective (Putnam and 
Holmer 1992), as well as the consequences for further developments. 
The main research question of this thesis is then to understand: 
What frames do stakeholders construct and mobilize in participatory 
natural resources management, how do these frames change in inter-
action, and how do they affect the process and outcome of negotiation 
and conflict management?
The specific frames people construct in interaction integrate their past expe-
riences, future expectations and goals, and the present context in which the 
interaction is taking place (Aarts and van Woerkum 2006). Thus, the study of 
the frames that the stakeholders co-construct and mobilize in the participatory 
management of protected areas will enable us to uncover and understand their 
past experiences, expectations, and interests with regard to the process, the 
content and the relationships insofar as people consider these as relevant, and 
the evolution of the cooperation and conflict that emerge in each case. 
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1.4  Methodology: the interpretive approach
Organizations, institutions, norms, cooperation, conflict, and other social ac-
tions, and their analysis, are human activities that are not the mirror of nature 
(Rorty 1979) but an interpretation of it (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2006). Ac-
cording to Bernstein (1978:145) cited by Yanow (2006:13):
A human actor is constantly interpreting his (her) own acts and those 
of others. To understand human action we must not take the position 
of an outside observer who ‘sees’ only the physical manifestations of 
these acts; rather we must develop categories for understanding what 
the actor - from his (or her) own point of view - ‘means’ in his (or 
her) actions…. (I)n focusing on action, we can and must speak of its 
subjective meaning.
For social constructionism theorists, what is most important about human 
behaviour and interaction is the meaning or communicative intent of the par-
ticipants (Rizzo et al. 1992). They also believe that the assignment of meaning 
to action (i.e. the sign-meaning relationship) is not simple or direct, but con-
structed and negotiated interpersonally (Rizzo et al. 1992). Thus, to understand 
human social activities, we must investigate the meaning making of people in 
interaction. From the perspective of the people involved, the interpretive ap-
proach invites the use of methods for understanding human behaviours and 
activities from the perspective of the actors themselves (Yanow and Schwartz-
Shea 2006). The interpretive approach assumes that we live in a world that 
people can understand in different ways (Van Bommel 2008). 
The philosophical basis of the interpretive approach has its roots in phenom-
enology and hermeneutics, which take as their point of departure the fact that 
the generation of knowledge is shaped by the researcher and that the way to 
study human actors is through verstehen - understanding (Yanow 2006). The 
interpretive approach draws from phenomenology the fact that meaning mak-
ing takes place in the life world of the individual, characterized by multiple 
realities and multiple interpretations that may be constructed differently by 
different people. With hermeneutics, the interpretive approach shares the fact 
that meaning is not expressed directly. Rather, it is embedded in (or projected 
onto) artefacts by their creators, and it can be known through interpreting these 
artefacts. Thus, in the process of meaning making through the interpretive ap-
proach, both the researcher and the researched interpret the social reality, thus 
influencing the knowledge generated. Interpretive researchers focus then on 
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the meaning making of the members of the situation and on that of the re-
searcher. Interpretive researchers are required to act as translator-storytellers, 
that is, to engage in learning about the meaning of the events to the people be-
ing studied and translate these into a rich empirical and conceptual story (Van 
Bommel and Van der Zouwen 2010). In this research, the interpretive approach 
is used because we aim to use framing theory to understand the interactional 
processes in the management of the protected areas. 
The interpretive approach provides a variety of methods for data collection and 
interpretive data analysis, such as discourse analysis, narrative analysis, frame 
analysis, interaction analysis.... (see Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2006). Several 
such methods were selected and used to fit the specific research question at 
issue (for details see chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5 of this thesis).
1.5  Research strategy: the case-study approach
The choice of philosophical assumptions underlying a particular research 
should justify the choice of research methodologies (Johari 2009). The philo-
sophical basis of this research is interpretivism. Thus, the research strategy 
adopted in this thesis is derived from interpretivism. Klein and Myers (1999) 
identified seven principles for conducting interpretive research: the funda-
mental principle of hermeneutic circle; the principle of contextualization; the 
principle of interaction between researcher and subjects; the principle of ab-
straction and generalization; the principle of dialogical reasoning; the principle 
of multiple interpretations; and the principle of suspicion (Srivastava and Teo 
2005). The fundamental principle of hermeneutic circle states that human be-
ings understand a complex whole from the meanings of its parts and their 
interrelationships. As for the principle of contextualization, it implies that in 
interpretive research, the context of the research setting plays a very important 
role in attributing meaning to a particular action. Thus, the social and historical 
background is important to understand how the current situation has emerged. 
The principle of interaction between researcher and subjects reiterates the im-
portance of interaction between researchers and subjects during the interpre-
tive research and that research data produced are socially constructed. 
The research approach tradition that allow such contextual analysis of human 
(inter)action is a case-study approach, and particularly what Van Velsen (1967) 
calls ‘the extended-case method’ or ‘situational analysis’ (Leeuwis 2004). Ac-
cording to Yin (2002 and 1994), case studies should be undertaken in situa-
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tion when the researcher is interested in studying how processes unfold. ‘Case 
studies focus on understanding the dynamics present within single settings’ 
(Eisenhardt 1989: 534). They are indicated when it is necessary to explore in-
depth, the relations between individuals and institutions, to understand, de-
scribe, explain and interpret behaviours, attitudes (Mettrick 1994). A case study 
is a good approach as Yin (1994) states, to seek answers to ‘how’ and ‘why’ 
questions, the type of questions asked in this research.
Three cases were selected and studied in-depth after a preparatory study (Fig-
ure 1). A preparatory study phase to start a research project plays a crucial 
role as it enables to establish the importance of the context for the relevance 
of the project (Nederlof et al. 2004). It also leads to the transparent selection 
with respect to cases to be studied in-depth and the sites and the stakeholders 
to be involved. Two cases (the Agoua forest restoration case and the Ouémé 
Supérieur and N’Dali forests management case) of the three cases were cho-
sen because they were characterized by open conflict among the stakeholders. 
The third case (the management of the Pendjari national park) was chosen 
because no open conflict was noticeable in the management of this protected 
area, which is often cited as Benin’s relatively better managed protected area. 
1.6  Thesis outline
In this thesis, the interpretive approach is used to investigate three cases of 
participatory management of protected areas in Benin in which conflicts have 
emerged. The aim is to understand why and how conflicts emerge and evolve in 
negotiation among the stakeholders involved in the participatory management 
of protected areas in Benin. Thus, in each case studied, the evolution of the 
participatory management of the protected area was researched, paying atten-
tion to cooperation and conflict that emerged. How the participatory manage-
ment of the protected areas evolved and led to the emergence and escalation 
of conflicts was the focus. 
Chapter 2 presents the case of the participatory restoration of the Agoua forest. 
Discourse analysis methods were used to analyse the evolution of the frames 
of the stakeholders involved in the process. The aim was to understand how 
conflicts emerge, evolve, and either end in resolution or persist in intractable 
conflict, in order to enhance our capability to handle such conflicts in the sus-
tainable management of natural resources. This case study revealed that the 
conflict was constructed and evolved mainly in the stakeholders’ discourses. It 
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shows the relevance and agency of discourse in conflict and the importance of the 
framing perspective for understanding participatory management and conflict dy-
namics. The study resulted in new questions that form the basis for the following 
studies. In chapter 3, a framing perspective was used to investigate the evolution 
of social cohesion among the stakeholders involved in the community-based nat-
ural resources management (CBNRM) of the Ouémé Supérieur and N’Dali (OSN) 
forests, including the extent to which it has contributed to the explanation of the 
collapse of the process. This case study shows that the social cohesion between 
the stakeholders involved was built at the beginning of the process but then disap-
peared and was followed by distrust and conflict. The stakeholders involved grad-
ually transformed the formal institutions into informal institutions. The neglect 
of these informal rules in the course of the process in favour of the formal rules 
resulted in conflict and distrust. It is concluded that it is necessary to accept and 
use these informal rules and relationships - which determine the success of the 
process - rather than the formal institutions as declared at the start of the process. 
In chapter 4, the role of trust as social capital in the participatory management of 
natural resources was further investigated. The aim of the study was to investi-
gate the dynamics of trust in the relationships and interactions among the stake-
holders involved in the participatory management of the Pendjari National Park 
(PNP). This study shows that trust was built at the beginning of the process and 
enabled relationships and collaboration among the stakeholders involved in the 
conservation process, with a consequent increase in wildlife in the park. However, 
this trust disappeared and led to distrust among the stakeholders, which evolved 
and hindered the process. 
The analyses of the emergence and escalation of conflict as presented in chapters 
2, 3, and 4 all show the impact of social identity dynamics. Chapter 5 then presents 
a study on the role of social identity in the emergence and escalation of conflicts 
in the participatory management of the three protected areas, Agoua forest, OSN 
forests, and PNP. The study shows that conflict emerges when the differences in 
stakeholders’ identities become salient and escalates when the decisions and ac-
tions undertaken during the management of the conflict are framed by the stake-
holders as threatening their identities. 
Finally, in chapter 6 the main findings of the empirical studies are discussed with 
regard to the overall aim of the study. The chapter ends with the main conclusions 
and discusses important implications for policy implementation in the participa-
tory management of natural resources. 
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Figure 1.1: Study areas location
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Abstract
Agoua Forest in Benin was declared a protected area in 1953 and subsequently 
managed by means of a coercion system, which, however, did not prevent its 
deforestation. In 2002, a participatory management process was designed 
to restore this forest. Although the project managers and local communities 
agreed a plan at the start of the process, the plan was not implemented because 
conflict arose in the course of the process. In this paper, an interactional fram-
ing approach was used to analyse the emergence of this conflict, which ended 
in an impasse. Our study showed that the conflict was constructed and evolved 
mainly in stakeholders’ discourses even without changes in actual forest man-
agement and use. Moreover, it became clear that stakeholders constructed dif-
ferent frames in different conversation contexts: stakeholders, who share a set 
of perceptions, norms and expectations as constructed and expressed in their 
talks (we-groups) constructed stereotypes and stigmas, blaming the other party 
and presenting themselves as innocent victims. In conversations involving all 
stakeholders, people did not reveal their real thoughts, either about each other 
or about the proposals for conflict resolution. This study shows the relevance 
and agency of discourse in conflict, and the importance of the interactional 
framing approach in understanding participatory management and conflict dy-
namics. It reveals how, by means of discourses, farmers in Agoua forest suc-
ceeded in handling the conflict with the effect that little has been done in the 
project’s decision to implement the plan. 
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2.1 Introduction
The establishment and preservation of nature reserves and protected areas are 
constrained by a significant challenge, i.e., the distribution of costs and benefits 
related to such an enterprise (Krueger 2009). Although the wider community 
may benefit from these protected areas because they are considered as global 
or national goods, the costs are borne by individuals or groups who live in or 
around them. In many cases, conservation actions have led to the physical 
and economic displacement of millions of people who formerly lived, hunted, 
fished, and farmed in areas now protected for wildlife, watersheds, reefs, for-
ests, or rare ecosystems (Brockington and Igoe 2006; Agrawal and Redford 
2009). The implementation of such decisions often raises resistance and con-
flicts between local communities and the organizations in charge of it (Connor 
2005). 
In 2002, the Benin government initiated the restoration of three forest massifs 
(Agoua, Wari-Maro and Monts Kouffè) because of their importance in Benin’s 
ecosystem and their high level of degradation due to severe anthropogenic in-
fluences such as poaching, logging, grazing and agricultural activities. In the 
case of Agoua’s restoration, a conflict arose between the local communities 
settled in the forests and the Management Project for the Wari-Waro, Monts 
Kouffè and Agoua Forest Massifs (PAMF: Projet d’Aménagement des Massifs For-
estiers d’Agoua, des Monts Kouffè et de Wari-Waro) charged with the restoration 
of these forests. Negotiations between the stakeholders involved ended in an 
impasse, although formal agreements were signed, and tension still remained 
after the ending of the project in June 2008.
Since the creation of Benin’s protected areas in the colonial period between 
1940 and 1960, and subsequently until the beginning of the 1990s, the State 
managed the forests using force and repression. Communities living adjacent 
to these forests were kept at a distance as they were considered to be a threat 
to these natural resources. However, this management system did little to stop 
or slow down the degradation of these forests. It rather encouraged corrup-
tion and illegal logging, creating conflicts between the forest rangers and the 
local communities whose livelihoods depended, at least partly, on the forests 
(Siebert and Elwert 2004). The objective of the sustainable management of 
natural resources was not reached as there were too few rangers to control 
its implementation. After the Rio de Janeiro Summit of 1992, forestry reforms 
were undertaken in Benin. A new forest law was established in 1993. The main 
reform was the commitment of Benin to participatory management of its natu-
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ral resources. Since then, many projects have been initiated to stimulate lo-
cal communities’ participation in the sustainable management of forests and 
parks. However, despite many efforts, the results of these interventions are 
still questionable (El-Hadj Issa 2001; Tchiwanou 2001; Zoundoh 2001). Sev-
eral studies have revealed that the forestry reforms of the early 1990s have 
not been successful due to the failure of participatory management (MDR and 
PGFTR 1999; Siebert and Elwert 2004). In many cases, conflicts have arisen 
between the stakeholders involved in these projects. These conflicts resulted 
from opposition between forest department representatives and villagers due 
to corruption in collecting and sharing forest management revenues and illegal 
logging (Siebert and Elwert 2004), and among the forest department, farmers 
and herders because of the restriction on access to forest lands for farming and 
grazing (Arouna 2006). 
Elsewhere too, studies have revealed conflicts related to natural resource man-
agement (Hares 2009; Hellström 2001; Yasmi 2003). Conflicts arise because 
the stakeholders involved have competing interests, perceptions and ideas 
about how natural resources should be managed (Buckles 1999; Castro and 
Nielson 2003; Yasmi et al. 2006). With the realisation that the traditional top-
down forest management was not efficient in terms of conservation and had 
more often than not led to conflicts, efforts have been made to involve local 
people in forest management during the last two decades (Kassa et al. 2009). 
However, in Benin, conflicts re-emerged between forest administrations and 
local communities despite many efforts to involve local communities in for-
est management (Arouna 2006). In this paper, we aim to improve our under-
standing of how conflicts emerge, evolve and either end in resolution or persist 
in intractable conflict in the context of participatory management in order to 
enhance our capability to handle such conflicts and thereby contribute to the 
sustainable management of natural resources. 
To this end, we analysed the conflict that arose in relation to the participa-
tory restoration of Agoua forest by PAMF. Because we wanted to study the 
manifestation of this conflict over time, we used a framing perspective (Aarts 
et al Forthcoming). According to Kretsedemas (2000: 639), ‘frame analysis 
has been used to examine the ways in which movement groups articulate their 
goals, recruit participants, and respond to the counterframes of their oppo-
nents’. Frame analysis is therefore useful in conflict situations to investigate 
how frames emerge and their applications after they have been developed 
(Kretsedemas 2000).
39
The Discursive Construction of Conflict in Participation
2.2  Method
2.2.1 Research approach 
Frame and framing concepts are particularly relevant for researchers study-
ing conflict, negotiation and inter-group interactions (Dewulf et al. 2009; Gray 
2003). The notion of frame is rooted in cognitive psychology (Bartlett 1932) and 
anthropology (Bateson 1954). It is often associated with Erwing Goffman be-
cause of the book he published in 1974 Frame analysis: An essay on the organiza-
tion of experience. In this book, he described how to use the concept of frame to 
understand human thought and interactions. Since then, the concept of frame 
has evolved. Current research on framing distinguishes two main approaches: 
the cognitive approach and the interactional approach (Dewulf et al. 2009).
The cognitive approach in framing research was explicitly formulated by Minsky 
(1975) in the field of artificial intelligence. This research tradition has its roots 
in Bartlett’s (1932) schema theory of memory. The cognitive approach focuses 
on cognitive frames or mental structures that help us to organise and inter-
pret incoming perceptual information by fitting it into pre-existing categories 
about reality (Dewulf et al. 2009; Minsky 1975). In research using the cognitive 
framing approach, frames are considered as stocks of knowledge used by in-
dividuals to assess new information. The definitions of frame by Goffman and 
Gitlin fit in this framing approach. Goffman (1974) defined frames as schemas 
of interpretation that enable individuals to locate, perceive, identify and label 
phenomena. In the same way, Gitlin (1980: 6) said that ‘frames are principles 
of selection, emphasis and presentation composed of little tacit theories about 
what exists, what happens, and what matters’. They are knowledge schemas or 
structures of expectations about people, objects, events and settings (Dewulf 
et al. 2009; Tannen and Wallat 1987). 
The interactional approach to framing research is linked to the early work of 
Bateson (1954) on meta-communication in which framing is defined as ex-
changing cues that indicate how ongoing interaction should be understood 
(Dewulf et al. 2009). In this approach, the definition of framing corresponds to 
what Entman (1993: 52) said: ‘to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived 
reality and to make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way 
as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral 
evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation’. Frames are alignments or co-
constructions produced and negotiated in interactions (Dewulf et al. 2009). 
Interactional frames are thus communication devices used by participants in 
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interaction to negotiate meanings and alignments. The interactional approach 
to framing thus enables us to understand how participants in a conflict co-
construct meanings and negotiate alignments while interacting. 
Both framing research traditions are useful to gain insight into conflict dynam-
ics, but each gives a different kind of understanding of how and why frames 
change. The cognitive approach notes that stakeholders hold multiple frames 
as knowledge schemas and shift from one to other when they get new informa-
tion (Minsky 1975). The interactional approach links frame shifting by stake-
holders to what is going on during interaction (Dewulf et al. 2009). In this re-
search, we opted for the interactional approach to get more insight on how and 
why stakeholders’ frames evolve in conflict situations. In the interactional ap-
proach, frames are considered as agency used to act on the world (Benford and 
Snow 2000; Marullo et al. 1996; Pellow 1999). People use frames to perform 
actions. For example, in social movements such as peace, civil rights, environ-
ment, women’s movements etc. where groups of people engage in collective 
action, frames are used to activate and motivate the greatest number of po-
tential adherents (Marullo et al. 1996). Social movement actors are signifying 
agents who actively engage in producing and maintaining frames for constitu-
ents, antagonists, and bystanders and observers (Benford and Snow 2000). In 
efforts to change policy, policy makers use frames to gain broader support by 
linking the preferred issue framing of a group to the core values of an external 
group (Marichal 2009). According to Gray (2003: 15), ‘frames are used to (1) 
define issues, (2) shape what action should be taken and by whom, (3) protect 
oneself, (4) justify the stand we are taking on an issue, and (5) mobilize people 
to take or refrain from action on issues’. Thus, frames are constructed in inter-
action and used strategically to persuade others to our point of view, gain ad-
vantage in negotiations and rally like-minded people to our causes (Shmueli et 
al. 2006). Thus, in the interactional framing approach, people co-construct so-
cial realities in conversations (Dewulf et al. 2009; Ford et al. 2002; Pearce and 
Cronen 1980). Since constructed realities provide the context in which people 
act and interact, the nature of these realities establishes the opportunities for 
action, how people see the world, what actions to take, etc. (Ford et al. 2002). 
Frames are then iterative; this means they are constructed in a particular reality 
and influence this reality as well (Aarts et al. Forthcoming; Aarts and van Woer-
kum 2006; Ford 1999). In this framing perspective, a conflict is neither a state 
of the world nor a state of mind, but a reality that resides in the social interac-
tion among disputants (Dewulf et al. 2009; Ford et al. 2002). So, conflicts arise 
only because of how people co-construct issues, relationships and interactions 
(Dewulf et al. 2009). 
41
The Discursive Construction of Conflict in Participation
To understand the dynamic of the conflict between the PAMF staff members 
and the farmers in relation to Agoua’s restoration, we investigated how these 
stakeholders framed the problem, both their own and the other stakeholders’ 
role in the process and the participatory process that was designed to manage 
the forest. We analysed the frames that stakeholders brought to the fore in dif-
ferent conversation contexts over time (see Aarts et al. Forthcoming; Dewulf et 
al. 2009; Gray 2003).
Issue or problem frames deal with what the conflict is about. Disputants often 
start talking about the conflict by giving a brief summary of what they believe 
the conflict is about. Gray (2003) called this ‘whole story frames’. These frames 
shed light on which aspects of the conflict are important to each party. Issue 
frames also include cause and solution frames as the disputants, by describ-
ing the issue, tend to highlight their meanings of the causes and their desired 
solutions. 
Relationship frames include identity, characterisation and power frames. Iden-
tity frames refer to how stakeholders involved in a conflict present themselves. 
Parties in conflict view themselves as having a particular identity in a specific 
conflict situation (Kaufman et al. 2003). Identity frames are the different an-
swers to the question: Who am I? (Gray 2003; Hoare 1994). Answers to that 
question may vary from one stakeholder to another depending on their demo-
graphic characteristics (e.g., race, gender and ethnicity), location (e.g., their 
work place, where they are living and their origin), their role (e.g., as a farmer or 
a facilitator), the institution with which they work (e.g., a project staff member 
or a government officer) or their interests (e.g., whether or not they agree with 
the legislation) (Gray 2003). Characterisation frames are the mirror of identity 
frames as they concern how a group of actors present the others involved in 
a conflict. They are the answer to the question: Who are they? (Gray 2003). In 
conflicts, parties tend to stereotype and portray opponents negatively or posi-
tively. They construct characterisation frames that are often different from the 
identity frames of the other parties. In this case, such characterisations often 
undermine the others’ legitimacy, cast doubt on their motivations or exploit 
their sensitivity (Kaufman et al. 2003). Characterisation frames are also used 
by parties in conflict to strengthen their own identity and justify their actions 
towards the others. Parties in conflict describe their relation with each other 
using power frames. Power frames are related to power resources as they are 
the way actors involved in a conflict evaluate their own resources and those of 
the others to influence each other (Marfo 2006). Disputants use power frames 
to characterise not only the forms of power that are legitimised in the conflict 
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but also the forms of power that are preferred to comfort their own position 
(Kaufman et al. 2003). 
Process management frames refer to the way parties judge the implementation 
of the process and their preferred management process (Gray 2003; Kaufman 
et al. 2003). When the process concerns a conflict, we talk about conflict man-
agement frames. Depending on parties’ identity frames, their characterisation 
frames and their interests, they may hope for or prefer a particular type of man-
agement process. Conflict management frames in environment conflict studies 
may vary from avoidance or passivity to struggle, sabotage or violence (Gray 
2003).
Identity frames, characterization frames, and power frames are important for 
understanding conflict, as conflict almost inevitably arises when people feel 
their identities been threatened (Aarts et al. Forthcoming; Blok 2001). These 
frames also influence people’s feelings of whether or not there is a problem and 
the way they define the issue at stake (Gray 2003). People are always negotiat-
ing identities and the problem at stake in the presence of others in interaction. 
Thus, the above frames have been investigated and analysed in different inter-
action contexts, varying both over time and in the composition of the stake-
holders involved in the conversations. 
 
2.2.2 Research methodology
The interpretive approach was used to investigate how the conflict in Agoua’s 
restoration emerged, evolved and was managed (see Bommel 2008 and Yanow 
2000). This approach suggests that we live in a world that is variously under-
stood. It is based on the assumption that there are multiple possible interpre-
tations of a social situation (Yanow 2000). We observed what the stakeholders 
involved in the conflict were saying and doing and the contexts in which these 
talks and actions took place (Silverman 2001).
Data were collected from February 2007 to October 2008, a timeframe that co-
incided with the negotiation period between the PAMF and the local communi-
ties. They were gathered through semi-structured interviews and informal con-
versations with the stakeholders, participatory observation of meetings held in 
the framework of the management of the project and the conflict, and analysis 
of documents concerning the project and the conflict. The semi-structured in-
terviews with the stakeholders were scheduled and carried out on the basis of 
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a topic list, whereas informal conversations were held in informal discussions 
with the stakeholders in the research area. In total, nineteen farmers with farms 
in the forest, six members of restoration committees, seven staff members of 
the PAMF, six staff members of the municipality, and the director of the centre 
for agriculture promotion of Bantè municipality (CeCPA: Centre Communal de 
Promotion Agricole) were interviewed. The individual interviews were supple-
mented by six focus group discussions with the farmers. These focus group 
discussions were held with all kinds of farmers who responded to our invitation 
to talk about the conflict. Two negotiation meetings held during the conflict 
management process between the stakeholders involved in the conflict were 
attended and data were recorded. 
The interviews and conversations were tape-recorded, transcribed and coded. 
We analysed the transcribed texts and documents using notions and techniques 
from discourse analysis methods. Discourse analysis focuses attention on the 
way language is used, what it is used for and the social context in which it is 
used, including its effects (Punch 2005). Another reason for this choice was 
that discourse analysis studies use not only transcripts of talks like conversation 
analysis, but also other sources based on transcripts of open-ended interviews, 
or on documents of some kind (Silverman 2001; Wooffitt 2005). Through dis-
course analysis, we investigated how conflict emerged, evolved and was man-
aged during the participatory restoration of Agoua forest. 
2.2.3 Research setting
This research focuses on the Agoua forest conflict in Benin. The Agoua forest 
is a State forest, which was declared a protected area by Decree No. 8 104 SE of 
4 November 1953. At that time, the forest covered 75,300 ha (Akpado 1996). In 
2002, it was reduced to 68,848.43 ha (PAMF 2006). The forest is located in the 
centre-west of Benin and entirely in Bantè Municipality (see Figure 1).
Before its classification as State owned, Agoua forest was managed by local 
communities whose traditional authorities had taken care of the conservation 
of this ecosystem for many centuries (PAMF 2006). This traditional institution 
was steered by the king and his court, who are still present today. 
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Figure 2.1: Agoua forest and its different zones 
Source: PAMF 2006
After the conversion of Agoua forest into public domain, its management was 
confided to the forest administration, which adopted a coercion and repression 
approach but had only a few forest rangers to enforce implementation. Local 
communities, who were consequently removed from the management and use 
of the forest, adopted a rebel attitude towards the natural resources on which 
their livelihood depended. During the 1960s and 1970s, Agoua forest was il-
legally occupied by these local communities in search of land for agriculture. 
According to the 2002 census, the local populations consisted of about 58,594 
persons or 8,194 households living in and around the forest of Agoua (RGPH 
2003). Most of them depended on the forest for their livelihood. Agriculture, 
the main source of livelihood, was practiced by about 80 per cent of the villag-
ers, followed by hunting and fishing (PAMF 2006). The introduction of cashew 
plantations increased demand for land in the region and pushed the farmers to 
settle in the forest. PAMF estimated that 5,889 ha of the forest were occupied 
by local communities’ farms, plantations and fallows, and 50 ha occupied by 
houses scattered in the forest. Most of the farmers settled in the forest had 
migrated from other regions of Benin and abroad in search of land and were 
installed in the forest by the local traditional authorities who managed the land 
tenure system. To the present day, in each village, there is a spiritual chief who 
is the keeper of all the lands inherited from the ancestors. These lands are di-
vided and each part belongs to a collectivity that shares it among its members. 
Until the end of the 1980s land was lent to the newcomers without any compen-
sation. Since the beginning of the 1990s the local traditional authorities have 
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been receiving money or drinks before giving land to any migrant because of 
the growing scarcity (PAMF 2006). 
According to PAMF (2006), the main causes of Agoua’s degradation were ille-
gal and excessive logging and poaching, weak control system in the forest, the 
slash and burn technique in agriculture resulting in excessive and inefficient 
use of land in the forest, late bush fires provoking wildfire and herders’ actions 
with their cattle. Illegal logging was organized by small-scale entrepreneurs and 
loggers on the local and regional levels. They used other loggers and unskilled 
labour recruited in the villages closer to the forests and they were often in com-
plicity with local authorities and/or local forest administration representatives 
(Siebert and Elwert 2004). The PAMF project was initiated in 2002 to start the 
restoration of Agoua forest. PAMF was a five-year project implemented by the 
Ministry of Environment and Nature Conservation to restore and design the 
management plan of Agoua, Wari-Maro, and Monts Kouffè forest massifs. 
2.3 Case Study
2.3.1 The participatory management plan for Agoua forest
In Benin, participatory forest management is carried out through the establish-
ment and implementation of the participatory management plan (PMP: Plan 
d’Aménagement Participatif) for the forests. The PMP for a forest is a docu-
ment that aims to incorporate the knowledge and needs of the local com-
munities and forest administration in a sustainable forest management plan 
(PAMF 2006). It is elaborated by the stakeholders, such as the project team, 
local communities, NGOs, socio-political authorities, forest experts, etc. The 
PMP describes the resources available in the forest and how they should be 
managed in a sustainable way for a period of time (ten years in the case of 
Agoua forest). PAMF began the establishment of the Agoua forest PMP with 
awareness raising campaigns among local communities on the importance of 
natural resource conservation, and the objectives and activities to be carried 
out by the project. At the same time, the zoning of the forest was undertaken 
by PAMF staff members and discussed with farmers’ representatives. For the 
zoning process, aerial photos were taken to sort out the different levels of oc-
cupation and degradation of the forest. In fact, during the repressive manage-
ment regime (in force from the time the forest was put under state protection 
in 1953 until participatory management was introduced in 1993), despite Agoua 
forest being supervised by forests rangers, farmers settled there, and thirteen 
47
Chapter 2
villages and hamlets had been created in the forest (PAMF 2006). Agoua forest 
was eventually divided into four zones: service zones, protection zones, agro-
forestry zones and production zones.
Service zones consisted of roads that enabled travellers to reach villages lo-
cated inside the forest. Protection zones represented ecosystems that bordered 
the three main rivers in the forest: Zou, Ogou and Otio. They were integrally 
conserved and protected from any human intrusion. Agro-forestry zones con-
cerned parts of the forest mainly occupied by farms, fallows, private planta-
tions of more than 1 ha in size and the villages. According to PAMF (2006), the 
lands reserved for agro-forestry were three times larger than the lands initially 
occupied by the farmers in the forest, covering an area of 21,831.09 ha to take 
account of growth in the local populations and the required expansion of farms 
in the future. The agro-forestry zones were dedicated to the cultivation of food 
crops. However, cashew plantations of more than 1 ha were to be preserved. 
Also, farmers installed on these lands should pay an annual fee for occupying 
the State’s land. For land in the agro-forestry zone occupied before the zoning, 
the annual fee was to be 10,000 FCFA 1 per ha per year, and for new land oc-
cupation, 20,000 FCFA per ha per year. Cashew plantation owners were to pay 
20,000 FCFA per ha every year to continue harvesting their plantations. The re-
mainder of the forest was designated as a production zone, comprised of those 
parts of the forest intended for reforestation and for exploitation by forest users 
under contracts with the forest management team during the implementation 
phase of the PMP. 
Because forest protection and production zones had been subject to signifi-
cant human influences (logging, hunting, grazing, agriculture…) their level of 
degradation was high and they needed to be restored. Their reforestation with 
fast growing forest trees was entrusted to local communities. Contracts were 
signed with local communities’ committees for forest restoration that pro-
duced and planted trees in the degraded parts of the forest. They were to take 
care of these trees for four years after planting them before leaving them to 
grow naturally. The local hunters were transformed into forest guards to assist 
forest rangers in preventing illegal logging, hunting, grazing and fishing in the 
forest. The project also built infrastructures in the villages adjacent to the forest 
such as roads, wells, pumps and warehouses to help farmers store their agri-
cultural produce. Income-generating activities (grasscutter [greater cane rat: 
Thryonomys swinderianus] and rabbit breeding, beekeeping for honey and butter 
1 € 1 = 655.957 FCFA.
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production by women) were initiated and financed by the project to reduce lo-
cal communities’ poverty level and thus their dependence and pressure on the 
forest. These project activities mobilised a significant number of people from 
the local villages and provided them with substantial income. When referring to 
this period, local communities used the following kind of utterances:
When the PAMF came we were happy as we heard that it would fight 
bush fires and then our cashew plantations would not burn. We also 
believed that it would bring jobs to our region. 
Source: Focus group discussion with Bantè’s farmers, March 2007
And:
At the start, we were happy with the PAMF as it built infrastructures 
in our villages and enabled many villagers to earn money by working 
with the restoration and hunting committees. We thanked the govern-
ment for choosing our region for the implementation of this project. 
Source: Focus group discussion with Bantè’s farmers, March 2007
 
In these interview excerpts, local communities presented the project and its 
activities positively during the elaboration of the PMP. The mayor of the mu-
nicipality described local communities’ initial feeling about the project’s activi-
ties as follows: 
Local communities accepted this project with enthusiasm, because of 
its vision and policy of forest conservation and restoration, while si-
multaneously improving livelihoods and reducing the level of poverty. 
Source: Bantè’s Mayor, November 2007
These utterances indicate that, at the start of the project, local communities 
agreed with its objectives and activities. In their discourse, they praised the 
presence of the project in their region. They used positive frames to charac-
terise the project and its activities. No conflict or clash was perceptible in the 
discourse of the local communities until after the planning stage of the PMP, 
prior to its proposed implementation in 2006.
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2.3.2 Explosion of a conflict 
In 2006, PAMF announced the beginning of the implementation of the PMP 
and this implied the execution of the Zoning Plan. The project management 
staff then decided to repossess forest lands occupied by farmers in the protec-
tion and production zones. Instead of throwing all the farmers out of the forest, 
PAMF asked them to move into the agro-forestry zones dedicated to farming. 
PAMF planned to destroy all the farms and plantations in the production and 
protection zones in order to replace them with forest trees. This was contested 
by the farmers. Farmers agreed to abandon their food-crop farms but not their 
cashew tree plantations because they considered the latter part and parcel of 
the forest. Farmers installed in agro-forestry zones refused to pay the stipulated 
fees for land occupation. According to the farmers, PAMF wanted to chase 
them from their lands, and they were struggling to resist PAMF’s attempt to 
extort their farms from them. The following interview excerpts highlight their 
thoughts:
We were living here in peace and working on our farms when PAMF 
came and created the conflict. If somebody has his possessions and 
another wants to extort him, it means creating a conflict 
Source: Farmer informant, November 2007
Another farmer added:
We don’t agree with the way PAMF manages our forests because they 
want us to leave our farms.
Source: Farmer informant, November 2007
In these testimonies, farmers presented the PAMF people as the troublemak-
ers. Taking a closer look allows us to find identity and characterisation frames 
that contributed to the start of the problem. The phrase We were living here in 
peace and working on our farms… suggests that the farmers considered them-
selves as quiet, hardworking and peaceful beings, whereas the PAMF staff 
members were characterised as distorting their peaceful lives (…when PAMF 
came and created the conflict, and …because they want us to leave our farms.). 
With the phrase If somebody has his possessions and another wants to extort him, 
it means creating a conflict, the problem is brought to a higher, generalised level, 
aimed at getting support from the researcher as well.
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The conflict broke out when PAMF destroyed a cashew plantation to replace it 
with a plantation of forest trees. Farmers started blaming PAMF, saying that it 
had changed the initial objectives and agreements:
When PAMF started, its staff members organised meetings in our vil-
lages. At these meetings, they said the project will be implemented in 
our region. We asked them what they really wanted to do and they 
replied that they were coming to restore the protected forests of our 
region. We then asked them whether or not we would be chased away 
later. They told us that they would not chase us away; rather that they 
were coming to work together with us. That was what we agreed upon 
together.
Source: Farmer informant, August 2008
Another farmer said:
When the project came first, they did not tell us what they are doing 
now, namely, chasing people away from the forest. They said that they 
would give farmers some tree seedlings to replace the trees farmers 
had destroyed on their farms. We would grow our crops while simul-
taneously planting forestry trees. When these forestry trees were big 
enough, we would leave these sites. Suddenly, they asked some people 
to destroy our plantations and crops 
Source: Farmer informant, August 2008
PAMF was pictured by the farmers as untrustworthy as the utterances show 
(They told us that they will not chase us away; rather they came to work togeth-
er with us, and When the project came first, they did not tell us what they are 
doing now, namely, chasing people away from the forest). The farmers justified 
the fact that they had not protested when the zoning was being established and 
that they were now refusing to leave their farm by characterising the PAMF as 
liars (They said that they would give farmers some tree seedlings to replace the 
trees farmers had destroyed on their farms.…Suddenly, they asked some people 
to destroy our plantations and crops). 
Also, the government officers were blamed for not having informed the farmers 
about the status of the forest in the past and instead allowed them to settle in 
the forest and helped them to establish themselves there, whereas the same 
officers were now allowing PAMF to chase them away, as becomes clear in the 
next two utterances:
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When we came back from Ghana in 1970s, we heard that some farm-
ers had been chased from one side of the forest. Then we settled on 
the other side. We were not informed that this side was also part of 
the forest until PAMF came. When we were settling, nobody bothered 
us and now after working for so many years we are warned to leave. 
Source: Farmer informant, August 2008
And: 
In the past when the Ministry of Agriculture used to take care of the 
forests, the extension workers helped us to plant cashew trees in our 
farms in the forest. We established villages in the forest and the gov-
ernment built schools, dug wells and even opened health centres in 
these villages.
Source: Farmer informant, August 2008
Through these utterances, farmers presented themselves as the ultimate vic-
tims. Apparently, the mayor acknowledged the responsibility of the State for the 
actual situation:
You may be better informed than me about the status of this forest as 
a protected forest, the fact that it belongs to the State and cannot be 
occupied by anyone. However, in the past the State made the mistake 
of abandoning the forest for more than forty years, and this facilitated 
and favoured the settlement of the local communities in this area.
Source: Bantè’s Mayor, August 2008
The CeCPA director in Bantè Municipality also argued: 
In one way or another, the State is the one responsible. In the 1950s, 
this forest was declared a protected area. Since then, people have been 
allowed to settle in it. The State built some infrastructures, such as 
schools, health centres, wells etc., in the villages created in the for-
est. Some of these villages are nowadays officially recognised villages. 
Then suddenly, one day farmers are told to leave as they are in a 
public domain. It would have been better if the State had taken its 
responsibility from the start by fencing the forest. Then, this situation 
would never have occurred.
Source: Bantè’s CeCPA Director, August 2008
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However, contrary to these vocalised stakeholder perspectives, PAMF rejected 
the analysis of both the farmers and the municipality. This is highlighted in the 
following testimony of the PAMF office head in Bantè Municipality: 
For them [the farmers] the project will just establish the Zoning Plan 
and stop by the end of the last year (2006) as it is a five-year project. 
So then, they will go back to their initial places in the forest. It was 
clear in their mind that ‘we will help them make it and the project will 
finish before they implement it. They will leave and we will go back 
again to our places.’ The forest will become what it was before the 
project. When they realised at the end of 2006 that the project started 
again with the implementation of the PMP, they said ‘we will never 
leave’. 
Source: Bantè’s PAMF office head, September 2008
In this utterance, PAMF explained the situation by the fact that, when the zon-
ing was agreed upon, farmers did not protest because they thought that the 
actual implementation of the Zoning Plan would never take place. As demon-
strated by the staff members’ utterances below, PAMF characterised the farm-
ers’ protests as selfish, since those who were complaining were the ones who 
had to move, and thus had a direct stake:
After the zoning of the forest, everybody agreed it was not acceptable 
for farmers to be scattered everywhere in the forest. So, they had to be 
concentrated in the agro-forestry zones. However, at that time we did 
not know who had to leave the forest and who could stay. When the 
details of the Zoning Plan were demonstrated in the field, those who 
found their lands in production and protection zones of the forest, and 
who had to be displaced, started to complain that they didn’t agree 
with the zoning, nor would they leave.
Source: PAMF staff member in Bantè, September 2008 
They added:
The farmers to be relocated are those who settled deep in the forest 
and are still extending their farms. We told them that they had to 
leave. They said that they agreed with us but that they had to be com-
pensated before they left. That’s the whole problem. The farmers are 
just asking to be compensated for the plantations they have to leave.
Source: PAMF staff member in Bantè, September 2008
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In both testimonies, PAMF suggested that farmers in general agreed with the 
zoning, but only the few who had to be relocated insisted on the preservation 
of their cashew plantations or compensation. 
The utterances so far have been parts of conversations of stakeholders, who 
share a set of perceptions, norms and expectations as constructed and ex-
pressed in their talks (we-groups) with the researcher (Gumperz 1965). What is 
striking is that in such we-contexts both farmers and PAMF managers rejected 
any responsibility for the situation and overtly blamed and accused the other 
side. By doing so, they presented themselves as victims and the other party as 
causer of the conflict. Farmers blamed PAMF for not telling them the truth at 
the start of the project, and the government for encouraging their settlement in 
the forest for many years before asking them to leave. From PAMF’s perspec-
tive, the farmers ignored the Zoning Plan as they thought that it would not be 
implemented before the ending of the project. 
These interview excerpts also show a shift in farmers’ characterisations of 
PAMF from positive to negative, and the emergence of conflict frames in their 
discourse from the moment the implementation of the Zoning Plan was an-
nounced. Accusations that PAMF was untrustworthy and a liar, emerged when 
PAMF started to talk about its decision to really implement the Zoning Plan. 
PAMF rejected these accusations and constructed the problem as a fight start-
ed by those farmers who were concerned with their personal interests. Victim 
identity frames, and blaming and accusing characterisation frames emerged 
in the stakeholders’ discourse, reinforcing the tension between the different 
stakeholder groups. Each party was tacitly attributing the causes of the situ-
ation to the others. Here, we recognise the situation as described by Ford et 
al. (2002), who argued that change and resistance to change are a function 
of the ongoing background conversations constructed in we-group conversa-
tions and consequently form the context for both the change initiative and the 
responses to it. 
2.3.3 Evolution of the conflict
 
The destruction of a cashew plantation incited farmers to action. They wrote a 
letter to Benin’s president on 12 October 2006 with copies to the Ministry of 
Environment and Nature Conservation and the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal 
Breeding and Fisheries. In this letter, they called upon the president for help to 
preserve their plantations and farms in the forest. To persuade the president, 
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they used an argument that they thought the president would find relevant: 
PAMF was hindering their efforts to increase crop production in their region by 
destroying their farms. In informal conversations however, they also claimed 
their right to protection from the State as citizens represented by the president, 
arguing:
We agree that the land is owned by the State, but we as human beings 
also belong to the State.
Source: Farmer informant, August 2008
Implicitly they accused the State of not taking care of them by refusing to take 
their side. Both of the ministries contacted sent a separate team to investigate 
the situation. They brought back different pictures about the situation. Then the 
president asked for an inter-ministerial commission to assess the situation and 
to come up with propositions to solve the problem.
The inter-ministerial commission was the first to call a meeting to hear the 
different stakeholders’ opinions on the situation. The meeting was held in the 
conference room of Bantè Municipality on 3 March 2007. The representatives 
of the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Breeding and Fisheries and the Ministry 
of Environment and Nature Conservation - forming the inter-ministerial com-
mission wished by the president - all the farmers’ representatives of all the local 
villages, the PAMF staff members, the mayor of the municipality, and the direc-
tor of CeCPA were present at the meeting. 
At this meeting, the PAMF staff members reminded the participants how the 
zoning had been determined. According to PAMF, five meetings had been or-
ganised with local communities’ representatives - the village councils for sus-
tainable development (CVDD: Conseil Villageois de Développement Durable) of 
all the local villages - to talk about the Zoning Plan. On each CVDD, farmers 
had at least one representative. As far as PAMF was concerned, the CVDDs 
were in charge of informing the farmers of the outcomes of the meetings. The 
different zones, their surface areas and their functions were shown to the farm-
ers. PAMF reassured the farmers that nobody would be chased out of the for-
est, but rather that those who had their farms in the production and protection 
zones would be relocated to the agro-forestry zones.
The farmers publicly expressed their opposition to leaving the forest. They ar-
gued that they were not involved in the elaboration of the Zoning Plan; in partic-
ular, they contested the five meetings held to discuss the zoning. According to 
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them, some meetings had been organised in the framework of the participatory 
management of the forest but not especially to discuss the zoning of the for-
est. They did not even remember PAMF showing them the agro-forestry zones 
before they were unveiled at the meeting: 
When they tell farmers to move to the agro-forestry zones, which are 
occupied by other farmers, where will the newcomers be settled? Are 
they going to dispute land with their brothers or is it the government 
who is going to redistribute these lands to the farmers? We don’t even 
know where these places [agro-forestry zones] are.
Source: Bantè’s farmers at the meeting, March 2007
Later, in an interview with him, the director of the CeCPA supported this argu-
ment by the farmers and recognised that:
The fundamental problem that exists is where the farmers will settle if 
they leave their plantations in the forest. The farmers estimated that 
about 10,300 households settled in the forest had to leave. Where will 
they settle? Bantè Municipality is bordered by Monts Kouffè forest in 
the north, in the north-east by another forest, Wari-Maro forest, and 
in the south by Agbado river. Agoua forest occupies the whole western 
part of the municipality.
Source: Bantè’s CeCPA director, August 2008
For the farmers and the director of the CeCPA, the lands PAMF presented as 
representing the agro-forestry zones were occupied by other farmers who were 
forbidding their peers to settle there, arguing that these lands were their fal-
lows. According to them, there was no land left for them in that area. Even if 
they got lands in these zones they would not be allowed to recreate their de-
stroyed cashew plantations, which represented their main source of livelihood. 
Some farmers stated that they had been chased away from other countries and 
would not accept being chased anyway from the lands of their ancestors. They 
warned whoever intended to destroy their farms to be ready for a fight. Either 
the farmers would kill him or they would be killed. At the end of the meeting, 
the farmers refused to sign the report of the meeting.
The behaviours of PAMF and the farmers’ representatives in this we-versus-
they interaction setting show that each party was fighting to gain credibility in 
the eyes of the inter-ministerial commission. PAMF tried to convince the par-
ticipants at the meeting that it had done its job properly. According to PAMF, 
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the situation was due to farmers’ representatives who did not pass on to their 
constituency the zoning information communicated at the meetings. PAMF 
also tried to calm the situation via utterances like: 
We will not chase you out of the forest, but relocate you. Only those 
who have their farms and plantations deeper in the forest will be 
moved into the agro-forestry zone.
Source: PAMF staff members at the meeting, March 2007
At the same time, the farmers’ representatives denied all the actions that the 
PAMF claimed to have undertaken to inform them about the zoning process. 
They even characterised PAMF staff members as killers, like in this piece: 
For us, the PAMF wants to kill us alive. They want to kill farmers alive, 
which means killing us before our age to die, as some of the farmers 
are old and unable to create new plantations, which are their only one 
source of livelihood now and during their retirement period. Since God 
created Bantè our municipality, no factory has been built here. We 
only grow crops and the land is our wealth.
Source: Farmer informants, March 2007
With the aim of gaining the support of the commission (Shmueli et al. 2006; 
Marichal 2009), they again framed themselves as victims of PAMF’s actions. 
They expressed their distrust vis-à-vis PAMF by refusing to sign the report of 
the meeting at the end. At that meeting, farmers expressed themselves freely 
as they constituted a majority vis-à-vis the members of the commission and 
PAMF staff members. Emotion, anger and violence were noticeable in all their 
utterances. PAMF staff members, in their turn, used positive identity frames 
to describe themselves. The difference between the farmers’ negative charac-
terisation frames of PAMF staff members and the PAMF staff members’ own 
identity frames increased the distance between these stakeholders and thus 
reinforced the conflict. 
Identity and characterisation frames were used by the different stakeholders in 
this we-versus-they interaction setting to persuade the members of the inter-
ministerial commission to support their position. The commission heard the 
farmers’ complaints and PAMF’s reactions. As discussions raised tension, the 
commission decided to stop the meeting and call another negotiation meet-
ing with only the farmers’ representatives, PAMF and the other stakeholders 
involved in the conflict. Before the commission members left, they asked the 
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farmers to stay calm and reassured them that they would solve the problem. 
However, despite the commission’s warning, on 3 August 2007 the farmers 
held a demonstration march that the national television was invited by the 
farmers to cover and broadcast. This action by the farmers aimed at gaining 
governmental support: 
Because they did not follow what the president said, that is, to discuss 
with us and look for our agreement before taking any action and start-
ing to destroy our farms, we decided to have a demonstration. That 
will enable the government to know what is happening here’.
Source: Farmer informant, September 2008
When broadcast on national TV, this news indeed pushed the president to take 
the situation seriously, and he sent the Minister of Environment and Nature 
Conservation to solve the problem. The minister organised a tour in the project 
area to see what the project was doing and had a discussion with the members 
of the project and the farmers. After listening to all the parties, the minister 
appeased the farmers and promised to organise a meeting between the repre-
sentatives of the parties and herself.
2.3.4 Escalation of the conflict
After two postponements, the last negotiation meeting was finally held on 18 
and 19 October 2007 in Bohicon but without the presence of the minister, who 
sent representatives. The representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal 
Breeding and Fisheries, of the Ministry of Environment and Nature Conserva-
tion, of the PAMF project, of Savalou and Bantè Municipality, of the farmers, 
of the forest restoration committees and of the parliament member of Bantè 
Municipality, and the local radio reporter were present at the meeting.
The meeting opened with a résumé of the history of the conflict as some par-
ticipants had not been involved since the beginning. The process that resulted 
in the zoning was presented by PAMF. The floor was then given to the farm-
ers’ representatives. Farmers started by accepting the zoning of the forest and 
the principles involved. Next, they started negotiating by proposing a wish list. 
They wanted the occupation fees payable by the farmers in agro-forestry zones 
to be abolished or at least reduced. They also proposed that cashew trees and 
forest trees should be allowed to co-exist in the forest. So, they wanted all the 
plantations in the forest to be saved. If this was not feasible, they suggested as-
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sisting the farmers to create new cashew plantations outside the forest. In this 
case, they asked for a moratorium of about twenty or thirty years to continue 
harvesting their cashew plantations in the production and protection zones 
in order to be able to create new cashew plantations outside the forest. They 
asked for financial compensation to be paid by the government if they had to 
abandon their plantations. And they asked PAMF to accept the creation of new 
cashew plantations in agro-forestry zones.
The PAMF representatives reacted by arguing that farmers would not be al-
lowed either to create new cashew plantations in the agro-forestry zones or to 
continue harvesting the existing plantations in the production and protection 
zones. Otherwise, they would continue exercising their property right on these 
lands, which their children would consider as their heritage. PAMF agreed to 
compensate farmers by assisting them to create new cashew plantations out-
side the forest. They would receive improved cashew varieties and technical 
assistance to grow them. However, it was out of the question for PAMF to give 
financial compensation to the farmers who had to leave the forest because 
the land belonged to the State. The only compensation that the project could 
give the farmers was to help them start beekeeping and raising grasscutters. 
Farmers would be allowed to continue harvesting cashew nuts in plantations 
that were more than five years’ old in the production and protection zones for 
eight years only, to enable them to create new ones outside the forest. Planta-
tions that were less than five years’ old would be destroyed. PAMF agreed to 
reduce the annual fees payable by farmers in agro-forestry zones to 7,500 FCFA 
rather than 10,000 FCFA per year for those who were already settled in the 
forest for annual crops, 15,000 FCFA rather than 20,000 FCFA for new land 
occupation in the agro-forestry zones, and 15,000 rather than 20,000 FCFA for 
cashew plantations in the forest. Finally, PAMF promised to note in the report 
to be sent to the minister that farmers would like compensation for their invest-
ments (cashew plantations) in the forest. This proposition was to be presented 
to government to be studied in depth and see whether or not the government 
would take social measures to help them. These PAMF propositions consti-
tuted the points of the meeting’s report. All the participants present at the 
meeting signed the report; this was interpreted by the officials as agreement. 
However, although all the participants signed the report, later interviews with 
them showed that they had different interpretations and views about the meet-
ing and the outcomes. The representatives of the farmers reacted in this way:
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Researcher: What do you think about the outcomes of the meeting?
Farmers’ representative 1: All the solutions retained there where proposed 
by them. They did not accept any of our propositions. We asked them to 
compensate us and they said that they could not ask the president to give 
us compensation as many other villages are in the same situation. If they 
compensate us they will have to do the same for these other villages. We 
told them that we were not asking for compensation for the land we are 
leaving but for our plantations, as we would need a lot of funding to start 
other ones. Many of us are old and weak and do not have the strength 
necessary to create a new plantation without funding.
Researcher: But why did you sign the report of the meeting?
Farmers’ representative 1: We just accepted keeping in mind that we 
will not leave unless the State pays us every year what we get from our 
cashew plantations. We know that it cannot do that, so we are sure that 
we will never leave. Even when we told this to the farmers, most of them 
answered that they don’t want any kind of compensation but only to let 
them continue harvesting their cashew plantations. 
Farmers’ representative 2: First of all, they invited us to a city far from the 
place where the problem is taking place, and at the end of the meeting 
they threatened us by saying that those parties who will not respect the 
agreements will be taken to court.
Source: Interview with farmers’ representatives, November 2007
In this we-group discussion, farmers vocalised their hidden agenda, which was to 
conserve their farms in the forest. Even though they signed the report, they neither 
agreed with PAMF’s propositions nor expressed this at the we-versus-they meet-
ing. According to them, they started to negotiate, proposed solutions and signed 
at this specific meeting because they were a minority (four farmers out of twenty-
nine participants). As they were less represented than the other stakeholders, they 
did not feel able to express and defend their arguments as they did in the former 
meeting. Instead, farmers postponed their contestations to later when the plan 
was being implemented. 
For PAMF, the problem was solved at the end of this meeting as the farmers 
signed the final report; this means that in eight years they will leave the forest 
without any concessions. 
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The Minister of Environment and Nature Conservation said that she 
does not understand how a forest could be restored without any dam-
age. She also said that enough concessions have been made by the 
PAMF. At this stage, she said, it is time to go to the essential matters. 
The awareness raising time is over, it is time to act.
Source: PAMF staff members, November 2007
PAMF used this testimony of the minister to give more credibility to its own 
plan, which was to throw farmers out of the forest. Like the farmers, PAMF 
vocalised this plan only in interviews with the researcher, not in the meeting 
where it probably should have been discussed. As a result, the agreement that 
was reached at the meeting was no more than a pseudo consensus, hiding the 
conflict that was nevertheless experienced by all stakeholders involved. 
No action was taken after this meeting in the framework of the management 
of the conflict. The project ended in June 2008 in this impasse without imple-
menting the Zoning Plan. Although a lot of discussions took place, both within 
we-groups and between the different stakeholders, at the end of the project 
nothing had been implemented.
The research shows that the conflict was constructed by means of talk. Failing 
negotiations in combination with a lot of stereotyping and stigmatising that 
mainly took place in we-groups reinforced the conflict. The project ended in a 
formal agreement that hid a serious impasse. Over time, the issue of imple-
menting the forest restoration evolved into a protracted or intractable conflict 
(Coleman et al. 2007; Gray 2003; Shmueli et al. 2006). 
2.4  Discussion and Conclusions 
Although strict natural resource conservation in the past has succeeded in pre-
serving such resources in some cases, in many others it has created conflicts 
between local communities and public institutions charged with conservation 
(Rishi 2007). Participatory management was initiated to avoid these conflicts 
and promote sustainable management of natural resources. However, in the 
Agoua participatory restoration project, despite its positive start and agreed 
upon plan, conflict emerged and local communities opposed the project. 
The dispute began when PAMF started talking about the implementation of 
the PMP. Farmers framed this situation as a threat, because they felt that the 
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PAMF wanted to throw them out of the forest, and this triggered frame shift-
ing on their part. In retrospect, they started blaming the government for not 
forbidding them earlier from settling in the forest and PAMF for not informing 
them about the zoning of the forest at the beginning of the project. Until then, 
PAMF had considered that the farmers had been informed about the Zoning 
Plan by their representatives who attended all the meetings organised by PAMF 
to discuss the zoning. PAMF was surprised by the farmers’ reactions as its staff 
members had not monitored the feedback process of the farmers’ representa-
tives to their constituency. The support of stakeholder constituencies is critical 
to participatory management and conflict resolution; hence meetings and dis-
cussions should not be limited to stakeholders’ representatives but involve the 
wider stakeholder population.
The conflict was constructed, interpreted, enacted and maintained in stake-
holders’ discourses through which they emphasised different realities and 
had different senses of themselves and their world (Ford et al. 2002). As in 
other conflict situations, frames as uttered in different contexts consisted of 
blaming, stereotyping and stigmatising, resulting in divergence and distanc-
ing (Aarts et al. Forthcoming; Gray 2003). All stakeholders portrayed their op-
ponents negatively and projected responsibility for the conflict onto them. At 
the same time, they presented themselves as being the victims of the others’ 
behaviours. Stakeholders constructed and expressed their frames in we-group 
conversations, recognising and affirming each other. In we-versus-they interac-
tions, depending on their framing of power positions and interdependence, 
stakeholders used denial and disapproval to attack each other or to start po-
sitional bargaining. In public, they referred to frames constructed in we-group 
conversations to look for support from powerful outsiders. 
By analysing and connecting different conversation contexts (both over time 
and between different people), this study makes clear why negotiations did not 
result in stakeholders’ reframing the situation, but rather ended in distrust, ac-
cusations and even threats. 
The conflict management process did not succeed in creating a new reality that 
would enable the deconstruction of stakeholders’ former frames as no effort 
was made inside or outside the meetings arenas to exchange and critically dis-
cuss these we-group frames to trigger integrative reframing (Ford et al. 2002). 
This may be explained by the fact that all the parties had a stake in the conflict. 
No neutral party was involved in the conflict management process as was re-
quested by the farmers, who called upon the president to mediate because they 
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did not trust PAMF. Although the request to the president led to interest and in-
volvement of relative outsiders, they did not play a mediating role. They merely 
attended a PAMF management meeting that led only to pseudo consensus. We 
agree with Gray (2003: 32) who argues ‘since reframing requires perspective 
taking, it is often difficult for parties to reframe without the help of a neutral 
third party or someone who does not have a direct stake in the conflict.’ Thus, 
one way of solving the conflict in relation to the restoration of Agoua forest may 
be to involve a neutral mediator in its management. The main task of the me-
diator would be to bring the stakeholders together to discuss their frames with 
regard to the problem at stake, including the causes and solutions they have in 
mind, with the aim of creating mutual understanding, which may trigger com-
mon reframing (Shmueli et al. 2006).
It can be concluded that in participatory management there is no shortage of 
power struggles between stakeholders (Leeuwis 2000, 2004). Our analysis 
shows that conflict was constructed by means of conversations, both within 
we-groups and in negotiations with all the stakeholders involved. Conscious 
and unconscious, explicit and implicit accusations destroyed the relationships 
between the stakeholders, reinforcing the distance and thereby reducing the 
space for changing situations. To understand the evolution of a conflict, an in-
teractional framing approach, such as we used, showing how conflicts emerge, 
evolve and end, or persist in talk, seems to be effective (Aarts et al. Forthcom-
ing; Dewulf et al. 2009).
From this case study, we have learned that, if potential problems are not prop-
erly discussed at the start, conflicts emerge during implementation. On the 
basis of our study, we stress that people who are involved in participatory pro-
tected area management should pay more attention to the divergences that 
often exist between upper level and local discourses (Bosak 2008). Not only 
should what happens during the participatory meetings be taken into account, 
but also what happens in we-group conversations in which stereotypes and 
stigmas are constructed. Hence discourse can create conflict, even when ut-
terances are not supported by concrete action. In our case, the conflict was a 
discursive affair as very little changed on the ground.
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Abstract
Community-based natural resources management (CBNRM) was introduced in 
Benin in the early 1990s, after the failure of the former top-down management 
system to enhance sustainable conservation in the country’s protected areas. 
CBNRM was first tested on a small scale in a few protected areas. Because of 
the initially positive results, the Forest Department decided to continue and 
scale up this participatory approach to all Benin’s protected areas. Focusing on 
the relationships between the actors involved, this paper seeks to explain the 
dynamics of the participatory management process in the Ouémé Supérieur and 
N’Dali forests in Northern Benin. The analysis is based on data gathered from 
interviews with the different actors involved. The study shows that social cohe-
sion between people involved in CBNRM, the Forest Rangers and local commu-
nities was built at the beginning of the process, but then disappeared and was 
followed by conflict. Stakeholders interpreted and made sense of formally de-
clared participatory management rules (formal institutions) and gradually de-
veloped informal relationships, rules and routines (informal institutions) that 
facilitated the collaboration process and resulted in social cohesion. Conflicts 
and distrust emerged when replacement CBNRM officers did not respect the 
informal rules of conduct. The case shows that it is the state of informal rules 
and relationships that determines the success of a collaborative process rather 
than formally declared institutions; hence this should be recognized.
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3.1 Introduction
 
Most protected area management in developing countries has been character-
ized by two main successive phases: strict conservation by the state followed by 
devolution of management to local communities (Garcia and Lescuyer 2008; 
Kumar 2007; Masozera et al. 2006; Murali et al. 2002). During the strict conser-
vation phase, the state and local communities played a cat and mouse game. 
The state formally devolved no role to local communities in the management 
of these resources and used coercion measures to keep them at a distance. 
Local communities then adopted a rebel attitude towards these resources, tak-
ing any opportunity to use them to improve their livelihood. This management 
strategy, based on fences and fines, which aimed at keeping human beings far 
from protected areas, created conflicts between local communities and man-
agement authorities and contributed little to resource conservation (Masozera 
et al. 2006; Wells et al. 1992). The shift towards a participatory approach to 
management arose due to the failure of the conservationist system to meet 
the need both to conserve natural resources and to reduce poverty within lo-
cal communities (Masozera et al. 2006). The involvement of stakeholders in 
planning and management was seen as a necessary condition for sustainable 
conservation of natural resources and was advocated at the Rio de Janeiro Con-
ference on Environment and Development in 1992. Community-based natural 
resources management (CBNRM) is considered as the optimal management 
system to minimize conflicts over local natural resource use rights, for sub-
sistence, for commercial use and for the preservation of the environment and 
ecology (Rishi 2007). However, despite many attempts at citizen participation, 
efforts often fail to resolve conflicts, to create support for decisions, or to raise 
the level of trust between citizens and public officials (Smith and McDonough 
2001). 
Protected area management in Benin has followed the general trend in devel-
oping countries. Reforms in protected area management, based on participa-
tory principles, were undertaken in 1993 after the failure of the coercive man-
agement system. Under a new law (Loi n°93-009 du 2 Juillet 1993 portant regime 
des forêts), the Forest Department (FD) proclaimed that they wanted to involve 
local communities in forest management to end conflicts and better conserve 
forests. By doing so, it was expected to gain the support of local communities 
in the sustainable management of these protected areas and to contribute to 
the reduction of their poverty level. CBNRM was first tested on a small scale 
between 1993 and 1998 through the implementation of the Project of Natural 
Resources Management (PGRN: Projet de Gestion des Ressources Naturelles). 
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The FD found the results satisfactory and decided later to scale up CBNRM to 
all Benin’s protected areas (MDR and PGFTR 1999; Siebert and Elwert 2004). 
However, instead of leading to collaborative and cohesive management, the 
scaling up of CBNRM in Benin finally gave way to conflicts between the FD 
and local communities that hinder the sustainable management of the forests 
(Alohou 2007; Arouna 2006; MDR and PGFTR 1999; Siebert and Elwert 2004). 
After nearly two decades of CBNRM implementation of protected area manage-
ment in Benin, this study investigated how and why despite the relatively suc-
cessful beginning, conflicts worsened between the stakeholders. 
Advocates of the participatory approach expect participation to contribute to 
well-informed and justified decisions that will positively affect the life of the 
stakeholders and be easier to implement than top-down decisions (Dekker and 
Van Kempen 2009; Saarikoski et al. 2010). However, they seem to overlook the 
role of social relations in guaranteeing or impeding the success of the process 
(Golooba-Mutebi 2005). It is possible to apply all the rules and guidelines of 
public participation in a mechanical way, while leaving people with a feeling 
that they are being treated unfairly because, for example, they may think they 
are being treated disrespectfully (Idrissou et al. 2011; Smith and McDonough 
2001). The participatory approach is likely to succeed when its implementation 
takes into account the social, political and cultural context (Golooba-Mutebi 
2005). Thus, social relation characteristics such as social cohesion influence 
the implementation and results of participatory processes (Cradock et al. 2009; 
Dekker and Van Kempen 2009; Van Marissing et al. 2006). The aim of this 
study was then to understand how social cohesion has evolved between the 
stakeholders involved in CBNRM in Benin, and to what extent it contributes to 
the explanation of the collapse of the process.
Social cohesion and participation shape and evolve in social actors’ interac-
tions. Through social interactions, meanings are created and maintained be-
tween social actors (Bloch 2003). Attributing meanings to situations, events, 
policies and so forth is known as framing (Agustín 2008). Thus, to understand 
the influence of social cohesion in CBNRM and figure out what led the process 
to the current situation, we analysed the frames the stakeholders involved in 
CBNRM bring to the fore in interviews and interactions. In other words, frames 
people construct in interactions show the social context as well as their con-
cerns. Frames make it possible to understand individuals’ actions as they are 
used to ‘(1) define issues, (2) shape what action should be taken and by whom, 
(3) protect oneself, (4) justify a stance we are taking on an issue, and (5) mobi-
lize people to take or refrain from action on issues’ (Gray 2003: 15). 
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3.2 Social cohesion and institutions for participatory forest 
management
Participation is often defined as a process of involving, in decision making and 
implementation, stakeholders who will be affected by the decisions made (Hjort-
so 2004). It is expected that participation will build social and institutional capital 
and promote individual and organizational learning among stakeholders (Saa-
rikoski et al. 2010). Thus, the participatory process fosters interactions among 
the stakeholders concerned with the implementation of a policy and leads to the 
building of social relations between the societal units such as individuals, groups, 
associations and territorial units (Berger-Schmitt 2002). Webler et al. (2001) iden-
tified five public discourses that characterize good participation. According to the 
public, a good participation process should be legitimate, promote a search for 
common values, realize democratic principles of fairness and equality, promote 
equal power among all participants and viewpoints, and foster responsible lead-
ership (Webler et al. 2001). These characteristics of a good participation process 
pertain to the relations that should exist between the stakeholders. They are all 
related to different dimensions of social cohesion as described by scholars such 
as Kearns and Forrest (2000), Ache and Andersen (2008), Van Marissing (2008), 
Cradock et al. (2009), Dekker and Van Kempen (2009), Tolsma et al. (2009), Van 
Kempen and Bolt (2009), etc. Hence, a good participatory process should be 
characterized by social cohesion among stakeholders that might enable them to 
achieve the goals pursued (Cradock et al. 2009; Van Marissing et al. 2006). 
3.2.1 Social cohesion
Social cohesion is associated with the ties that individuals have with other indi-
viduals (Tolsma et al. 2009), the absence of latent conflicts and the presence of 
strong social bonds (Cradock et al. 2009; Kawachi and Berkman 2000), a kind 
of glue holding society together (Dekker 2006; Maloutas and Malouta 2004; Van 
Kempen and Bolt 2009). The definitions of social cohesion in current literature 
are best summarized by what Kearns and Forrest consider as the kernel of the 
concept and formulate as follows: 
A cohesive society ‘hangs together’; all the component parts somehow 
fit in and contribute to society’s collective project and well-being; and 
conflict between societal goals and groups, and disruptive behaviours, 
are largely absent or minimal. 
Kearns and Forrest, 2000: 996
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This rather broad definition can be narrowed down to the case of participa-
tory forest management. Social cohesion refers in this case to the relations 
and interactions that bond together stakeholders involved in the participatory 
management of a forest and the extent to which each stakeholder category 
acts for the sustainable management of the forest, relying or not on the sup-
port of the others. As the stakeholders involved in participatory forest manage-
ment often have diverse backgrounds, knowledge, interests and perspectives 
vis-à-vis the forest, social cohesion between them is neither perfect nor absent 
(Dekker and Van Kempen 2009). Rather, participatory processes are arenas of 
continuous transformation of relationships and responsibilities, of networks 
and competence, of collective memory and memberships (Aarts and Leeuwis 
2010). Participation enables social interactions where meanings are created 
and maintained through language (Bloch 2003). Participation can thus be con-
sidered as a socially constructed reality in which social cohesion is constructed, 
interpreted, enacted and maintained through discourse (Ford 1999). Our ways 
of speaking and making accounts determine how we experience reality, and 
this then influences our communication (Bloch 2003). Participants in differ-
ent constructed realities will thus have different senses of themselves and the 
world (Ford et al. 2002). As a result, they will engage in different actions, and 
offer different forms of resistance, depending on the reality in which they live 
(Ford et al. 2002).
Frames and framing
People make sense of social reality by constructing understandings through 
the framing process (Aarts and Woerkum 2006; Dewulf et al. 2009; Gray 2003; 
Gray et al. 2007; Kaufman et al. 2003; Shmueli et al. 2006). Frames are shared, 
structured ways of speaking, thinking, interpreting and representing social re-
alities in the world (Webler et al. 2001). They are the lenses through which 
people see the word around them. Frames refer to how people evaluate various 
aspects of a situation, what knowledge and attitudes become cognitively most 
accessible and preferred, what alternatives are considered, and what goals they 
want to reach (Lindenberg and Steg 2007). Through the framing process, peo-
ple construct social realities and present them in interactions. Stakeholders 
thus construct and present social cohesion in interactions using frames. As 
frames are not static entities and can rather be revised and transformed under 
certain circumstances (Gray 2003), in a participatory process, social cohesion 
among stakeholders is expected to undergo transformation in particular situ-
ations as well.
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Social cohesion dimensions and frames related
The definitions of the notion of social cohesion proposed by scholars in the 
field also recognize and share its multidimensional features (Ache and Ander-
sen 2008; Cradock et al. 2009; Dekker and Van Kempen 2009; Kearns and 
Forrest 2000; Tolsma et al. 2009; Van Kempen and Bolt 2009; Van Marissing 
2008). Kearns and Forrest (2000) identified five constituent dimensions of so-
cial cohesion that take into account those formulated by most of the other 
authors. Each dimension focuses on a particular aspect of the social tie that 
binds members of a society. They are associated with particular types of frames 
that represent the meanings that the stakeholders attribute to the dimension.
Common values and civic culture refer to a society in which the members share 
common values that enable them to recognize and support common aims and 
objectives. They also share a common set of moral principles and codes of be-
haviour through which to conduct their relations with one another (Kearns and 
Forrest 2000). In a cohesive participatory management process, stakeholders 
agree and share the same or at least overlapping views about the need for 
sustainable management (in the present case of forests) and act accordingly, 
supported by the others. Analysing social cohesion in participatory manage-
ment from the perspective of the common values and civic culture dimension 
consists of focusing on stakeholders’ knowledge, their feelings and their judge-
ment of the rationale behind sustainable management. The frames associated 
with this dimension are problem and solution frames. In cohesive participa-
tory forest management, the stakeholders may have different frames about the 
forest’s problems but have the same or at least overlapping frames about the 
solutions and the process of implementing them. 
Social order and social control: social cohesion refers to a situation without latent 
conflicts or where conflicts are minimized and the existing order and system 
is not challenged (Cradock et al. 2009; Kearns and Forrest 2000). As conflicts 
of interests are inherent in natural resources management (Hares 2009; Hell-
ström 2001; Yasmi 2003), this dimension of social cohesion analysis in partici-
patory forest management refers to the way conflicts of interests are consid-
ered and managed. In a cohesive forest management process, social control 
is not asserted through overt means of coercion and repression, and potential 
conflicts are democratically resolved (Dekker and Van Kempen 2009; Kearns 
and Forrest 2000). This entails stakeholders sharing the same conflict manage-
ment frames. Conflict management frames refer to the stakeholders’ prefer-
ences for managing or dealing with conflicts (Gray 2003). 
74 75
Chapter 3
Social solidarity and reductions in wealth disparities: one of the key elements of 
social cohesion is solidarity, which refers to a harmonious development of the 
different groups in society (Kearns and Forrest 2000). Participants in a cohe-
sive society expect solidarity in the distribution of the advantages deriving from 
the functioning of the society (Chipkin and Ngqulunga 2008). In a participatory 
forest management process as well, stakeholders involved expect the financial 
revenues or benefits in kind and opportunities stemming from such manage-
ment to be shared with them without disparities and exclusion. They must have 
the feeling that they can gain from their participation. Here, social cohesion is 
framed in term of gain or loss by the stakeholders. Whether the stakeholders 
see the actions taken by others or the process in which they are involved as 
creating gain or loss for themselves or for others is determinant for their behav-
iours in the process (Gray 2003). 
Social networks and social capital: both informal networks such as family or 
friendship ties and formal networks concerning whether participation in orga-
nized activities is high or low are important in a cohesive society (Stafford et al. 
2003). The formal network is considered as the common form of social network 
in organized associations such as participatory forest management where dif-
ferent stakeholder categories are at least formally involved. Social networks are 
constitutive and producers of social capital. They are networks in which dilem-
mas and problems are easily solved by collective actions and in relationships, 
and they are sustained by expectations, norms and trust, which facilitate such 
solutions (Kearns and Forrest 2000). Social capital and trust are intimately 
related and required between the members of a social network so that they are 
willing to moderate their demands in order to reach agreements (Chipkin and 
Ngqulunga 2008; Heuser 2005). This dimension is about relationship building 
among the stakeholders that would enable them to work together. Important 
frames here in building such relationships are identity and characterization 
frames. In interactions, individuals claim an identity that is accepted or denied 
by others (Dewulf et al. 2009). Identity frames are individuals’ answers to the 
question who I am? (Gray 2003). At the same time, they present the others 
using characterization frames that answer the questions who are they? (Gray 
2003) or how do I construct you in relation to me? (Dewulf et al. 2009). 
Territorial belonging and identity: this dimension of social cohesion refers to the 
intertwining of the people’s identity and that of a place to which they are at-
tached and consequently has a positive effect upon this place (Kearns and For-
rest 2000). Attachment to place includes the sharing of common values and 
norms and a willingness to participate in social networks and building social 
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capital or trust (Kearns and Forrest 2000). Social cohesion in participatory for-
est management will thus depend on the degree to which the stakeholders are 
attached to the forest, share its sustainable management principles and are 
willing to cooperate with others to reach this goal. This dimension is associated 
with relationship frames, especially how stakeholders see themselves in rela-
tion to the forest. Frames developed here are called place-based identity frames 
and are the answers to the question who I am in relation to my geographic loca-
tion or my community (Gray 2003).
The dimensions of social cohesion described above characterize the relation-
ships among actors and how these relationships constrain and enable smooth 
interactions among them. This aspect of human relations is related to insti-
tutions. Thus, although social cohesion develops in an institutional context 
that constrains its development, it contributes in turn to shaping the existing 
institutions. 
Institutions
All the dimensions of social cohesion and their related frames are important 
in understanding relations constructed in interactions among stakeholders in-
volved in a participatory process. Social cohesion represents a state of trans-
formation of institutions in interactions where the different relationships and 
behaviours of the stakeholders contribute to achieving the collective goals. In-
stitutions essentially create incentives, both positive and negative, for individu-
als and groups to act in particular ways (Woodhill 2008). They are sets of for-
mal and informal rules that enable and structure all forms of social interaction 
(Arts and Buizer 2009; Torniainen and Saastamoinen 2007; Woodhill 2008). 
Formal institutions are openly established rules communicated through offi-
cially accepted channels, whereas informal institutions are shared rules, usually 
unwritten, that are built, communicated and enforced through non officially 
recognized channels (Torniainen and Saastamoinen 2007). Participation thus 
takes place in an institutional context that represents the set of rules according 
to which decision making and implementation in a management process are 
carried out. It encompasses formal and informal rules that govern relation-
ships and interactions among the stakeholders. Formal rules in participatory 
management are agreed upon plans officially established by the stakeholders 
and through which they should conduct interactions and build relationships. 
At the same time, informal rules emerge among them and interfere with the 
formal rules. They consist of informal relationships and codes of conduct that 
emerge and persist among the stakeholders outside the official arena. 
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Institutions are dynamic, and the reasons for their dynamism are not fully under-
stood (Arts and Buizer 2009; Woodhill 2008). On the basis of insights from neo-
institutionalism and discourse theory, Arts and Buizer (2009) make two assump-
tions about institutional dynamics. The first considers institutional dynamics as 
originating from the emergence of new ideas, concepts and narratives in society 
that institutionalize in social practices and that affect social outcomes (Arts and 
Buizer 2009). The new ideas, concepts and narratives emerge from the interpre-
tation of social realities and represent thus second-order realities or represented 
realities (Ford 1999). Arts and Buizer’s (2009) second assumption asserts that, 
in turn, ideas, concepts and narratives that become strongly institutionalized in 
social practices are especially relevant to understand how institutions changes 
or remain stable (Arts and Buizer 2009). Second-order realities may institution-
alize, becoming thus first-order realities or presented realities from which new 
interpretations may start (Ford 1999). In both cases, institutions are constructed 
and shaped through discourses that carry ideas, concepts and narratives. In fact, 
ideas, concepts and narratives reflect frames that are constructed and expressed 
in interaction through discourses (Webler et al. 2001). 
So, in this study, by analysing the evolution of the stakeholders’ frames, we in-
vestigated how dynamics of social cohesion among the stakeholders are related 
to the dynamic of participatory management. To do so, we used the above dis-
cussion to develop our analytical framework in Figure 1. It is based on the as-
sumption that stakeholders’ frames, social cohesion among them, and institu-
tions are all characteristics of social processes such as participation. They are 
also linked, as social cohesion and institutions are presented and represented in 
stakeholders’ frames that in turn influence social cohesion and institutions built. 
This dynamic may also evolve over time according to the specific situations in 
which it takes place. 
3.3 Method
3.3.1 Research setting
 
The evolution of social cohesion in CBNRM was analysed in the case of the man-
agement of Ouémé Supérieure and N’dali (OSN) forests in Benin. The OSN for-
ests are among those in which the participatory natural resources management 
process began in Benin in 1993. They thus represent the historical picture of the 
implementation of the participatory approach to forest management in Benin as 
they have been subject to this approach from its inception to the present day. 
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They are also the largest of the forests involved in both the test and the scaling 
up phase of participatory management implementation in Benin. 
OSN is formed by two forests: the forest of Ouémé Supérieure (OSF) and the 
forest of N’dali (NF). They have been managed together because they are eco-
systems, close to each other, facing similar anthropogenic pressures. According 
to the FD, solving the problems of one of them may increase the pressure on 
the other (PGRN 1999). The OSF was declared protected during Benin’s colonial 
period by decree n° 4310 SE of July 27, 1952. It covers an area of 193,406 ha and 
straddles two departments, Donga and Borgou. NF was put under government 
protection by decree n° 366 SE of January 30, 1942 and covers an area of 4,721 
ha. It is bordered by two villages and one city and wholly located in Borgou de-
partment. 
The number of local people living around these two forests was estimated at 
99,126 in 1992 dispersed over 82 villages (RGPH2 1992). According to the 2002 
census, this population grew to 173,557 people living in 13,234 households dis-
persed over 83 villages (RGPH3 2002). The main sources of livelihood of these 
local communities are agriculture, hunting, fishing and trade. All these activities 
are linked to the forests. Even trade, which is mainly a female occupation, in-
volves agricultural produce, non-timber forest products, firewood and charcoal 
(Alohou 2007; PGRN 1999). With the growth of the local population, the pres-
sure on the OSN increased because of demand for land for farming, the use of 
forest products and grazing (Alohou 2007). 
Participation
Frames
Presentations and 
representations
Social Cohesion
Networks and 
coalitions
Figure 3.1: A framework for analysing participation evolution 
Institutions
Formal and 
informal rules
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3.3.2 Research methodology
The case study approach was used in this research to investigate the imple-
mentation of CBNRM in the OSN in Benin. This research approach focuses on 
understanding the dynamics present within single settings (Eisendhardt 1989). 
The case study approach is particularly relevant when the researcher intends to 
carry out an in-depth probe of a subject (Noor 2008). According to Yin (1994, 
2002), case studies should be undertaken in situations where the researcher is 
interested in studying how processes unfold. They are indicated when it is nec-
essary to explore in depth the relations between individuals and institutions, to 
understand, describe, explain and interpret behaviours and attitudes, as is the 
case in this research (Mettrick 1994). 
Multiple qualitative techniques were used to collect data to enhance the validity 
and reliability of findings in the case studied (Noor 2008). Data were collected 
through semi-structures interviews and conversations with the stakeholders in-
volved in the management of the OSN. These techniques were used because 
they offer sufficient flexibility to approach different respondents differently while 
still investigating the same topic (Noor 2008). They were carried out with indi-
vidual stakeholders and groups of stakeholders. Individual interviews (33) were 
completed with local community committee board members (10), forests users 
(7), FD staff members (7), municipality staff members (5) and NGO staff mem-
bers (4). The respondents were chosen according to the importance of their 
role in the management of the OSN. Focus group interviews were also carried 
out with local community committee board members (2), forests users (6) and 
NGO staff members (1). This enabled triangulation of the various points of view 
of individual stakeholders interviewed. The interviews were tape-recorded and 
transcribed.
The interviews and conversations were supplemented by observations and docu-
mentary sources, employed to gather information that interviews and conversa-
tions did not provide. The observations concerned the physical settings and the 
social environment in which CBNRM is been implementing. Documents were 
used to cross-validate information gathered from interviews, conversations and 
observations as what people say and how they act may be different than what 
is written (Noor 2008). Documents concerning the forests, the projects imple-
mented and still in progress, and the local communities were consulted. 
Framing studies use techniques from discourse and conversation analysis to 
analyse frames (Dewulf 2005; Koenig 2004). The data gathered and processed 
79
From Cohesion to Conflict in Participation
were analysed using critical discourse analysis principles. Discourse analysis 
deals with studying and analysing language as a social production (de Pinho et 
al. 2009; Hodges et al. 2008; Punch 2005). From the range of discourse analy-
sis approaches (see Hodges et al. 2008), we chose critical discourse analysis. 
Critical discourse analysis studies not only texts and the use of language but 
also how they are used in social contexts. It shows how the existence of institu-
tions and the roles to be played by individuals are made possible by ways of 
thinking and speaking (de Pinho et al. 2009; Hodges et al. 2008; Punch 2005). 
Critical discourse analysis makes it possible to understand phenomena such as 
social practices, individuals and institutions in a certain way and make state-
ments about what is considered to be true (Hodges et al. 2008). This approach 
is relevant for investigating how social cohesion evolved over time in the CB-
NRM of the OSN through stakeholders’ framing and reframing. 
3.4  Case study
In 1993, the FD proposed to involve local communities in the management 
of the OSN through the implementation of CBNRM. CBNRM was carried out 
in the OSN through the establishment and implementation of the Participa-
tory Management Plan (PAP: Plan d’Aménagement Participatif). Three different 
phases characterize CBNRM implementation in the OSN. It was introduced in 
1993 by the Project of Natural Resources Management (PGRN: Projet de Ges-
tion des Ressources Naturelles), which established the PAP for the OSN. At the 
end of this project in 1998, a phase without a project followed, during which 
the implementation of the PAP started. Later, in 2005, the Programme of For-
ests and Adjacent Lands Management (PGFTR: Projet de Gestion des Forêts et 
Terroirs Riverains) was initiated to scale up participatory management to other 
protected areas and to support the implementation of the PAP in the OSN. 
Both the PGRN and the PGFTR are run by the FD.
3.4.1 The establishment of the OSN’s PAP
When the participatory approach was introduced, the PAP represented the for-
mal institutional framework under which a forest should be managed in Benin. 
It describes the new relationships, roles and responsibilities among local com-
munities, the FD, and NGOs in the CBNRM of the OSN. The OSN’s PAP was 
established through multiple village meetings, involving local communities, 
the PGRN staff members, the FD representatives and the facilitators of the Co-
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operative League of the United States of America (CLUSA), an American NGO 
to which training and facilitation activities were confided. The meetings provid-
ed the stakeholders with the opportunity to meet, assess the forests’ problems, 
and agree on actions to be undertaken as well as the roles and responsibilities 
of each actor (Table 1). During the establishment of the PAP, both local commu-
nities and Forest Rangers (FR) were sensitized and trained on the participatory 
approach by CLUSA facilitators. The PAP states that the management of the 
forests belongs to local communities, who should get technical and financial 
support from the FD and be trained in organization management skills by the 
NGOs (PGRN 1999). The Village Association for Forest Management (AVIGEF: 
Association Villageoise de Gestion des Forêts) was created and represents the lo-
cal communities’ organizations. It is to take the lead in the management of 
the OSN at the end of the project (PGRN 1999). AVIGEF has boards at villages 
level, management unit (UA2: Unité d’Aménagement) level and forest level. The 
different AVIGEF boards are responsible for organizing the sustainable manage-
ment of the OSN at each level (PGRN 1999). The establishment of the OSN’s 
PAP was completed by the end of the PGRN in 1998. The implementation of the 
plan was then confided to AVIGEF members who were to be assisted by FRs and 
CLUSA facilitators. 
 
While the PAP was being established, the restoration of the OSN was under-
taken by both the local communities and FRs. The establishment of the PAP and 
the restoration activities were occasions for villagers to get closer to FRs without 
fear, in contrast to the past. The meetings enabled FRs and local communities 
to interact and build new relationships. Both FRs and local communities evoke 
their relationships built during this period, using positive frames. The head of 
Borgou FD office stated:
Contrary to the past, the FD invited local communities to define what 
to do and work together. Since the beginning, we have noticed local 
communities’ interest in the participatory management of the OSN 
forests as they could approach the FRs without fear. It was clear that 
the FD was a little bit frustrated as we had managed these forests 
alone for decades and we were powerful and feared. However, immedi-
ately this fear of local communities was reduced with the introduction 
of the participatory management.
Source: Head of Borgou’s FD office, February 2009
2 The OSN forests are divided into six sections or management units (UA: Unité d’Aménagement) 
around six main villages bordering them: Affon, Bakou, Bétérou, Bori, N’dali and Sirarou.
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This utterance shows that the participatory process led to the deconstruction of 
former relationships between FRs and local communities, who framed each oth-
er as enemies before CBNRM was introduced. The regular meetings that were 
organized opened space for social network building and interactions between 
them, and conflicts gave way to collaboration. A member of the AVIGEF board 
supports this point, arguing:
During the management of the forest by the PGRN, villagers were very 
enthusiastic as they were very often invited to meetings. Each month 
there were meetings to which we were invited together with the FRs and 
then we knew what was going on in the management of the forests.
Source: Focus group discussion with Beterou AVIGEF board members, January 2009
AVIGEF Forest Department (FD) NGO
?? Organize the association 
?? Plan and coordinate activities 
to be carried out for the 
management of the forests
?? Assign seedling production or 
services providing markets in 
OSN forest restoration 
?? Sign contracts with forest 
user groups in OSN forest 
management
??Mobilize (especially by 
collection of contributions) 
and manage financial 
resources necessary for the 
restoration of the forest
?? Respect the technical 
prescriptions of the PAP
?? Achieve internal management 
control
?? Look after the application 
of requirements under 
forest management laws 
and the PAP
?? Provide technical services 
and the training of local 
communities involved in 
the implementation of the 
PAP
?? Advise and support local 
communities in the 
implementation of the PAP
?? Assure the collection of 
forest exploitation taxes
?? Assist village organizations 
in the elaboration and 
implementation of their 
annual working plans and 
the budget
?? Assist local communities 
in the implementation of 
the plan 
?? Training 
and 
facilitation 
Table 3.1 Roles and responsibilities of AVIGEF, FD and NGO in the OSN’s PAP
Source: The OSN’s PAP (PGRN, 1999)
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At these meetings, FRs and AVIGEF members shared their views about the 
forests’ problems and the possible solutions. They discussed the conflicting is-
sues that divided them, such as local communities’ forest resources use rights 
and the sharing of the benefits deriving from the sustainable management of 
the forests. Thus, local communities were allowed to undertake in the forests 
some activities formerly forbidden. In each UA, a restoration committee was 
created by local communities and trained on seedlings and reforestation by 
CLUSA. The PGRN signed contracts with these committees to carry out resto-
ration activities. Restoration activities mobilized local communities who were 
paid in return. These initiatives were framed by the local communities as their 
profit from the participatory management of the forests. The following state-
ments corroborate this frame on the part of the local communities: 
The participatory approach was better than the former management 
system. During the PGRN phase, we were allowed to carry out many 
activities in the forests such as firewood gathering, fruit picking, and 
grass harvesting. There were also forest enrichment groups in almost 
all the villages and the young men worked in these groups and earned 
money.
Source: Focus group discussion with Beterou villagers, December 2008
The PGRN phase was associated with the building of the formal institutional 
framework through which the participatory management of the OSN should be 
implemented. However, it seems to have led to the construction, between the 
FRs and local communities, of social networks through meetings and restora-
tion activities that fostered interactions between them, common or overlapping 
values about the forests by sharing their frames of the forests’ problems and 
solutions, and social solidarity as each of the actors identified the benefits of 
participating. The PGRN was implemented without conflict between the FRs 
and local communities who even worked together to complete the PAP and the 
restoration of the forests. Local communities stopped fearing FRs, and con-
flicts about forest resources use existing between them during the coercion 
management period disappeared and were replaced by peace and social order. 
The formal participation of the stakeholders seems to have stimulated social 
cohesion among them with the emergence of some dimensions such as social 
networks, common values, social solidarity and social order (Dekker and Van 
Kempen 2006, 2009; Saarikoski et al. 2010; Van Marissing et al. 2006).
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3.4.2  The implementation of the OSN’s PAP by AVIGEF
When the PGRN finished in 1998, a few personnel from CLUSA were retained 
by the FD as there was no follow-up project to preserve and further implement 
the PAP. They had assisted AVIGEF in the implementation of the PAP until 
2000. Later, the former facilitators of CLUSA created the NGO Action for Com-
munitarian Initiatives Support (APIC: Action pour la Promotion des Initiatives 
Communautaires). APIC signed contracts with the FD for social mobilization 
and support for local communities in the implementation of the OSN’s PAP. 
The implementation of the OSN’s PAP involves the elaboration and execution 
of the Annual Working Plan (PAT: Plan Annuel de Travail) by all the stakeholders 
(AVIGEF, FD and NGO). The PAT includes the organization of local commu-
nities’ awareness raising campaigns on the sustainable management of the 
forests, and exploitation and reforestation activities in the forests. Exploitation 
activities concern the granting of authorizations and the collection of taxes for 
all activities carried out in the forests such as timber logging, grazing of cattle, 
charcoal production, fishing and occupation of forest zones that have been au-
thorized for agriculture. At the same time, reforestation and forest surveillance 
is pursued. 
The implementation of the OSN’s PAP started with the stakeholders (FRs, 
APIC facilitators, and AVIGEF members) involved in its establishment. They 
had all been trained on participation during the PGRN phase. According to 
them, their experiences and previous relationships facilitated the collaboration 
in the PAP implementation. AVIGEF board members expressed it in the follow-
ing statement:
At the beginning of the PAP implementation, everything went all 
right. At that time, when the FRs wanted to go anywhere in the forest, 
we went together. They never entered the forest without some mem-
ber of the AVIGEF board. When they caught illegal users in the forest, 
before deciding anything they called us. When they fined them, before 
going to make the payment in the state’s bank account, we used to 
collect what belonged to AVIGEF. They even gave us their permis-
sion to enter and carry out surveillances in the forests when they were 
away. If we caught illegal users, they only asked us to wait for them 
before deciding on the measures to be taken.
Source: Focus group discussion with Beterou AVIGEF board members, January 2009
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The same feelings were shared by an APIC facilitator who assisted AVIGEF dur-
ing this period: 
The early period of the PAP’s implementation was great. We worked 
with both FRs and AVIGEF without any problem. It was because 
all those present at that point in time were trained together by the 
PGRN. We had worked together with them during the PGRN period.
Source: APIC facilitator at Beterou village, February 2009
These testimonies show that the implementation phase of the PAP started 
quite well although the PGRN had ended. FRs, local communities and the facili-
tators managed to continue the activities undertaken during the PGRN phase 
even though there was no project to monitor the process. The stakeholders 
explained this by the fact that they knew each other and were all trained on the 
approach during the PGRN phase. 
The stakeholders evoke here the impact of social cohesion built during the 
PGRN phase. In fact, the stakeholders’ frames relating to social cohesion di-
mensions constructed during the PGRN phase remained and shaped the in-
stitutional relations among them. Social cohesion co-constructed during the 
PGRN phase enabled them to build informal roles and rules among themselves 
in the management of the forests. As the social network was conserved after 
the end of the PGRN, these informal relationships, roles and rules persisted. 
This is emphasized in utterances such as ‘…when FRs wanted to go anywhere 
in the forests, we went together… before deciding anything they called us…they 
even gave us their permission to go to surveillances …’. Tacitly agreed upon roles 
and rules had emerged and evolved beyond the formal institutions, enabling a 
smooth evolution of the participatory process (see also Arts and Buizer, 2009; 
Torniainen and Saastamoinen, 2007; Woodhill, 2008). During this phase, in ad-
dition to the previous social cohesion dimensions developed during the PGRN 
phase, social capital in terms of trust emerged from the interactions among 
the stakeholders. This is well emphasized by the fact that the FRs involved the 
AVIGEF members in surveillance of the forests and even allowed them to go 
alone and shared the outcomes with them. Thus, no tension was perceptible 
after the end of the project. 
However, a few years after the implementation phase of the PAP began, the 
FD started to replace the FRs of the villages surrounding the OSN. A conflict 
of role division between FRs and AVIGEF members arose when the new FRs 
arrived. The conflict hindered the implementation of the PAP as the new FRs 
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and AVIGEF members did not agree on how to carry out the activities such 
as surveillances of the forests and logging. Both stakeholders blamed and ac-
cused each other, holding each other responsible for the conflict using identity 
and characterization frames (Aarts and Woerkum 2006; Gray 2003; Gray et al. 
2001). AVIGEF members present the new FRs as responsible for the slowing 
down of the PAP implementation by their behaviour on arrival. The following 
interview excerpts highlight their thoughts:
The new FRs, when they came, had chosen to work with villagers who 
were not members of the AVIGEF board. Even when we complained 
to the higher level of the FD hierarchy they said nothing. What could 
we do? As they are the FRs so they can manage the forests alone. 
When everything finishes in the forests, we will all stay quiet.
Source: Focus group discussion with Beterou AVIGEF board members, January 2009
Another member argued:
The FRs started considering us like their trackers or their workmen, 
and I told them that we are not like that. I told them that we are 
members of an organization with which they should work as partners. 
We then decided if it is like that they should manage the forest alone 
and we will just watch them.
Source: Focus group discussion with Beterou AVIGEF board members, January 2009
The replacement of the FRs in the villages broke down the former social net-
work built during the PGRN phase. The above utterances show how much the 
relationship, roles and rules had been affected by this decision. By saying ‘…they 
had chosen to work with villagers who were not members of the AVIGEF board’ and 
‘The FRs started considering us like their trackers or their workmen…’ the AVIGEF 
members meant that, when the new FRs arrived, they did not follow the former 
informal relationships, roles and rules articulated with the former FRs. So, they 
evoked their intention to withdraw from the process, like in this piece of talk ‘…
they can manage the forests alone…’. 
On the other hand, for the FRs, the conflicts occurred because they had tried 
to stop the AVIGEF members from going beyond their remit. According to the 
FRs, when they came, they noticed that the AVIGEF members considered them-
selves as ‘FRs’. The following statement shows it clearly:
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The AVIGEF members who should work with the FRs transformed 
themselves into FRs. In the villages you could notice AVIGFEF mem-
bers were called ‘Bâ-Forêt’ [FR in local language]. When a logger came 
into the village, he was directly sent to the AVIGEF members who 
authorized him to log trees in the forests without referring to us. They 
even carry out surveillances and receive taxes from illegal loggers and 
herders without informing us, but this does not come within their re-
mit.
Source: Head of N’Dali Municipality FD office, February 2009
The conflicts arose when the stakeholders started contesting each other’s roles 
and the forest management rules. Whereas the local communities were still 
committed to the informal roles and rules that had been gradually developed, 
the new FRs framed this as usurping FR duties from a formal perspective. What 
we see here is a mismatch between the stakeholders’ identity and characteriza-
tion frames that affected the social cohesion existing between the former FRs 
and the AVIGEF members, as well as the informal institutions built. 
AVIGEF members explained the behaviour of the new FRs in terms of their lack 
of knowledge about participation as they were not trained together. In the fol-
lowing utterance, they present FRs as ‘laymen’ in the participatory approach and 
still committed to the former top-down management approach of the FD: 
Immediately after the end of the PGRN, the first participatory forest 
management project, many things had changed positively in the for-
est until the FRs trained in participatory management were moved to 
other places. The FRs sent to us after the end of the PGRN had just left 
school, lacked training on participatory management and confused ev-
erything in the process. Participatory management was not their prob-
lem. They knew only what the FD was doing before it was decided to 
shift to a participatory process.
Source: Focus group discussion with Beterou AVIGEF board members, January 2009
AVIGEF members also evoked in the above utterance that, contrary to their 
predecessors, the new FRs lacked training on participatory management and 
were not committed to this approach. This idea is acknowledged by the FD staff 
members. Therefore, the head of Borgou FD said: 
The worse is also that the PAP was only completed when the PGRN 
was about to end. The PAP was written, the committees were installed 
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and the project was finished. Another project did not follow immedi-
ately. The FRs trained in the participatory approach were transferred 
to other places, and new FRs came in to do the job. At the end of the 
process that led to the PAP, local communities should have been sup-
ported but they were left on their own. All this led to the delay in the 
implementation of the PAP.
Source: Head of Borgou’s FD office, February 2009
He was supported by FRs, as one of them argued in the following utterance:
When an FR is sent to a post where the participatory approach is 
being implemented, he should be trained. This does not happen. He 
reads the PAP himself or he is helped by his predecessor to under-
stand the on-going process. After one or two years when he has started 
understanding the process, he is sent to another place and we see a 
perpetual renewal of the FRs.
Source: Kpessou village FD representative, December 2009
AVIGEF members and FD staff members meant here that, besides the break 
of the social network built during PGRN, another cause of conflict is the differ-
ences in understanding of the participatory process between AVIGEF members 
and the new FRs. Unfortunately, there was no project to monitor the involve-
ment of the new FRs in the ongoing process as the PGRN did at the beginning 
of the process. 
3.4.3 The implementation of the OSN’s PAP under the PGFTR
The PGFTR was launched in 2003 and started its activities in 2005 to support 
the implementation of the PAP established for several forests, including the 
OSN. The project also had to establish the PAP for Benin’s forests that did 
not have their plan yet. The PGFTR was based on the experiences of the PGRN 
and was meant to pursue activities started during the PGRN phase, such as 
awareness raising, forest restoration and surveillance. In addition, the PGFTR 
introduced an innovation intended to support local communities in carrying 
out income-generating activities to reduce their livelihood dependency on for-
est resources. In each village adjacent to the forest, local communities were 
trained and given subsidies to carry out activities such as beekeeping, breeding 
of grasscutters (Thryonomys swinderianus: Greater Cane Rat, classified as micro-
livestock), shea butter production, tree nursery, etc. 
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In the OSN case, the PGFTR inherited the tense situation between the FRs and the 
AVIGEF members. However, the PGFTR did not assess the state of affairs in order 
to decide whether or not it should organize, as PGRN did, intense meetings and 
awareness raising campaigns that might enable FRs, AVIGEF members and APIC 
facilitators to interact and reconsider the rules to improve social cohesion among 
them. The PGFTR signed contracts with APIC to continue their assistance to the 
local communities in the implementation of the PAP. Instead of reconsidering the 
management situation and solving the existing problems, the corrective measure 
undertaken by the PGFTR was to officially ban logging activities in the OSN in 
2005. This measure escalated conflict between the stakeholders who interpreted 
the decision differently. 
For the FD, logging was stopped because it was not being properly implemented 
by both FRs and AVIGEF members. The FRs accused AVIGEF members of usurp-
ing the FRs’ remit by organizing logging in the forests without permission. The 
FD blamed AVIGEF members for misusing the revenue they earned from forest 
exploitation. The head of Borgou FD stated:
Unfortunately, the money collected by the members of the AVIGEF 
boards is misappropriated. An audit of the management of the OSN’s 
AVIGEF from the introduction of co-management until now showed that 
up to 80% of the money collected has been misappropriated and the 
board members are not bothered. They know their job perfectly, but it is 
a lack of patriotism that has led to bad management of the resources.
Source: Head of Borgou’s FD office, February 2009
The FRs also believed that logging should be stopped because the implementa-
tion of the participatory approach should be questioned. For them, it failed to 
achieve the sustainability of the OSN, as in this statement of an FR:
It is not that the participatory approach as theoretically described in the 
PAP is not being applied as it should be. We could say that this participa-
tory approach has contributed more to the destruction of our forests than 
to their protection. I say that because I am in the field and I see what is 
happening.
Source: Head of N’Dali Municipality FD office, February 2009
However, for the AVIGEF board members, the FD officially stopped logging activi-
ties in the forests to be free to carry it out illegally. This utterance during a focus 
group discussion with AVIGEF board members highlights their thoughts:
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In the past, the loggers were allowed to get a licence and log only with 
hand saws and not the motor chain-saws. During this period, when the 
loggers with licence were in the forest and heard the motor chain-saw 
sound, they informed us because they knew that motor chain-sawyers 
were illegal. We informed the FRs and they were caught. So the legal 
loggers helped us arrest the illegal loggers because they were jealous. 
Suddenly in 2005, logging was forbidden by the FD even for those who 
had a licence. They did it to be free to send their own sawyers into the 
forest; since then, illegal logging has increased anarchically.
Source: Focus group discussion with AVIGEF board members of Beterou, January 2009
According to AVIGEF board members, by suspending logging the FD was im-
plementing its hidden intention of dispossessing local communities from the 
power they had been given in CBNRM implementation. On this issue, the head 
of the executive board of the OSN’s AVIGEF stated:
They said that the forest is for us but they did not grant us all the 
power to manage it. We have no power in practice. For example, when 
there are illegal loggings in the forest, AVIGEF is not allowed to act. 
We don’t have the power to catch the illegal users. It is the FRs who 
have the right to do so. Also, it is the FRs who are allowed to fine the 
illegal loggers and solve the problems. They said we are there only to 
inform them. But in the end, we never got any feedback even verbally 
as partners.
Source: President of the OSN’s AVIGEF, January 2009
AVIGEF board members present the FD’s behaviour as a way of making the 
participatory approach fail in order to regain their former power with regard to 
forest management. The following extract from a focus group interview with 
AVIGEF board members also confirms their idea:
It seems like the FD proclaimed publicly that local communities are 
managing the forests through the AVIGEF, while FRs are illegally ex-
ploiting forest resources. Then, they would be able to say later that it 
is local communities who are responsible of the degradation of the 
forests and conclude that the sustainable management of the forests 
using a participatory approach failed.
Source: Focus group discussion with Beterou AVIGEF board members, January 2009
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Even though the PGFTR was launched, the cohesion between FRs and AVIGEF 
members continued to degenerate, and the conflict between them escalated. 
This was mainly due to the decision of the PGFTR to stop logging activities - a 
decision that was differently interpreted by FRs and AVIGEF members. This 
decision reinforced their blaming and accusations of each other. So, the lack of 
participation in decision making degraded the cohesion and escalated conflict 
between the stakeholders (see also Cradock et al. 2009). 
In contrast to the PGRN, the PGFTR did not succeed in rebuilding social cohe-
sion between the FRs and local communities. Rather, its decision to suspend 
logging intensified the conflict existing between them. Unlike the PGRN, the 
PGFTR did not have a team charged with organizing and following up the im-
plementation of the PAP in each forest. The PGRN experience shows that social 
networks and trust were built during the regular meetings and training sessions 
organized by the project for all the stakeholders together. Regular interactions 
between people favour the construction of social networks and trust (Cradock 
et al. 2009; Dekker and Van Kempen 2006, 2009; Van Marissing et al. 2006). 
This was confirmed during the implementation of the PAP as the replacement 
of FRs and the lack of meetings involving all the stakeholders led to the breakup 
of the social networks and the emergence of conflict and distrust. Even though 
the PGFTR was launched, the cohesion between the stakeholders continued to 
deteriorate and even reached rock bottom as no formal procedure was under-
taken to enforce interactions and enable coalitions and network building. 
3.5  Conclusions
Despite the multiple political theories and policy models for forest conserva-
tion, we still need more understanding of the evolution of institutions in par-
ticipatory management (Arts and Buizer 2009; Buizer and Van Herzele 2010; 
Saarikoski et al. 2010; Woodhill 2008). This analysis of the OSN participatory 
management has increased our understanding of the dynamics and interrela-
tions that exist between social cohesion, institutions and stakeholders’ frames 
in participatory processes.
Participatory processes start with formal institutions that represent the formal 
rules according to which interactions and relationships among stakeholders 
should be conducted (Buizer and Van Herzele 2010; Saarikoski et al. 2010). 
However, we discovered that progressively informal institutions and relation-
ships emerged and even became decisive in the further implementation of the 
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process. Formal rules, representing the stakeholders’ first-order reality at the 
beginning of processes, were interpreted, extended and translated into infor-
mal rules that were considered as their second-order reality. Progressively, these 
informal rules among the stakeholders became tacitly more important than the 
formal rules and institutionalized in the first-order reality on which interactions 
and relationships were henceforth based (Arts and Buizer 2009; Ford 1999). 
When the transformation of formal and informal rules evolves towards social 
cohesion, participation becomes effective (Cradock et al. 2009; Van Marissing 
et al. 2006). The OSN’s PAP represents the formal institutional set up at the 
beginning of the participatory management of these forests. However, during 
the course of the implementation of the plan, it was interpreted, extended and 
translated into a set of informal agreements and relationships through which 
FRs and AVIGEF members conducted the management of the OSN until the 
FRs were replaced. The stakeholders managed to establish and implement the 
OSN’s PAP during the PGRN, and for a few years after it ended. This happened 
because the training on participation that the stakeholders attended together 
and the interactions during restoration activities and meetings favoured the 
emergence of social cohesion from their interpretation and transformation of 
the PAP. Social cohesion dimensions such as social networks, common values, 
social solidarity, social order and trust emerged and enabled them to work to-
gether. 
The informal rules co-constructed by the stakeholders in interactions reflected 
and supported the social cohesion among them. Stakeholders’ behaviours al-
ways contribute to reinforcing or undermining institutions (Woodhill 2008). 
Formal institutions and centrally formulated plans are constantly challenged 
by new coalitions and networks that emerge from the interactions of the stake-
holders and lead to re-defined informal rules and sets of relationships (Arts 
and Buizer 2009; Buizer and Van Herzele 2010; Ford 1999). When they become 
first-order reality, informal institutions and the set of coalitions and networks 
that goes with them become so strong that the risk of conflict among partici-
pants is high when an attempt is made to break even some of them without 
proper monitoring. Conflict emerged in the case of the OSN’s participatory 
management when the social network created during the PGRN phase by FRs, 
AVIGEF members and APIC facilitators was broken by the FD when they re-
placed the FRs with new recruits, who subsequently challenged the established 
informal rules. 
Social cohesion as well as informal institutions are dynamic and change with 
time. When there is a gap between one project phase and the next, it is likely that 
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social cohesion as well as the informal institutions will change (Arts and Buizer 
2009; Cradock et al. 2009; Dekker and Van Kempen 2009; Woodhill 2008). 
Thus, it is critical to conduct an assessment of the state of affairs to adapt the 
implementation of the next project phase to the current social context. In the 
management of the OSN, after the PGRN phase ended, no project followed 
immediately. So, when the PGFTR was launched later, its decisions exacerbated 
conflicts between FRs and local communities because it was implemented on 
the basis of the results of the PGRN and failed to take into account the ongoing 
dynamics of social cohesion and institutions. The new project phase did not 
start with any joint stakeholder meeting reconsidering the state of affairs and 
the required process management. 
Finally, we note that a joint vision is not always needed to create coordinated 
action. What is essential is a process in which social cohesion is developed 
in terms of trust and constructive relationships that motivate stakeholders 
to collaborate and develop informal institutions and effective social organi-
zation (Woodhill 2008). FRs and local communities did not have the same 
backgrounds, interests and perspectives vis-à-vis the forests; however, they 
succeeded in implementing CBNRM without major conflicts during the PGRN 
phase and for a few years after because of social cohesion and informal in-
stitutions built together. Thus, the lack of a comprehensive joint review and 
renewed preparation and implementation by the stakeholders lies at the root of 
the failure of the next phase (Hounkonnou 2001). 
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 Abstract
This paper investigated how and why the issue of trust building between the 
park direction and the local communities gave way to a hidden conflict in the 
participatory management of the Pendjari national park (PNP) in Benin, and 
how it was resolved. The findings revealed that calculus-based trust was built at 
the beginning of the process and enabled an improved relationship and collab-
oration between the park direction and local communities, and a subsequent 
raise of wildlife in the park. However, dysfunctional use of the trust built led to 
the emergence of distrust, which evolved into conflict. This conflict was hidden 
by the illusion of peaceful relationships between the stakeholders as pursued in 
common meetings. It was noticeable only through accusations on each other, 
including the shift of responsibility for solving the conflict when discussing the 
management separately with the different stakeholders. We conclude that (dis)
trust should not be looked as a static/cognitive state, but as a dynamic frame 
that may be strategically used in interaction.
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4.1 Introduction 
Interactions in social networks have a strong but often overlooked influence 
on the propensity of stakeholders to participate in the implementation of poli-
cies that affect their livelihood (McClurg 2003). In stakeholders’ interactions, 
trust is one of the most influential factors that contribute to the success or 
failure of the relationships (Lewicki 2006; Lijeblad et al. 2009). When trust is 
high between individuals, they are generally more likely to engage in social ex-
changes and co-operative interactions (Ache and Andersen 2008). Trust is an 
important requirement for peaceful and effective management of all relation-
ships between individuals, between groups, and between individuals or groups 
and the organizations and societies to which they belong (Kelman 2005). Thus, 
building and enhancing trust is a way to improve co-operation and reduce in-
security in the relationship of different actors (Shahbaz et al. 2008). However, 
trust building among actors in interaction is a process where resistance forces 
emerge and need to be managed productively to weaken rather than strengthen 
them (Marcus 2006). Trust building needs change in the relationship system 
between the different actors involved, which cannot happen without experienc-
ing conflict (Marcus 2006). 
The relationship between trust and conflict is an obvious one as most people 
think that trust is the ‘glue’ that holds relationships together (Lewicki 2006). 
Trust is at the core of conflict resolution (Marcus 2006). Trust is important in 
conflict management as when parties trust each other they can resolve rela-
tively easily conflicts whereas when they do not trust each other, conflicts are 
destructive and their resolution is more difficult (Lewicki 2006). 
Conflicts are inherent to participatory natural resources management be-
cause of the differences between the stakeholders involved (Hjortso 2004). 
Participatory natural resources management involves many more or less in-
terdependent stakeholders with fundamental different values, backgrounds, 
perceptions, interests, and perspectives vis-à-vis these resources (Anderson 
et al. 1998; Hjortso 2004). Participatory natural resources management thus 
depends on (perceived) interdependence and co-operation of the stakeholders 
involved. When co-operation and interdependence are evoked in a social pro-
cess, the closely related issue of trust becomes important too (Eshuis and Van 
Woerkum 2003; Kelman 2005). Trust is a vital component for effective negotia-
tion between stakeholders, especially when they have an ongoing relationship 
with one another (Tomlinson et al. 2009). 
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The participatory management of the Pendjari national park (PNP) started in 
1993 after the Rio de Janeiro Summit. The park was created by the state dur-
ing the colonial period in 1954 without the consent of the local communities, 
who were chased from their lands to create it. Consequently, the park had been 
managed with power and repression by the forest department until 1992. This 
management period was characterized by continuous overt conflicts with many 
clashes, which opposed the forest administration and local communities for 
resources use. Because the local communities had a conflicting relationship 
with the park direction for decades, they were reluctant to engage in the man-
agement of the park at the beginning of the participatory process. However, 
after nearly two decades of the implementation of participatory management 
of natural resources in Benin, the case of the PNP is seen as relatively suc-
cessful (Kiansi and Sinsin 2007; Natta et al. 2009). This study investigated the 
dynamics of trust in the relationships and interactions among the stakeholders 
involved in the participatory management of the PNP. 
Many studies carried out by organizational scholars attempting to better under-
stand the dynamics of cooperation and competition, the resolution of conflicts, 
and the facilitation of economical exchange focused on interpersonal trust (Le-
wicki 2006). However, most researches have taken a static view of trust and 
limited attention has been given to the emergence, evolution and strategic use 
of trust over time within interpersonal relationships (Lewicki et al. 2006). In 
this study, we analyzed the construction, the dynamics and the strategic use of 
trust over time in the management of conflict in the participatory management 
of the PNP. To this end, we investigated how and why the trust related frames 
as expressed in interactions by the stakeholders involved, are reinforced or re-
vised over time in the management of the park. 
4.2 Visiting the concept of trust
The importance of trust in understanding relationships and interactions has 
caught much attention especially during the last decade (Bigley and Pearce 
1998; Kramer 1999; Lewicki 2006). Many definitions of trust have emerged 
and evolved over time (Dietz and Den Hartog 2006). Early researches on trust 
focused on intentions and motives and associated trust with the individuals’ 
expressions of confidence in others’ intentions and motives when they must 
make a decision to act (Dietz and Den Hartog 2006; Lewicki 2006). In recent 
researches, scholars include the behavioural aspect and define trust as ‘… the 
willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on 
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the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the 
trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party’ (Mayer 
et al. 1995:712). Putting these two considerations together, trust can be defined 
as an individual’s positive expectation regarding another’s words, decisions, 
and actions (Lewicki et al. 1998). 
Despite the existence of many definitions of trust, most scholars in this field of 
research agreed that trust has two fundamental features: the psychological and 
the behavioural features (Kramer 1999; Lewicki 2006). 
Trust has been defined as a psychological state of an individual, which entails a 
perceived vulnerability or risk deriving from the uncertainty regarding the mo-
tives, intentions, and future actions of others (Kramer 1999; Lewicki 2006; Le-
wicki et al. 2006; Tomlinson et al. 2009). Trust in this case is a more general 
attitude or expectancy about others and the social environment in which they 
are embedded (Kramer 1999). Psychological trust definitions share the notion 
of expectation from the trustor’s side (e.g. Mayor et al. 1995; Lewicki et al. 1998; 
Rousseau et al. 1998). This notion of trust is associated with cognition. 
Other definitions conceptualized trust in terms of risk taking behaviour (Mayer 
et al. 1995; Schoorman et al. 2007), choice behaviour (Kramer 1999; Lewicki 
2006; Lewicki et al. 2006; Tomlinson et al. 2009), or as an action (Dietz and 
Den Hartog 2006). Trust in this case refers to interactional behaviour rather 
than just a state of mind. A behavioural approach to trust considers that trust 
is grounded in observable choices made by individuals in interpersonal inter-
action context (Kramer 1999; Lewicki 2006). Individual’s assessments of the 
trusting relationship in terms of whether or not the expected gains will be maxi-
mized or the expected losses minimized are prior to trusting decision making 
(Kramer 1999). Trust is considered in that sense as a willingly rational and ac-
tive choice (Kramer 1999; Lewicki et al. 2006). Behavioural trust is thus a dis-
cursive constructed social relation, built in interaction between actors (Lewis 
2008). 
In both cases, trust can be considered as a frame held or built by individuals 
in interaction. Frames are what we use to make sense of the world around us 
(Gray 2003). Frames are either cognitive or interactional. Cognitive frames are 
memory structures that help us to organize and to interpret new experiences 
(Dewulf et al. 2009; Gray 2003; Minsky 1975). In the other hand, interactional 
frames are alignments or co-constructions produced and negotiated in interac-
tions (Dewulf et al. 2009; Gray 2003; Idrissou et al. 2011). As a cognitive frame, 
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trust is thus a memory-based structure of expectations of an individual about 
the other party’s future behaviours as well as the world around him (Dewulf et 
al. 2009). Trust is a knowledge schema, which refers to individuals’ expecta-
tions about others, objects, events and settings in the world (Tannen and Wal-
lat 1987; Dewulf et al. 2009). It is a product of past experiences with individuals 
and the relationships among them stored in memory and used to predict future 
behaviours. When trust is considered as an interactional frame, it is considered 
to be used strategically, co-constructed and continuously negotiated in the on-
going interaction among actors. Interactional trust frames are alignments co-
constructed through social actors’ discourses in interactions (Gray 2003; Aarts 
and Woerkum 2006; Dewulf et al. 2009). 
We assume that individuals start any interaction with cognitive levels of trust 
built from their past experiences, which become continuously negotiated and 
up-to-dated in their current interaction with new information of the changing 
context. At the start of any participatory natural resources management, all the 
stakeholders involved hold a level of cognitive trust about each other and their 
relationships based on their past experiences. Through out the process, align-
ment to each others’ trust is negotiated the result of which may be trust rein-
forcement or distrust. Several factors play key roles in these dynamics of trust.
 
4.3 Trust dynamics
4.3.1 Factors affecting trust formation
The definitions of trust converge towards the idea that trust is a multi-dimen-
sional construction (Mayer et al. 1995; Lewicki et al. 1998; Mayer and Davis 
1999; Dietz and Den Hartog 2006; Lewicki 2006; Schoorman et al. 2007). Sev-
eral factors were identified to influence the formation of trust in relationships. 
These factors are related to the trustor, the trustee, and the social context in 
which trust is been built. The factor related to the trustor is his propensity to 
trust what means his general willingness to trust others (Mayer et al. 1995). 
This propensity to trust represents his intrinsic disposition to trust someone 
prior to additional data on the other party. This identity of a party remains stable 
over time but varies across individuals due to their difference in developmental 
experiences, personality types, and cultural backgrounds (Mayer et al. 1995; 
Gray 2003; Aarts and Woerkum 2006; Dewulf et al. 2009).
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In trust development, the factors related to the trustee concern his trustworthi-
ness. Three characteristics often appear in the literature as factors determin-
ing a trustee’s trustworthiness: ability, benevolence, and integrity (Mayer et al. 
1995). These factors represent the trustor’s characterization frames about the 
trustee in their trust relationship. The ability of a trustee is the group of skills, 
competencies and characteristics that enable him to have a capacity to act in 
a specific domain (Mayer et al. 1995). When a trustor frames the trustee as 
having the ability in a specific situation, it means that the trustor believes that 
the trustee have the knowledge necessary to act in his favour in that context. 
As for benevolence, it is the degree to which a trustee is considered to want to 
behave in the trustor’s interest without considering his own interests (Mayer 
et al. 1995). Framing the trustee as imbued of benevolence vis-à-vis the trustor 
means that the trustor is sure that the trustee will do what ever is possible to 
help the trustor in any situation. In the case of integrity, the trustor first believes 
that he shares a set of principles with the trustee (Mayer et al. 1995). Second-
ly, the trustor frames the trustee as having integrity, when he knows that the 
trustee always respects the sets of principles they share. Ability, benevolence 
and integrity are all characterization frames used by the trustor to present the 
trustee. Ability, benevolence and integrity are all important to trust formation, 
but each may evolve independently to one another. Although they are related to 
one another, they are different at the same time. These factors enable the trus-
tor to trust the other party in a specific domain and context and maybe not in 
others. They also contribute to the development of different stages of trust in 
different interaction contexts.
4.3.2 Different stages of trust and informative frames
Different forms of relationships develop among individuals in different interac-
tions (Kelman 2005; Lewicki 2006). Depending on the frames related to the 
factors affecting trust formation constructed by the stakeholders in interaction 
and their dynamics, different stages of trust develop among them. Trust that 
emerges may also evolve to another stage due to the changing characteristics 
of the environment of relationships and interactions among the stakeholders.
Dietz and Den Hartog (2006) discerned five stages of trust along the contin-
uum of trust evolution. Deterrence-based trust is followed by calculus-based 
trust, knowledge-based trust, and relational-based trust before reaching iden-
tification-based trust (Dietz and Den Hartog 2006). The trust stages are differ-
ent intensities to which one trusts another. 
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Deterrence-based trust is trust that develops from the fear of punishment or 
negative consequences associated with the violation of trust (Lewicki 2006). 
Calculus-based trust is built and maintained through the promise of rewards 
for preserving trust (Lewicki 2006). Between these two trust relationships, pun-
ishment is likely to be more significant motivator than the promise of reward 
(Dietz and Den Hartog 2006). These forms of trust belongs to the behavioral 
tradition of trust as they emerge from the evaluation of the social context of the 
relationship (Kramer 1999; Lewicki 2006). Trust is considered here as a ratio-
nal choice and related to gain or loss evaluation in both cases. Stakeholders 
involved in a participatory process develop calculus-based trust depending on 
their assessment of their potential interests in terms of gain or loss in partici-
pating to the process. They develop deterrence-based trust when their frames 
underlying their trusting relationship are related to the sanctions they may re-
ceive from the other party when they do not trust him and act accordingly. 
For Dietz and Den Hartog (2006), ‘real’ trust develops from knowledge-based 
trust as before no trust exist (deterrence-based trust) or the relationship is 
characterized by suspicions (calculus-based trust). Knowledge-based trust ex-
ists when the parties are able to predict each other’s behaviour because they 
know each other’s motives, abilities, and reliability (Dietz and Den Hartog 
2006). The relationship moves to relational-based trust when emotional behav-
iour appears; trust is based on the affection one has towards the other (Dietz 
and Den Hartog 2006). Finally the development of identification-based trust 
is based on the mutual identification with the other’s desires and intentions 
(Lewicki 2006). At this stage, parties know each other up to the point that 
they understand more clearly what they must do to sustain the other’s trust. 
These three stages of trust are best captured through the identity and charac-
terization frames of the trustor. The emergence of knowledge-based, relational-
based, and identification-based trust depends on the match or mismatch of 
trustor’s identity frames with his characterization frames about the trustee. In 
a participatory process, these forms of trust are linked to the mutual identity 
and characterization frames of the different parties. They trust each other when 
their respective identity and characterization frames match.
4.4 Trust versus distrust
There is an ongoing debate in trust literature about the relationship between 
trust and distrust (Lewicki et al. 1998; Schoorman et al. 2007). Some research-
ers believe that trust and distrust are opposite ends of the same continuum 
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(e.g. Mayer et al. 1995; Schoorman et al. 2007). Shoorman et al. (2007) argue 
that the definition of trust- willingness to take risk (i.e. be vulnerable) in a rela-
tionship- means that at the lowest level of trust, no risk would be taken at all. 
Thus, for scholars of this strand of thought, distrust is defined as the complete 
lack or absence of trust or what Ross et al. (2001:568) called ‘absence of faith 
in other people’ (Ross et al. 2001; Schoorman et al. 2007). 
Other researchers support the idea that although trust and distrust are sepa-
rate dimensions, they are linked rather than being opposite ends of a single 
continuum (e.g. Lewicki et al. 1998; Dietz and Den Hartog 2006; Lewicki 2006; 
Lewicki et al. 2006). They argued that trust is not a simple matter of ‘either/
or’ in other words to trust or to distrust (Dietz and Den Hartog 2006). Trust 
and distrust can coexist like in the existing ambivalences under which positive 
and negative attitudes can coexist as well as expectations of benefit and harm, 
and love and hate sentiments have been shown to coexist (Lewicki et al. 1998). 
Another argument that supports this relation between trust and distrust is that 
one may trust the other party in some contexts and distrust him in others (Le-
wicki et al. 2006). This argument is also supported by the fact that relation-
ships are multifaceted and multiplex rather than unidimensional constructs, 
and moreover the parties involved are constantly inconsistent and in a state 
of imbalance (Lewicki et al. 1998; Seppänen and Blomqvist 2006). Thus, trust 
and distrust may appear simultaneously in a relationship and are considered 
important coexistent mechanisms for managing relationship complexity (Sep-
pänen and Blomqvist 2006). As participatory natural resources management 
involves many stakeholders with different characteristics, relationships among 
them are multiplex and multidimensional. We posit that in participatory natural 
resources management, trust and distrust coexist and evolve simultaneously 
depending on the interactional contexts rather than being opposite ends of a 
continuum. Trust and distrust both describe the state of the relationships but 
they are also used strategically by the stakeholders involved.
4.4.1 Functional and dysfunctional trust
Trust is mostly seen as having positive function in relationships (Mayer et al. 
1995; Dietz and Den Hartog 2006; Lewicki 2006; Schoorman et al. 2007; Tom-
linson et al. 2009). Trust is usually associated with positive emotional reactions 
(hope, confidence and assurance) towards another (Benamati et al. 2006). 
Trust reduces perceptions of physical risk by instilling confidence about the 
relationship, the work environment, another’s competence, and so on (Conchie 
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and Donald 2008). It also reduces psychological risk that is the distress caused 
by the expectations about others words, behaviour and actions (Conchie and 
Donald 2008). According to social exchange theory, when an individual vol-
untary engages in behaviour that benefits to another, it generates trust to the 
other party’s side and a sense of obligation to reciprocate with positive actions 
(Conchie and Donald 2008). Trust is also know as enabling organizational 
outcomes such as co-operation and high level of performance as it creates 
or enhances the conditions of positive interpretations of another’s behaviour 
(McEvily et al. 2003). 
However, trust does not always yield positive effects. Organizations that rely 
exclusively on trust as an organizing principle may experience strategic blind-
ness, overconfidence, inertia, or the inability to innovate (McEvily et al. 2003; 
Conchie and Donald 2008). Thus, a level of distrust can be functional in some 
situations. 
4.4.2 Functional and dysfunctional distrust 
Although distrust has always been seen as negative and harmful, it should be 
acknowledged that there are potentially valuable benefits of some distrust (Le-
wicki and Tomlinson 2003; Tomlinson and Lewicki 2006; Conchie and Donald 
2008). Healthy and resilient organizations contain elements of distrust and 
suspicious in their management system for the importance of being vigilant 
and prudent in their behavioural (Conchie and Donald 2008). Lewicki and Tom-
linson (2003) argued that vigilance of another, periodic monitoring of their be-
haviour, and formal contracts are all reasonable and appropriate ways to ensure 
compliance and maintain ‘appropriate boundaries’ in a relationship. A certain 
level of distrust is also seen as vital to preventing excessive group cohesion that 
precludes sound decision making (Lewicki and Tomlinson 2003). Functional 
distrust is valuable as it prevent us from adopting naïve view of others that may 
blind us from seeing the cues of their untrustworthiness and thus set bound-
aries around their behaviours to limit their freedom (Lewicki and Tomlinson 
2003; Tomlinson and Lewicki 2006). 
However, distrust is often regarded as having negative effects as it can foster 
cynicism and paranoia (Lewicki and Tomlinson 2003; Tomlinson and Lewicki 
2006). Distrust is associated in this case with a lack of cooperation, lower sat-
isfaction and commitment, and even hostile behaviour (Lewicki and Tomlinson 
2003). Dysfunctional distrust hinders communication and reduces the parties’ 
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willingness to share information and engage in problem solving in conflict situ-
ation (Lewicki and Tomlinson 2003; Tomlinson and Lewicki 2006). As with dys-
functional distrust the positions of the parties harden and they becomes reluc-
tant to make any concessions, conflicts escalate towards intractability (Lewicki 
and Tomlinson 2003; Tomlinson and Lewicki 2006).
The theoretical discussion of this section shows that trust is a multidimension-
al frame with several stages. Although interactions between individuals start 
with a certain stage of trust/distrust, it evolves based on the characteristics of 
the interaction context. Both trust and distrust may contribute to enhancing 
or hindering the relationships and even lead to conflict or escalate the existing 
conflict in interaction. The emergence, dynamics, functions and uses of trust 
and distrust and the roles they played in the management of the PNP in Benin 
were investigated. 
 
4.5 Methodology
4.5.1 Research setting
The study was carried out on the management of the Pendjari national park 
(PNP). The PNP comprises the total wildlife reserve of 266,000 ha surrounded 
by two partial reserves of 205,000 ha, Pendjari and Atacora, for hunting and ec-
otourism (CENAGREF 2004). The park was declared a State forest and partial 
wildlife reserve in 1954. One year later, it became a State forest and complete 
wildlife reserve, which was renamed Pendjari national park in 1961. In 1986, 
UNESCO included PNP and its adjacent hunting zones in world’s biosphere 
reserves list. 
The PNP is located in the north-western part of Benin and mainly shared by 
two municipalities: Tanguiéta and Matéri (Figure 1). It is surrounded by 23 vil-
lages and one town. These villages are located alongside two axes that mark 
two of the three borders of the park: the Tanguiéta-Batia axis with 11 villages 
and the Tanguiéta-Porga axis with 12 villages. The third border of the park is the 
interstate border between Benin and Burkina Faso in the north-west of Benin, 
which is the Pendjari river. The populations living in these villages are farmers, 
hunters, herders and fishermen. Agriculture is their main source of livelihood. 
The villagers use slash and burn farming systems coupled with long term fallow 
periods. Hunting is a custom in the villages.
110 111
Chapter 1
TOGO
NIGERIA
BURKINA FASO
NIGER
COLLINES
ZOU
BORGOU
DONGA
ALIBORI
ATAKORA
Kandi
Parakou
Abomey
Savalou
Natitingou
Djougou
Cotonou
Dogbo
GHANA
Ouidah
Lokossa
Sakété
Porto Novo
Pendjari 
National Park
Agoua
Forest
B I G H T  O F  B E N I N
AFRICA
BENIN
Figure 4.1: Study area location 
111
Trust and Hidden Conflict in Participation
4.5.2 Research method
The case study method was used to investigate the management of the PNP. 
We were interested in understanding the ‘how’ and ‘why’ trust has been con-
structed and evolved in the management of the PNP. The case study method is 
suitable this research as we tries to illuminate why decisions were taken, how 
they were implemented, and what results were obtained (Schramm 1971; Bruhn 
2009). The case study examines a phenomenon in its natural setting using 
multiple data collection methods to gather information from one or few entities 
(people, groups, organizations) (Benbasat et al. 1987; Eisendhardt 1989). In 
this research, we collected data through literature reviews, observations, inter-
views and discussions.
Data were gathered from September 2009 to February 2010. We consulted 
documents available on the park and the communities living in the area for 
background information. We conducted interviews and informal conversations 
with different stakeholders involved in the management of the park such as the 
park director, the president of the AVIGREF of the PNP, the technical advisor of 
the park direction (3), the EGs (4), the mayor of Tanguiéta, the hunters (6), and 
the villagers (15). Some stakeholders were met two to four times to triangulate 
information. In addition, four focus group discussions with the farmers and 
three with the hunters were carried out to triangulate the information gathered 
from individual discussions with the stakeholders. All interviews and conver-
sations have been tape-recorded. Participatory observations were also made 
when attending meetings organised by the stakeholders in the framework of 
the management of the park, and when living and drinking with people to catch 
their stories. 
The interviews and conversations were transcribed and analysed using dis-
course analysis method. Discourse analysis method is about studying and 
analyzing the uses of language (Hodges et al. 2008). It seeks, within the area 
of social sciences, to unveil the linguistic singularities of discourse as a so-
cial production (de Pinho et al. 2009). Discourse analysis also considers that 
language-use is as a form of action (Hammersley 2003). In the range of the ex-
isting discourse analysis methods, we used critical discourse analysis method. 
Critical discourse analysis sees discourse as socially constructive as well as 
socially conditioned (Blommaert and Bulcaen 2000). Critical discourse analy-
sis method was suitable for this study as we were interested in understanding 
how and why trust was socially constructed and influenced in the management 
of the PNP. 
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4.6  Case study results
4.6.1 Introduction of participation in the management of the PNP 
 
Until 1993 the PNP was managed solely by the forest department since it was 
declared protected area in 1954. During this period, forest rangers (FRs) in 
charge of the surveillance of the park struggled to keep the local communities 
far away by the mean of repression. Some of the local communities who were 
living in the park were chased and forbidden to enter the park for any reason 
even for non-timber resources use, watering for their cattle and rituals for their 
gods still in the park. During the 1980s the tension raised up after clashes 
between the local communities and the FRs occasioned death of villagers and 
their animals, shot by the FRs. 
Participatory management of the PNP was introduced in 1993 by the project 
of natural resources management (PGRN: Projet de Gestion des Ressources Na-
turelles), the first participatory natural resources management project imple-
mented in Benin. This project tested the feasibility of participatory process 
in the management of natural resources in Benin between 1993 and 1999. In 
the case of PNP, participation was experimented in the village of Batia, where 
the PGRN involved the villagers in activities such as reforestation, tracking at 
game hunting and wildlife ecological monitoring (surveillance, wildlife count-
ing,…). In the same period, the national centre for wildlife reserves manage-
ment (CENAGREF: Centre National de Gestion des Réserves de Faune), a state 
office endowed with administrative and financial autonomous was created in 
1996 to take over the management of Benin’s parks.
The participatory management of the PNP effectively started in 2000, when the 
CENAGREF decided to scale up this management system to the entire park by 
involving all the villages surrounding the park and all the stakeholders in the 
management of the park. The village association for wildlife reserve manage-
ment (AVIGREF: Association Villageoise de Gestion des Réserves de Faune) was 
created and represents all the local communities living in the 23 villages sur-
rounding the PNP. This organisation is managed by a board in each village. 
The members of the village boards meet to elect the representatives of the axes 
of Tanguiéta-Porga and Tanguiéta-Batia, and the president of the AVIGREF-
Pendjari. The AVIGREF has an executive board formed by a secretary, and an 
accountant and his assistant to manage respectively the administrative and fi-
nancial issues of the organisation. AVIGREF has a directorate, which members 
are the president of AVIGREF and two other members, the Director of the PNP, 
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the mayors of Tangiéta and Matéri Municipalities, and two representatives of the 
farmers association of these two municipalities. 
Participation was introduced in the management of the PNP in a context character-
ized by more than four decades of conflicts and tension between local communities 
and the park direction. Thus, a number of decisions and actions have been under-
taken by the park administration supported by international donors to stimulate 
collaboration among the stakeholders involved in the participatory management 
of the PNP.
4.6.2 Trust building 
At the beginning of the implementation of the participatory management of the 
PNP, the local communities were reluctant to the aim of the park direction to in-
volve them in the management of the park due to the tense relationship they had 
with the park direction for many decades. The first intention of the park direction 
was thus to gain the collaboration of the local communities by building a trust-
worthy relationship with them. This is evoked by the Park director in the following 
utterance:
The objective was to reassure the local communities, who had had for long 
time since the park was created, tense relationship with the park direction.
Source: Director of PNP, January 2010
 
Therefore, the park direction intended to foster the participation of local communi-
ties by carrying out some actions. The Park director stated:
… beyond our intentions, we had to act to convince the local communities 
of our good intentions. The actions, which interest them mostly, are the 
perceptible financial incomes deriving from the management of the park 
and the access of certain resources in the park. It is why we started sharing 
income generated by the exploitation of the hunting zones with them,… 
the meat, which is systematically given to the villagers, …and at last, in 
the same idea of concrete actions to be undertaken, the park direction 
allowed the villagers to have access to the park for non-timber resources, 
watering their cattle and land for agriculture in the zone for controlled oc-
cupation (ZOC: Zone d’Occupation Contrôlée) created to answer to land 
shortage evoked by farmers.
Source: Director of PNP, January 2010)
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This interview excerpt highlights the intention of the park direction at the be-
ginning, which was to achieve some concrete actions that would enable the 
local communities to trust it and thus commit to its objective of sustainable 
management of the park. 
The park direction started replacing progressively the FRs by eco-guards (EGs), 
some young men recruited in the 23 AVIGREF-villages to carry out surveillances 
in the park. According to the park director,
…continuing to send the FRs, with whom the local communities had 
had a lot of  troubles in the past even with gunshots, would mean that 
the park direction still wanted to pacify the region instead of collabo-
rating with the local communities.
Source: Director of PNP, January 2010
The EGs have been trained to conduct surveillances in the park and also raised 
awareness among their parents on the sustainable management of the park in 
the villages. The park direction believed that the EGs will be more trusted and 
heard by their relatives than the FRs. Henceforth, surveillances were carried 
out by the EG and the AVIGREF members. A surveillance team was composed 
with 3 EGs and 2 AVIGREF members. They spent 15 days in the park, after which 
they were replaced by another team. The AVIGREF members were alternatively 
chosen in different villages to enable many villages to be involved in the surveil-
lance. They were also asked by the park direction to organize awareness raising 
campaigns with the EGs in the villages and village surveillances by its members 
only at the borders of their villages with the park.
 
The above statement of the park director shows that the park direction also 
decided to release each year, 30% of the benefits deriving from game hunting 
it organizes to the AVIGREF. The money is shared among the villages based 
on their results in the implementation of the activities requested by the park 
direction. It is used to pay the villagers, who participated to the surveillances 
with the EG and those who were involved in the village surveillances. Part of 
the money is also used to pay AVIGREF members, who organised meetings in 
the villages and abroad. The rest of the money is kept in the bank account of 
the AVIGREF of each village and dedicated to building infrastructures in the 
villages.
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The AVIGREF villages are also scheduled to receive the animals killed in the 
park by tourists at game hunting organised every year by the park direction. 
The meat is shared in priority among AVIGREF members, who pay 300 FCFA 3 
per kilo and sometimes sold among non-members paying 600 FCFA per kilo. 
The local communities are also allowed to have access to the park for their 
rituals and sacrifices to their gods, harvest non timber resources, and watering 
their cattle with the permission of the park direction. The park direction also 
delimitated a strip of land between the park and the villages called ZOC, where 
villagers are allowed to crop after signing a contract with the park direction. 
Both the park direction and the AVIGREF members acknowledged that these 
actions had an impact on the behaviour of the local communities vis-à-vis the 
park direction and the park. The park director said in that sense:
I can say that for at least 5 years, we saw the impacts of the implica-
tion of local communities because of the positive evolution of wildlife, 
which was perceptible. At the same time, we noticed an improvement 
of our relationship with them.
Source: Director of PNP, January 2010
The president of AVIGREF-Pendjari confirms this point of view of the park di-
rector in the following statement: 
The fauna had increased between 2000 and 2005 as a result of the 
decrease of poaching. Many poachers were caught with the collabora-
tion of the EGs and the local communities.
Source: President of AVIGREF, December 2009
The local communities also acknowledged that the actions of the park direction 
changed their mind about the park direction before participation was intro-
duced. This focus group discussion excerpt of the researcher with them shows 
it:
Local communities: We were all hunters in this village, but now al-
most all of us stopped. 
Researcher: Why? 
3  1 €=655.957 FCFA
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Local communities: We realized that our village is penalized from 
benefiting from the CENAGREF because of few persons’ behaviour. 
When we poach and kill an animal, we only use a part of the meat 
and leave the rest in the park. This is not significant compared to what 
we receive from the CENAGREF for working with it. We build schools, 
health centres, pay teachers and nurses with this money, which is good 
for us and for our children. Also nowadays it is more and more difficult 
to hunt without anybody else in the village noticing and telling the 
AVIGREF members or the CENAGREF.
Source: Focus group discussion with local communities, November 2009
The above utterances show that according to the park director, the president of 
AVIGREF and the local communities, the park direction succeeded in building 
a trustworthy relationship with the local communities through its actions to-
wards them. A close analysis of them enables to understand that the park direc-
tion developed a calculus-based trust with the local communities. The park di-
rector believed that with the rewards and concession of the park direction to the 
local communities, the park direction has been able to gain their confidence. 
4.6.3 Conflict emergence
However, according to the park direction, since 2006 the counting of wildlife 
population in the park revealed a significant decrease after 5 years of continu-
ous raise. The different stakeholders started accusing each other of acting ir-
responsible and they even acted one against another.
The accusations of the park direction and the AVIGREF executive board
The park direction and the AVIGREF executive board members explained the 
decrease of wildlife in park by the raise of poaching. They reported to have wit-
nessed since 2006, an increase in wild animal meat transactions in the neigh-
boring villages of the park. Both parties blamed the EGs of being responsible of 
this reverse of the situation. 
The EGs were mainly accused by the park direction and the AVIGREF executive 
board for carrying the responsibility of the increase of poaching because their 
behaviour has changed compared to what it was at the beginning of the pro-
cess. The park director:
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The EGs started behaving like in the public sector. You may know 
what is happening there. It is that once you become an agent of the 
public sector, your job is secured for 30 years. Whether you work or 
not, you will get your salary at the end of each month until you retire 
and start getting your retirement allowances.
Source: Director of PNP, January 2010
He continued by saying:
In the management of the park, we made a mistake in putting in 
place a remuneration system, which is not linked to the result; an 
automatic remuneration like in the public sector.
Source: Director of PNP, January 2010
 
These utterances show that according to the park director, the reverse of the 
situation is due to the fact that the park direction has secured the EGs’ job up 
to a point that they became overconfident about their job situation. The park 
direction converted the EGs into permanent workers of the CENAGREF with 
permanent salary and retirement; it granted them with healthcare insurance, 
built houses for them, and created bonuses and rewards for them when they 
arrest illegal users in the park. All these actions contributed to the fact that 
the EGs saw their job secured enough, what, according to the Park Director, 
harmed their motivation to work.
These points of view were shared by the technical advisor of the park direction who 
stated:
The EGs developed the complex of the ‘spoiled child’. As they had suc-
ceeded many times in the past in getting some advantages through 
claiming and disobediences, finally it became a habit for them. They 
were asking more and more advantages threatening to stop their job if 
they did not get satisfaction. As there were no more advantages to give 
them, they started working less and less. According to me, this could 
lead to the disappearance of the EGs’ corporation.
Source: Technical advisor of PNP, February 2010
Both the park director and the technical advisor pointed in their talks, the lack 
of benevolence of the EGs. According to them, the way the park direction dealt 
with the EGs at the beginning of the process empowered them so that they 
became overconfident about their importance in the management of the park. 
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For the park direction, the EGs even developed complicity relationships with 
some poachers instead of combating them. The park director referred to that 
in the following piece of talk:
Because they thought they acquired a permanent job situation, they 
wanted to gain more by any mean and even by using their position of 
EGs, someone who should protect the park, to be in complicity with 
the poachers.
Source: Director of PNP, January 2010
 
This utterance shows that the park direction put also the integrity of the EGs in 
question. The EGs were accused of lack of integrity in carrying out the surveil-
lances. 
The president of AVIGREF confirmed the thoughts of the park director and the 
technical advisor on the fact that the EGs became less efficient in their job. 
However, he raised other aspects, which he believed explain the current behav-
iour of the EGs as shown in the following interview excerpt:
The job became too difficult for the EGs. At the beginning they were 
strong, but their strength has decreased over time. Some have the will 
but they are not able to walk for long distances anymore. So when 
they go to surveillance, they don’t penetrate deeper in the park. Most 
of them built a family and need to stay sometimes at home. Some 
of them developed other businesses in the cities and come back to 
monitor them instead of staying in the park. These are factors, which 
explain the inefficiency of the EGs vis-à-vis the poachers, who always 
fear to be caught and are vigilante. When the poachers realized that 
there were less risk to be caught, their number increased in the park.
Source: President of AVIGREF of PNP, December, 2009
 
The president of AVIGREF pointed out here the loss of ability and integrity of 
the EGs in their job. According to him, although some had the will to do their 
job, they were no more able because they became less capable. For some, it is 
because other activities compete with their job as EGs that they spent less time 
for surveillance in the park. 
Although the park direction succeeded in building trust with the EGs, this trust 
was instable and even disappeared. The utterances above show that the park 
direction had developed a calculus-based trust with the EGs’ at the beginning 
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of the process by the mean of incentives. When poaching started raising in the 
park, the park direction and the AVIGREF executive board distrusted the EGs as 
they believed that the situation was due to the EGs’ loss of benevolence, integ-
rity and ability. According to them, the EGs made a dysfunctional use of trust 
developed as they reciprocated with inadequate job fulfillment. 
The accusations of the EGs
The EGs agreed that they became less efficient than how they were at the begin-
ning of the process. However, they evoked other reasons than those of the park 
direction to explain their current performance. In the following utterance, they 
pointed out their job:
This job is not the one someone can do for longtime. It is a very tough 
one. Since we started until 2006, we were young and enthusiastic. 
During this period, when we saw signs of poachers in the park or when 
we got some information about them, we went deeper in the park 
and even at night to catch them. But after a while, we were not able 
to do that.
Source: EG informant, October 2009
 
Another EG stated:
We have been doing this job for almost 10 years. Nobody could be ac-
tive in this job after 10 years like he was at the beginning. In few years, 
we will become unable to perform this job. Some young EGs should 
be recruited to refresh the corp.
Source: EG informant, December 2009
In these utterances, the EGs confirmed what the president of AVIGREF believed 
was one of the causes of their loss of ability. For them, as their job is hard, the 
park direction should renew the EGs after a while with fresh recruited EGs to 
keep the trend of working. The former EGs should thus be promoted to other 
positions demanding less physical effort. 
However, the EGs believed that it was mainly their lack of motivation, which ex-
plain their performance. According to them, the park direction started behaving 
unfairly with them what affected slowly their motivation. A EG resumed their 
opinion by saying:
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The important problem is our career, which is wrongly managed by 
the park direction. As our job is physically demanding, we should be 
strongly motivated to keep our performance what the park direction 
did not do. Since we started, our salary had been raised until 2006. 
But since then, we are getting this salary until now. We did not get any 
promotion and in 5 years some of us could not go to surveillance be-
cause they will become useless… it seems like we are like bananas that 
the CENAGREF will eat the flesh and then throw away the peels later.
Source: EG informant, January 2010
Another EG added:
The EGs lost hope. It is when people believe that something will change 
that they spend a lot of energy at their work. We are still expecting the 
document, which is supposed to describe how the EGs should evolve 
since they are recruited until their retirement, to be signed. Added to 
that, we are still at the same salary since four years ago despite infla-
tion all over the world.
Source: EG informant, December 2009
 
These interview excerpts highlight a raise of distrust at the EGs’ side. For them, 
the dramatically decline of their performance is due to their ‘loss of hope’ about 
the achievement of expectations they have built upon their relationship with 
the park direction. They explain the decline of their motivation as a response 
to their distrust to the park direction’s way of managing their career. These ut-
terances of the EGs also show that they considered their work as a job, what 
means that they were mainly interested in the material benefits from their work 
and did not seek or receive other type of reward from it (see Wrzesniewski et 
al. 1997). 
This section displays through the utterances of the stakeholders, the emergence 
of a conflict between the park direction and the executive board of AVIGREF in 
one side and the EGs in the other side in the management of the PNP. This 
conflict is characterized by mutual accusations, showing the rise of distrust 
among the stakeholders. The EGs distrusted the park direction because they 
believed that the park direction was mismanaging their career by not respecting 
its words. As a consequence, they lost the motivation they had at the beginning 
of the process. This situation led to the raise of poaching in the park, which 
the park direction interpreted as a result of the EGs’ complacency. The park 
direction and the executive board of AVIGREF in turn distrusted the EGs and 
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accused them to have lost benevolence, integrity and ability in the surveillance of 
the park. Although the park direction and the executive board of AVIGREF, and 
the EGs agreed on the rise of poaching in the park because the EGs became 
less efficient, they had different opinions on what led to the current situation. 
Each party distrusted the other and as a consequence shifted the responsibility 
of the raise of poaching on him. 
To solve the problem of poaching, the park direction decided to take new mea-
sures to boost the surveillances in the park. 
4.6.4 Management of the conflict 
The reaction of the park direction to the drop of the population of wildlife due 
to the raise of poaching was to involve the poachers in the surveillance of the 
park since 2009. According to the park direction, poaching was persisting in 
the park because it has failed to involve this category of stakeholder since the 
beginning of the participatory management of the park. The poachers were 
asked by the park direction to form their own organization. They were hence-
forth called local professional hunters (CPL: Chasseurs Professionels Locaux). 
Since then, the surveillance of the park was carried out by a team of 6 persons: 
2 EGs, 2 AVIGREF members and 2 CPLs. However, this decision was differently 
interpreted by the park direction and the EGs. 
The arguments of the park direction 
The park direction justified its decision to involve the CPLs in the management 
of the park with a research carried out, which confirmed its importance and 
possibility. However, a close discussion with the park director and the technical 
advisor of the park showed that the park direction accepted to negotiate with 
the poachers because it believed that their involvement in the surveillances will 
solve many problems they were facing with both the poachers and the EGs. 
With regard to the involvement of the poachers, the park director declared:
Poachers work in networks. So, if we have at least some of the mem-
bers of these networks with us, the others will be worried as they knew 
their former fellows will reveal to us their secrets and they will be 
caught.
Source: Director of PNP, January 2010
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He continued by arguing:
We encourage the combination of actors for the surveillances to avoid com-
plicities and corruption. Because when you are alone to hold the power like 
it was with the EGs in the past, complicities start. But now that the CPLs, 
with who the EGs were used to have complicity deals are also involved in 
the surveillances, it complicates things for the EGs. We are even getting 
some good results. The CPLs started reporting to us the behaviours of the 
EGs. They told us that sometimes the EGs don’t want to go far in the park 
for surveillance. The CPLs want to show that they are worthy.
Source: Director of PNP, January 2010
 
These utterances of the park director show how the park direction was dealing with 
the conflict, which opposed it with the EGs. Instead of continuing to negotiate with 
the EGs, the park direction decided to involve the CPLs to counter the effects of 
the complicities, corruption and lack of motivation of the EGs. The park direction 
believed that the combination of actors in the surveillances will balance the power 
between the EGs and the CPLs. 
The utterances highlight that the park direction legitimized the involvement of the 
CPLs with its distrust to the EGs. It made a functional use of its distrust to the EGs. 
By involving the CPLs, the park direction was protecting itself from the consequenc-
es of the potential negative intentions, behaviours and actions of the EGs such as 
complacence, complicities and corruption. It also involved the CPLs to share their 
knowledge on poaching that might enable it to catch their former fellows and de-
nounced the dishonest EGs. The park direction thus developed deterrence-based 
trust with the EGs as they were controlled by the CPLs at their job. 
The park direction also made a functional use of distrust in setting-up his new re-
lationship with the CPLs expressed in the following statement of the park director: 
We might experience in the future with the CPLs what is happing with the 
EGs now meaning loss of enthusiasm and complicities. The most impor-
tant is that we learned from our experience with the EGs. Even if we might 
have problems with the CPLs, it will be different because we will never 
consider a CPL as a permanent agent of the CENAGREF like we did with 
the EGs. We will work with them as partners and they will be paid accord-
ing to the job they would do.
Source: Director of PNP, January 2010
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In this piece of talk, the park director showed that the park direction used its 
experience with the EGs in setting up its relationship with the CPLs by avoid-
ing signing permanent contract with them. This behaviour of the park direc-
tion is an illustration of a functional use of distrust. Because of its distrust to 
the EGs and for fear of experiencing the same later with the CPLs, the park 
direction adapted a new type of contract with the CPLs. This is to avoid the 
development of complacence, complicities, corruptions and the lack of mo-
tivation by the CPLs as experienced with the EGs because of the permanent 
contract the park direction signed with them. The behaviour of the park direc-
tion illustrates the development of both calculus-based and deterrence-based 
trusts with the CPLs since the beginning of their relationship. 
According to the park direction, this management strategy is working so far 
as with the contribution of the CPLs they have arrested some poachers and 
no overt conflict is noticed among the actors except the complains of the 
EGs.
The reaction of the EGs
Not surprisingly the EGs complained about the involvement of the CPLs in 
the management of the park. They raised some concerns about the trustwor-
thiness of the CPLs in their surveillance of the park. One of the EGs said:
Nothing proves us that the CPLs fully reconverted. Give them guns 
and allow them to go to surveillance is a danger as nothing proves 
that they won’t start again their former behaviour after they know 
all our surveillance strategies.
Source: EG informant, January 2010
 
The EGs evoked clearly in this piece of talk, their distrust to the CPLs. They 
showed that the change of the CPLs will not be sustained in the future. They 
supported their thought by evoking their experience with some poachers, 
who trained them on patrols in the park and were caught later for poaching 
in the park. They presented those who showed up as opportunistic poachers 
who wanted to gain from the park direction. 
The EGs also considered the involvement of the CPLs as a threat for them 
because of their past conflicting relationship. An EG declared in that sense:
The park direction is asking us to go to surveillance with the CPLs 
who we had tracked for many years. We found it difficult to work 
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with our enemies as it is an occasion the park direction is giving them 
to pay back what we did to them.
Source: EG informant, January 2010
This utterance shows that the EGs presented the CPLs as untrustworthy per-
sons who may be dangerous and violent against them. 
This decision to involve the CPLs in the surveillance also increased the EGs’ 
distrust towards the park direction with regard to the management of their ca-
reer. For the EGs, the involvement of the CPLs confirmed that the park direction 
was not willing to improving their job conditions as expressed in the following 
piece of talk of one of them:
The EGs are frustrated as the park direction still owes them four years 
of bonuses, saying that there are not enough resources. But where do 
the resources, which are used to pay the CPLs come from?
Source: EG informant, December 2009
 
The EGs used distrust here as strategic means to protect their job and defend 
their bonuses they believe the CPLs will share with them.
The park direction considered the reactions of the EGs as reflecting the same 
reaction the FRs had in 2000, when the EGs were involved in the surveillance. 
It considered their reaction as normal as they all focus on their interest threat-
ened. Like it happened in 2000, the park direction believed that the EGs and 
AVIGREF members will slowly accommodate themselves to this new situation. 
By saying ‘We even started getting some good results’, the park director expresses 
that the park direction still had the situation under control and believed that its 
plan was working.
Both the park direction and the EGs used distrust as agency. The park direction 
used distrust to legitimize the involvement of the CPLs, which it believed will 
force the EGs to work and in setting up its relationship with the CPLs. The EGs 
in the other hand expressed distrust to fight against the involvement of the 
CPLs and claim the improvement of their job conditions. 
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4.7 Discussion and conclusions
 
Conflict is often defined as the incompatibility of ideas, beliefs, behaviours, 
roles, needs, desires, values, and so on among individuals (Lewicki 2006). In 
many cases, the apparently peaceful surface of management processes ob-
served by an outsider gives the illusion of absence of conflict between the ac-
tors involved. The conflict in the management of the PNP was noticeable only 
when discussing with each of the stakeholders separately. Although many con-
sider as conflicts only dramatic confrontations that attract public attention and 
even involve sometimes third party in the resolution of the differences, the vast 
majority of conflicts occur out of sight and in forms other than official negotia-
tion (Kolb and Putnam 1992). Hidden or silent conflicts in management pro-
cesses are usually embedded in the routine activities of the work settings and 
are rarely officially acknowledged or managed in the ways most conflict models 
suggest (Bartunek et al. 1992). In the case of the PNP participatory manage-
ment, the conflict was not officially acknowledged and managed. Stakeholders 
only developed strategies to accommodate to the situation and reduce their 
vulnerability towards the other party. In that sense, hidden conflicts are more 
difficult to solve as stakeholders do not really communicate with each other 
and do not put issues and ideas at stake into perspectives by contesting them 
overtly. Instead they only express their feelings with people with whom they al-
ready agree and who will confirm their existing opinions. This case study gives 
insight on the role of trust and distrust in the emergence and dynamics of such 
conflicts. 
We uncovered that trust development in the management process started with 
calculus-based trust building, where the different parties weighted the costs 
and benefits that may derive from their trusting behavior to make their decision 
(Dietz and Den Hartog 2006). In the participatory management of the PNP, the 
park direction developed a calculus-based trust with the local communities by 
sharing the benefits deriving from the management of the park with them each 
year, by allowing them to carry out some activities in the park, and by delimitat-
ing for them a zone for agriculture to respond to their land shortage claims. 
The local communities reciprocated by collaborating with the park direction, 
resulting in the decrease of poaching in the park.
However, calculus-based trust is inherently instable, vulnerable to erosion in 
the changing context. As it is based on rewards, calculus-based trust is instru-
mental and needs to be constantly sustained through the supply of at least the 
promises. Calculus-based trust is also differently interpreted over time by the 
126 127
Chapter 4
parties. Dysfunctional use of trust is susceptible to develop. Then, one party 
becomes overconfident about his position, asks more rewards and threatens 
to break his trusting behavior by stopping fulfilling his role in the relationship. 
Calculus-based trust needs thus to be counter balanced with deterrence-based 
trust, which enables the different parties to set the boundaries of the relation-
ship and the punishments in case of trust breaking (Lewicki 2006). The EGs 
made dysfunctional use of the trust relationship built with the park direction 
as they became overconfident about their importance in the surveillance of the 
park. This overconfidence was not constrained by any deterrent what enabled 
the development of inefficiency by the EGs. The situation led to the raise of dis-
trust between the stakeholders that hindered the process. When calculus-based 
trust is not constantly managed, distrust raises among the parties as a result of 
at least one party’s breaking of the trust rules.
Although distrust is usually seen as having negative connotations, our study 
shows that a reasonable level of distrust is needed in management processes 
(Lewicki and Tomlinson 2003; Conchie and Donald 2008). A certain level of 
distrust is functional for building trust and collaboration, particularly in case 
of calculus-based trust, as it enables actors to not think only about rewards 
but also to set boundaries and punishments that the parties will face in case of 
breaking the trust (Lewicki and Tomlinson 2003; Conchie and Donald 2008). 
Functional distrust motivates actors to put deterrents in place, thus nurtur-
ing the development of deterrence-based trust combined with calculus-based 
trust. In case of professional relationships the treat of punishment is likely to 
be a more significant trust motivator than the promise of rewards (Lewicki 
2006). EGs developed overconfidence (dysfunctional trust) because the park 
direction focused on providing incentives to them for trust building and did not 
develop clear, possible and likely to occur, deterrents for when the EGs violate 
the trust relationship. Thus, when building calculus-based trust a ‘healthy dose 
of distrust’ (functional distrust) is needed to enable stakeholders to focus on 
developing both rewards for sustaining trust behavior and punishments in case 
appointments are broken (Lewicki and Tomlinson 2003; Tomlinson and Lewicki 
2006). 
Another way of avoiding dysfunctional use of trust would be to focus on build-
ing knowledge-based, relationship-based or identification based trust among 
the stakeholders. For these cases, managers should based trust building on 
drawing the attention of the other party on the enjoyment of fulfilling their work 
and of the socially usefulness of their work, which will enable them to experi-
ence their work as a calling instead of just a job or a career (Wrzesniewski et al. 
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1997). Nevertheless in any relationship, issues of trust should be considered 
as dynamic and thus constantly be worked on in the ongoing process through 
negotiations among the stakeholders. 
The raising of dysfunctional distrust is the manifestation of conflict between 
parties as when it arises, parties start developing strategies to protect them-
selves instead of considering the common interest. Conflict raised between the 
park direction and the EGs when both developed dysfunctional distrust about 
each other as shown by their mutual accusations. Parties use strategically dis-
trust to legitimise decisions and actions in conflict situation. Both the park 
direction and the EGs made a strategically use of dysfunctional distrust. The 
park direction showed distrust of the EGs accusing them of being responsible 
of the increased poaching in the park and used this distrust to legitimate the 
involvement of the CPLs in the surveillance. The EGs made a dysfunctional use 
of distrust in justifying their loss of motivation, which resulted in the raised of 
poaching in the park using their distrust to the park direction. Distrust is thus 
used as agency in the conflict as both parties used it to protect themselves 
or act against the behavior of the other party (Lewicki and Tomlinson 2003; 
Conchie and Donald 2008). The park direction showed his distrust to the EGs 
by involving the CPLs in the surveillance to prevent the consequences of the 
EGs’ behaviour. The EGs in turn, manifested their loss of motivation as a result 
of their distrust to the park direction to underline their needs that were not 
fulfilled. They also expressed their distrust concerning the involvement of the 
CPLs to defend their job. 
Our study shows that issues of trust and distrust are fragile and important 
frames in conflicts emergence and dynamic in management process. Our in-
vestigation of trust and distrust as frames has made it possible to understand 
the initial relative success and later problems in the participatory management 
of the PNP. It also helped to open and refine the ‘black box’ of trust as a dy-
namic/interactional frame instead of a static/cognitive frame as it has been 
used conventionally.
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 Abstract
The research reported in this paper investigated the role of identity construc-
tion in the emergence and escalation of conflict in the participatory manage-
ment of protected areas in Benin. Three cases were studied. Data were collect-
ed through interviews, observations, and document consultation, and analysed 
using the interaction analysis method. The study shows that social identity sa-
lience was dynamic and played an important role in the emergence and escala-
tion of conflict in the cases studied. Conflicts emerged when identities became 
salient as a result of the stakeholders’ framing of contextual factors as a threat 
to their identity. The conflicts escalated when decisions and actions undertaken 
in the management process were framed as top-down and as posing a threat to 
the identities of the stakeholders. We conclude that, although participation was 
introduced by the government in the management of the protected areas, uni-
lateral decisions taken about the way the conflicts should be managed caused 
disappointment and distrust, and thus led to a greater distance between the 
parties involved and to conflict escalation. 
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5.1 Introduction
Conflicts over natural resources such as land, water, and forests are inevitable, 
ubiquitous, and will exist for the foreseeable future (Buckles and Rusnak 1999; 
Castro and Nielson 2003; Hares 2009; Mola-Yudego and Gritten 2010). How-
ever, there is still confusion about whether or not conflicts are desirable in 
natural resources management (Hellström 2001). On the one hand, conflicts 
over natural resources are considered as negative phenomena because of their 
complexity and the unpredictability of their impact on these resources, and on 
both the interests and the well-being of the people involved (Hellström 2001; 
Tyler 1999). Indeed, conflicts over resources can sometimes become harsh 
and result in violence, resource degradation, the undermining of livelihoods, 
and uprooting of communities (Castro and Nielson 2003). On the other hand, 
conflicts over natural resources have been seen as an important leverage for 
environment management by ensuring that the voices of the different stake-
holders are heard and that new social demands are responded to (Hellström 
2001). 
Although conflict has many negative impacts, many studies have recognized 
the value of conflict as a catalyst for positive social change (Buckles and Rus-
nak 1999). Conflict can be extremely valuable as the motor of progress or the 
mechanism by which injustice is removed (Smith 1997).
Nowadays, the aim is not to avoid conflicts, but to make it possible for con-
flicts to evolve without violence, death, suffering, and misery (Smith 1997). In 
that sense, Desloges and Gauthier (1997:111) have pointed out that: 
As such, conflictual situations are neither positive nor negative but 
they can be used in a constructive or destructive way. Many authors 
consider that conflicts are crucial not only for social change but [also] 
for the continuous creation of society by society itself. Therefore, con-
flict should not be viewed only as a dysfunctional relationship be-
tween individuals and communities that should be avoided at all cost 
but, also, as an opportunity for constructive change and growth.
Thus, if managed adequately, conflict over natural resources can yield positive 
outcomes such as reaching agreements and improving resources manage-
ment (e.g., via better collaboration), whereas, if addressed badly, it may carry 
negative overtones such as bad relationships, destruction of resources, and 
violence (Yasmi et al. 2009). With this mix of the impacts of conflicts, we still 
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need to understand when and how conflicts over resources become coopera-
tive and beneficial or destructive in the participatory management of natural 
resources. 
Participatory management of natural resources was introduced in Benin during 
the early 1990s when the top-down approach used in the management of these 
resources proved unsuccessful in terms of conservation. In 1993, the forest 
department decided to involve local communities in the management of its 
protected areas in order to cope with their continuous degradation caused by 
illegal logging, poaching, overgrazing, and occupation for agriculture. After a 
few years of relatively successful collaborative management, various conflicts 
emerged between the forest department representatives and the local commu-
nities (El-Hadj Issa 2001; Idrissou et al. 2011; Tchiwanou 2001; Zoundoh 2001). 
Negotiations undertaken between the stakeholders even escalated some of 
these conflicts (see Idrissou et al., 2011). In this paper, we present a study that 
investigated three cases of conflict in the participatory management of natural 
resources in Benin. 
Different social groups, who often have clearly diverging agendas, values, 
perspectives, and goals, are involved in participatory natural resources man-
agement on the assumption that they share power in decision making about, 
and implementation and evaluation of, the management of these resources 
(Haslam 2001; Hjortso 2004). In the natural resources management literature, 
conflicts that emerge are often seen as a consequence of the incompatibility 
of interests, values, roles, responsibilities, or access and property rights to the 
same territory or resources between at least two interdependent groups (see 
de Jong et al. 2006; Götmark 2009; Hares 2009; Mola-Yudego and Gritten 
2010; Yasmi et al. 2009). These conflicts often give rise to confrontations be-
tween local communities and government officials (see de Jong et al. 2006; 
Götmark 2009), between different stakeholder groups in the same community 
(see Hares 2009), between different ethnic groups (see Macias 2008), or be-
tween local communities and private companies. Whereas natural resources 
have economic, cultural, and historical importance for the local communities, 
government officials often favour conservation while promoting alternative in-
come-generating activities as sources of livelihood for local communities, and 
private companies are driven by purely economic goals. 
In the conflict literature however, social identity construction is considered to 
be at the core of conflict emergence in intergroup negotiation such as partici-
patory management, which is commonly conceptualized as a process centred 
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around the dual concerns (and perspectives) of self and other (Haslam 2001). 
Many of the core concepts in the negotiation literature relate to the issue of 
social identity because the primary problem in negotiation is the existence of 
social groups whose members are exposed to ingroup favouritism and out-
group pressures (Bergami and Bagozzi 2000; Haslam 2001). Many conflicts 
are thus attributed to differences in social identity (e.g., Aspinall 2007; Assal 
2006; Dalton and Chrobot-Mason 2007; Korostelina 2007; Livingstone and 
Haslam 2008). However, the natural resources management literature pays lit-
tle attention to the influence of the social identity of groups involved in conflict. 
The focus is often on tangible and especially economic interests and clashes, 
but group conflict can also revolve around symbolic resources, such as social 
status, values, and identity (Chapman 2006; Flippen 1999; Henningsen et al. 
2006).
People define their sense of self in social contexts by referring to their group 
membership, which impacts on their behaviour (Stets and Burke 2000; Zhou 
and Mori 2010). According to Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, and Flament (1971), the 
mere fact of social categorization is an inevitable source of conflict and ten-
sion (Haslam 2001; Tzeng and Jackson 1994). Social identity theory focuses on 
prejudices, discrimination, and conditions that promote different types of inter-
group behaviour such as conflict, cooperation, social change, and social stasis 
(Hogg and Reid 2006). It is used to analyse intergroup interactions either to 
predict conflict emergence or to manage them better in negotiation processes 
(Haslam 2001; Korostelina 2007). Thus, in this study we used the social iden-
tity approach to understand the role of identity construction in conflict relat-
ing to participatory natural resources management. We investigated three such 
conflicts in Benin to deepen our understanding of the role that social identity 
played in the stakeholders’ interactions and the extent to which it contributed 
to the emergence and escalation of the conflicts.
First we provide a theoretical overview of the concept of social identity, then 
explain the methodology used in our study, and finally present and discuss our 
results.
5.2 Social identity approach
The concept of social identity was first introduced by Tajfel who defined it as 
‘the individual’s knowledge that he belongs to certain social groups together 
with some emotional and value significance to him of this group membership’ 
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(Tajfel 1972:292). Social identity theory thus explains how self is conceptual-
ized in intergroup contexts, which means how people create and define their 
own place in society through a system of self categorizations (Hogg and Terry 
2000). According to social identity theory, people tend to categorize themselves 
and others into various social categories such as organizational membership, 
religious affiliation, gender, age group, locality, etc. (Ashforth and Mael 1989). 
Social identity plays an important role in the connection that people feel with 
groups; in their wish to distinguish themselves from others; and in group be-
haviour such as the more positive treatment of members of one’s own group 
- ingroup-favouring - as opposed to members of other groups - stereotyping 
and prejudice - (Cohen and Caspary 2010; Fischer et al. 2010). It provides a 
basis for perceptual, attitudinal, and behavioural effects of group membership 
(Van Knippenberg et al. 2002). It appears that groups react differently accord-
ing to the social context. Depending on the social context, different identities 
are made salient by groups. Groups make salient a type of social identity in 
response to a situational activation of an identity at a particular level to fit with 
the social field (Hogg and Terry 2000; Stets and Burke 2000). 
5.3 Social identity salience and conflict emergence in 
negotiation 
Social identity salience is seen as the main predictor of conflict in intergroup 
interaction (Haslam 2001; Hogg and Reid 2006; Korostelina 2007; Stets and 
Burke 2000; Tzeng and Jackson 1994). A group’s salient identity can be defined 
as the most important identity of that group and with which people belonging 
to the group psychologically identify themselves within that context (Hogg and 
Reid 2006; Korostelina 2007; Stets and Burke 2000). For example, people with 
a salient ethnic identity are more prejudiced and show more readiness for con-
flict behaviour towards other ethnic groups (Korostelina 2007; Phinney 1991). 
Thus, a salient social identity triggers actions against outgroup members and 
leads to conflict (Korostelina 2007). 
Scholars involved in social identity research have always been concerned about 
what makes a particular social identity salient in a situation and thus activates 
conflict. Several predictors of early warning of conflict centred on social identity 
have been identified by Korostelina (2007). As a particular identity activation or 
salience is a function of the interaction between the characteristics of the group 
and the situation (Stets and Burke 2000), conflict emergence is related to the 
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characteristics, forms, types, and nature of the salient social identity, and inter-
group relations (see Dalton and Chrobot-Mason 2007; Korostelina 2007). We 
discuss below those relevant in understanding conflict emergence in natural 
resources management.
One of the main group features that plays a significant role in group behaviour 
in interaction is ingroup primacy, which refers to the feeling of supremacy of 
group goals and values over individual goals and values (Dalton and Chrobot-
Mason 2007). Several components form the primacy of an ingroup (Koroste-
lina 2007): (1) predominance of ingroup aims over individual aims, (2) the 
readiness to forget all internal ingroup conflicts in situations of threat to the in-
group, and (3) the readiness to unite against an outgroup. This characteristic of 
group identity can increase or decrease the influence of identity salience on the 
conflict behaviour of the members of the ingroup. Thus, in participatory natural 
resources management, a group may enter into conflict with other groups just 
because the interests of some ingroup members are threatened and not those 
of the group as a whole; this results in unstable relationships. 
The mode of identity meaning or social identity content determines the type 
of identity conflict that emerges (Korostelina 2007; Livingstone and Haslam 
2008). The meaning of social identity is usually multimodal and contains 
several components such as ingroup traditions and values (culture), ingroup 
language, characteristics of ingroup members, ingroup interests, history of in-
group, ideology of ingroup, outgroup image, etc. The dominance of a com-
ponent in the social identity of a group in a context leads to conflict based on 
the difference in that component compared with outgroups (Livingstone and 
Haslam 2008). The dominance of outgroup image, for example, may lead to 
conflict about difference in image arising from ingroup and outgroup com-
parison. As participatory natural resources management involves stakeholder 
groups with different perspectives, objectives, and interests vis-à-vis these re-
sources, conflict among them may emerge due to the dominance of some of 
these differences in interaction. 
States of intergroup relations such as intergroup prejudice and outgroup threat 
also lead to conflict. Prejudice is often defined as a negative attitude or as an 
antipathy based on faulty and inflexible generalization directed towards indi-
viduals as members of a group or to the group as a whole (Dalton and Chrobot-
Mason 2007). Thus, outgroup threats increase intergroup prejudice and lead 
to more hostility towards the outgroup. When threatened, group members per-
ceive members of other groups as more homogenous with one another, and 
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develop more extreme positions and less tolerance towards them (Dalton and 
Chrobot-Mason 2007). Group members feel more threatened when the threat 
is directed at their social identity by an outgroup (Fischer et al. 2010). In par-
ticipatory natural resources management, intergroup prejudice may often be 
experienced as each group may evaluate positively its members and negatively 
outgroup members when they feel the identity of their ingroup threatened by 
the outgroup.
According to Korostelina (2007), the intensity of the perceived prejudice or 
threat to the social identity of the ingroup is higher when the social identity 
is acquired by ingroup members than when it is ascribed to them. People who 
acquire a social identity are more committed to ingroup beliefs, values, and 
norms than people with ascribed identities. Thus, in participatory natural re-
sources management, conflicts are more likely to emerge when the percep-
tion of prejudice or threat concerns an acquired rather than an ascribed social 
identity. 
In summary, identity conflict may emerge in participatory natural resources 
management when the social identities of the stakeholder groups become sa-
lient due to intergroup primacy and the development of intergroup prejudice or 
the feeling of threat from an outgroup. The type of identity conflict that emerg-
es depends on the mode of identity meaning at the basis of intergroup com-
parison and the intensity of its influence on the nature of the identity (acquired 
or ascribed) under threat. Identity salience could thus be a major concern in 
participatory natural resources management. 
 
5.4 Dynamic of social identity salience in negotiation
Many approaches to reducing intergroup identity conflicts focus on the need 
to increase the quantity and quality of intergroup contact in order to decrease 
the salience of groups’ identities (Gaertner et al. 1989; Haslam 2001; Hews-
tone et al. 2002). However, different views have been developed on how in-
tergroup contact should be achieved to deal with social identity salience in 
conflict prevention and conflict management in negotiation processes. In early 
applications of social identity principles, scholars argued that the most appro-
priate method to avoid or resolve social conflict was to apply procedures that 
served to reduce the social identity salience of groups involved in interaction or 
conflict (Haslam 2001). They suggested the decategorized contact model, which 
encouraged individual representations of (potentially) conflicting group mem-
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bers in intergroup contacts because individualized views would be inconsistent 
with the stereotypic beliefs of the group that lead to or perpetuate conflict. De-
categorization seeks to reduce ingroup and outgroup bias that leads to conflict 
by moving (former) ingroup members, as individuals rather than as part of a 
group, away from the self towards outgroup members (Haslam 2001; Hews-
tone et al. 2002). Other scholars proposed the common ingroup identity model 
and argued that a superior strategy was rather recategorization, which ‘trans-
forms members’ cognitive representations … from ‘us’ and ‘them’ to a more 
inclusive ‘we’’ (Gaertner et al. 1996:232). Recategorization seeks to alter the 
categorizations used by replacing the subordinate ‘us’ and ‘them’ to create a 
superordinate ‘we’ categorization (Hewstone et al. 2002). 
Several criticisms have been made of the decategorization and recategorization 
models (see Ashforth and Mael 1989; Haslam 2001; Hewstone et al. 2002) as 
both advocate violence to the social reality that they are supposed to address by 
seeking to break the existing social identities. The recategorization model even 
overlooks the power relations between the different groups in their willingness 
to impose a superordinate social identity on the parties in negotiation. Another 
limitation of both models is that they are based on the assumption that inter-
group conflicts are bad and hence must be avoided at all cost, whereas conflict 
and co-operation are seen as two sides of the same coin that alternate to give 
structure, meaning, and direction to social life (Haslam 2001). 
Some scholars then argued that the fact that parties were involved in nego-
tiation presupposed that they all believed in the existence of a so-called win-
win or integrative agreement that would satisfy the minimum requirements of 
both parties. Thus, negotiation usually happens because the parties involved 
acknowledge the existence of a shared superordinate identity (Haslam 2001). 
Intergroup negotiation is then seen as revolving around counter-posed social 
identities defined at subgroup and superordinate levels. Researchers have re-
cently argued that the best way to deal with intergroup negotiation is not to in-
crease the salience of a social identity at the expense of subgroup identities but 
to acknowledge and allow the expression of both superordinate and subgroup 
identities (Ashforth and Mael 1989; Haslam 2001; Hewstone et al. 2002). This 
way of thinking is at the core of the dual-identity model of conflict management. 
This model seeks to reduce bias between subgroups who share a common 
superordinate identity in addition to considering themselves as members of 
separate groups (Gaertner et al. 1989; Hewstone et al. 2002). Figure 1 depicts 
the dual-identity, the decategorization, and the recategorization models, sche-
matically.
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Figure 5.1. Categories-based solutions to intergroup conflict (Haslam, 2001)
Social reality prior to negotiation
Conflicting intergroup relations
Distinct social categories downplayed, parties treated as members of 
common superordinate category
Distinct social categories downplayed, 
parties treated as members of common superordinate category
Distinct social categories recognized, but accommodated 
within a common superordinate category
Solution prescribed by different models
Decategorization model
Recategorization model
Dual-identity model
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The models for intergroup identity conflict management are presented as if, in 
a negotiation process, one model or another should be applied that may or may 
not fit the negotiation process. However, we posit that a negotiation process 
is dynamic and may reflect different models at different steps of the process. 
Thus, a negotiation process may start with one model and switch to another 
due to the salience of either the subgroup identity or a superordinate identity, 
or both subgroup and superordinate identities in interaction. So, rather than 
being considered as strictly distinct, these models should be seen as intercon-
nected interactional contexts within which a negotiation process may be going 
back and forth. 
Participatory natural resources management involves different stakeholder cat-
egories with different identities. Thus, different identities may become salient 
in different contexts. In this study, we looked at how identities became salient 
and how their dynamic led to conflict in three case studies of participatory natu-
ral resources management in Benin. 
5.5 Cases studied and method
This study investigated conflict emergence and escalation in the participatory 
management of three protected areas in Benin: the Agoua forest, the Ouémé 
Spérieur and N’dali (OSN) forests and the Pendjari National Park (PNP).
The Agoua forest is a protected area put under government protection in 1953. 
It is situated in the centre-west of Benin in the municipality of Bantè. When it 
was declared a protected area, the Agoua forest covered about 75,300 ha (Ak-
pado 1996). However, this forest was progressively occupied by local commu-
nities who created villages and farms in it. The forest’s area had decreased to 
68,848.43 in 2002 (PAMF 2006). The forest department thus decided to restore 
it in 2002 under a five-year project, the Project for the Management of the Wari-
Waro, Monts Kouffè and Agoua Forest Massifs (PAMF: Projet d’Aménagement 
des Massifs Forestiers d’Agoua, des Monts Kouffè et de Wari-Waro). The aim of the 
project was the participatory restoration of the forest through the establish-
ment and implementation of the participatory management plan for the Agoua 
forest (PAMF 2006). 
The OSN forests are formed by the Ouémé Supérieur forest, declared a pro-
tected area in 1952, and the N’dali forest, declared protected in 1942. These 
forests cover respectively 193,406 ha and 4,721 ha, are located in the north of 
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Benin, and shared by the municipalities of Tchaourou, Djougou, and N’dali. 
These forests are managed together as they are close, have similar ecosystems, 
and face the same anthropogenic pressure (PGRN 1999). These forests were 
solely managed by the forest department from 1952 until the early 1990s when 
a participatory approach was introduced in the management of Benin’s pro-
tected areas. The participatory approach - community-based natural resources 
management (CBNRM) - was introduced in the management of the OSN for-
ests by the Natural Resources Management (NRM) project (Projet de Gestion 
des Ressources Naturelles) in 1993, which established the participatory manage-
ment plan for these forests. The implementation of the plan was started by 
the local communities and later supported by the Forests and Adjacent Lands 
Management (FALM) programme (Programme de Gestion des Forêts et Terroirs 
Riverains). Local communities formed village associations for forest manage-
ment (VAFM: Association Villageoise de Gestion des Forêts), which were involved 
in the management of these forests together with government officials.
The PNP was created by the colonial administration in 1954 and covers an area 
of 471,000 ha. It is located in north-western Benin and shared by the munici-
palities of Tanguiéta and Matéri. Like all Benin’s protected areas, it had been 
managed by government officials using a top-down approach until 1993 when 
the participatory approach was introduced. Local communities have been in-
volved in the management of the park through the village associations for wild-
life management and eco-guards recruited by the park direction in the villages 
surrounding the park.
In each of these cases, data were collected through interviews, observations, 
and document consultation (see Table 1). Key informants in each stakeholder 
category were interviewed individually, and focus group discussions were orga-
nized to triangulate the information gathered through the individual interviews. 
Data were also collected through participation in meetings organized in the 
framework of the management of these protected areas and observations of 
the activities of the different stakeholders involved. The interviews and conver-
sations were tape-recorded and transcribed. Documents such as project and 
study reports on the protected areas and the local communities were consulted 
to gather general information on the protected areas and the local communi-
ties, as well as events that occurred during the management of these protected 
areas and that have been documented. 
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Table 5.1: Interviews, focus group discussions, and meetings attended for each case
Cases Individual 
interviews
Focus group 
discussions
Meetings 
attended
Agoua forest 39 06 02
OSN forests 33 09 03
PNP 31 07 05
The data gathered and processed were analysed using the interaction analysis 
method (see Fairhurst 2004; Jordan and Henderson 1995). Interaction analysis 
is an interdisciplinary method suitable for the empirical investigation of the in-
teraction of people with each other and with objects in their environment (Jor-
dan and Henderson 1995). Interaction analysis consists of describing people’s 
behaviour in relation to those with whom they are doing interaction work in the 
construction of recognizable social scenes or events (Fairhurst 2004). We used 
interaction analysis in this study to investigate activities such as talk and non-
verbal interactions of stakeholders involved in the participatory management 
of protected areas in Benin to identify routines, practices, and problems, and 
the resources for their resolution (see Jordan and Henderson 1995). Interaction 
analysis was used in multiple cases studied to identify interactional patterns in 
conflict emergence and escalation in protected area management in Benin (see 
Jordan and Henderson 1995). 
5.6 Findings
Because protected areas were created in Benin during colonial times, govern-
ment officials managed them solely, and it was considered undesirable for local 
communities to be involved in their management (Arouna 2006). This created 
tense relationships between the forest department and local communities who 
never accepted the way these protected areas were created and managed by the 
state. The local communities perceived that their lands and resources had been 
expropriated by the state and used any occasion to exploit these resources for 
their livelihood. At the same time, the forest department considered the local 
communities as a threat to the natural resources and put its efforts into keep-
ing them as far as possible from the protected areas. The relationship between 
local communities and the forest department was characterized by conflicts 
146 147
Chapter 5
that persisted for more than three decades, since the protected areas were cre-
ated between 1940 and 1960 and lasted until participation was introduced in 
1993. 
The aim of the forest department was to foster sustainable management of 
forest resources under their care, but they had insufficient personnel to do so 
on their own. By introducing a participatory process, they intended to enlist 
the assistance of local communities in this endeavour (MDR and PGFTR 1999; 
PGRN 1999; Siebert and Elwert 2004). The first challenge for the forest depart-
ment at the beginning of the process was to reverse the negative images that 
they and the local communities had constructed of each other over time. In the 
participatory management processes implemented, the forest department, in 
conjunction with the representatives of the local communities, undertook to 
reconstruct each other’s social identity through several actions and interven-
tions during the establishment and implementation of the participatory man-
agement plans for the protected areas.
5.6.1 The establishment of the participatory management plans for the 
protected areas
Participatory management of the protected areas in Benin started with the es-
tablishment of their respective participatory management plans. In the three 
cases studied, establishment of the plan involved the forest department and the 
local communities. However, the process was facilitated by an NGO in the case 
of the OSN forests. The establishment of the plan began with several meetings 
involving both forest department representatives and local communities. They 
were organized to assess the problems of the protected areas and those of the 
local communities and raise awareness among the stakeholders about these 
issues. The way the resources of these areas should be managed and the roles 
and responsibilities of all the stakeholders were also decided and inscribed in 
the participatory management plan. These meetings were also meant to enable 
the local communities to become familiar with the forest department repre-
sentatives in order to extinguish the fear of the forest rangers experienced by 
the local communities over the past decades of coercive management. The for-
est department also undertook to improve the livelihood of local communities 
by building socio-communitarian infrastructures and initiating and financing 
income-generating activities in the villages surrounding the protected areas. 
Local communities were also involved in the management of the protected 
areas through VAFM. In the case of the Agoua and OSN forests’ participatory 
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management, local communities had been assigned the task of carrying out 
reforestation activities and forest surveillance assisted by forest rangers (FRs). 
In the case of the PNP, the guards were recruited as staff of the park direction. 
The former forest rangers were progressively replaced by eco-guards recruited 
in the villages surrounding the park to carry out surveillance. The director of 
the park explained the recruitment of the local communities as personnel of 
the park direction, arguing:
…continuing to send the FRs, with whom the local communities had 
had a lot of trouble in the past even with gunshots, would mean that 
the park direction still wanted to pacify the region instead of collabo-
rating with the local communities.
Source: Director of PNP, January 2010
By changing the local communities’ negative frames about forest department 
representatives, constructed from the time the protected areas were created 
until participation was introduced in 1993, the forest department hoped to en-
able better collaboration with these local communities. This intention of the 
forest department was highlighted in the utterances of its representatives in-
terviewed in the three cases. The head of the forest department in the Borgou 
region said in this respect:
Contrary to the past, the forest department invited local communities 
to define what to do and work together. From the beginning, we have 
noticed local communities’ interest in the participatory management 
of the OSN forests as they could approach the FRs without fear. It 
was clear that the forest department was a little bit frustrated as we 
had managed these forests alone for decades and we were powerful 
and feared. However, immediately this fear of local communities was 
reduced with the introduction of participatory management.
Source: Head of Borgou’s forest department office, February 2009
These statements show that the main concern of the forest department at the 
beginning of the participatory process was to alter the categorization estab-
lished during the coercive management period between the forest department 
representatives and the local communities. These statements also show that, 
according to the forest department, the actions that it undertook during the 
participatory management process to reverse this tendency yielded encourag-
ing results as the local communities’ fear of the FRs decreased. 
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The local communities also expressed their enthusiasm vis-à-vis these actions 
by the forest department, as illustrated in their statements below. The local 
communities in the Agoua forest restoration case praised the PAMF project in 
this respect:
At the start, we were happy with the PAMF as it built infrastructures 
in our villages and enabled many villagers to earn money by working 
with the restoration and hunting committees. We thanked the govern-
ment for choosing our region for the implementation of this project.
Source: Focus group discussion with Bantè’s farmers, March 2007
The local communities involved in the management of the OSN forests also 
expressed their positive view of the forest department through their apprecia-
tion of the actions of the NRM project. Their representatives acknowledged it, 
arguing:
During the management of the forest by the NRM project, villagers 
were very enthusiastic as they were very often invited to meetings. 
Each month there were meetings to which we were invited together 
with the FRs and then we knew what was going on in the manage-
ment of the forests.
Source: Focus group discussion with Bétérou VAFM board members, January 2009
The interview excerpts above show that, although the forest department and 
local communities had considered each other as enemies for decades, they 
apparently managed to build positive frames of each other during the earlier 
phase of the participatory process. These utterances in particular highlight the 
fact that the change in these stakeholders’ framing of each other was due to 
interactions at meetings, awareness raising campaigns, training, promotion of 
income-generating activities involving both stakeholder categories organized 
in the framework of the participatory management of the protected areas, and 
some concessions made to the local communities in terms of access to, and 
use of, some resources in the protected areas. A close look at these statements 
reveals that all these activities provided local communities with new roles, re-
sponsibilities, and resources that had been exclusively held and controlled by 
the forest department in the past. The forest department in all these cases 
presented itself as close to the local communities in contrast to the past when 
its representatives were feared by them.
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The establishment phase of the participatory management plan shows the ne-
gotiation models adopted by the forest department. In each of these cases, 
the forest department opted for the creation of a superordinate identity involv-
ing the representatives of the forest department and local communities in the 
sustainable management of the protected areas, within which the participatory 
management plan represented the institutional framework. However, in the 
case of the Agoua and OSN forests, the identities of both stakeholders were 
acknowledged and the roles and responsibilities were shared on the basis of 
these in the participatory management plan, whereas, in the case of the PNP, 
the identities of the eco-guards and of the park direction were downplayed as 
the eco-guards were considered members of the staff of the park direction. 
Thus, the forest department opted for the dual-identity model in the cases of 
the Agoua and OSN forests and the recategorization model in the case of the 
PNP. 
In all three cases, the establishment of the participatory management plans for 
the protected areas was followed by their implementation.
5.6.2 The implementation of the participatory management plan and the 
emergence of conflicts
The implementation of the participatory management plan consists of the 
management of the protected areas according to the rules established in the 
plan. In contrast to the establishment phase of the plan where the forest de-
partment and local communities built new relationships that brought them 
closer together, the implementation phase was characterized in the three cases 
studied by conflicts between these stakeholders. Although these conflicts arose 
in different contexts and were triggered by different reasons, they had several 
features in common. 
The Agoua forest case
Although the forest department managed the protected areas coercively for 
decades until participation was introduced, local communities settled in the 
Agoua forest where they created villages and farms. The participatory manage-
ment plan for Agoua forest thus divided the forest into four zones: the service 
zones for roads to access the villages in the forest, the agro-forestry zones 
dedicated to farming, and the protection and production zones - where no 
farmer was allowed to settle - dedicated to reforestation (PAMF 2006). It was 
also decided in the plan that all the farmers scattered throughout the forest 
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should move to the agro-forestry zone. The managers of the PAMF project 
and local communities’ representatives agreed on the plan at the beginning 
of the project (Idrissou et al. 2011). However, when the implementation phase 
was announced by the project in 2006, the local communities opposed it. The 
implementation of the plan presupposed that farmers who had their farms in 
the production and protection zones should abandon them and move to agro-
forestry zones where they would be given some lands for which they would pay 
annual fees, as also the farmers who already had their farms in these zones for 
forest land occupation.
Immediately the decision to implement the participatory management plan 
was announced by the project, the local communities expressed their objection 
to it. A farmer said in this regard:
When PAMF started, its staff members organized meetings in our vil-
lages. At these meetings, they said the project would be implemented 
in our region. We asked them what they really wanted to do and they 
replied that they were coming to restore the protected forests of our 
region. We then asked them whether or not we would be chased away 
later. They told us that they would not chase us away; rather that they 
were coming to work together with us. That was what we agreed upon 
together.
Source: Farmer informant, August 2008
Another farmer said:
When the project came first, they did not tell us what they are doing 
now, namely, chasing people away from the forest. They said that they 
would give farmers some tree seedlings to replace the trees farmers 
had destroyed on their farms. We would grow our crops while simul-
taneously planting forestry trees. When these forestry trees were big 
enough, we would leave these sites. Suddenly, they asked some people 
to destroy our plantations and crops.
Source: Farmer informant, August 2008
These interview excerpts reveal that, according to the farmers, they did not 
react against the PAMF project as at the beginning of the project no threat to 
their farming activity was apparent in the discourses of the project representa-
tives. So, the farmers constructed positive frames about the project because it 
was presented to them as only beneficial; this explains their interest in the proj-
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ect at that time. After the announcement of the implementation of the plan, these 
frames about the project changed and the locals started blaming the project, as 
in the following statements by some farmers:
We were living here in peace and working on our farms when PAMF 
came and created the conflict. If somebody has his possessions and an-
other wants to extort him, it means creating a conflict.
Source: Farmer informant, November 2007
Another farmer added:
We don’t agree with the way PAMF manages our forests because they 
want us to leave our farms.
Source: Farmer informant, November 2007
 
These excerpts show that the farmers considered the implementation of the par-
ticipatory management plan - which implied that some of them would lose their 
farms - as a way of expropriating their farms. They saw this decision as a threat 
to their identity as farmers, and this affected their frames about the project. Here, 
the identity of the farmers is associated with their activities or source of liveli-
hood. These frames became negative in contrast to the positive frames they had 
held about the project during the establishment of the plan. The PAMF represen-
tatives confirmed this feeling experienced by the farmers and explained it as in 
the following testimonies:
For them [the farmers] the project will just establish the Zoning Plan 
and stop by the end of the last year (2006) as it is a five-year project. So 
then, they will go back to their initial places in the forest. It was clear 
in their mind that ‘we will help them make it and the project will finish 
before they implement it. They will leave and we will go back again to 
our places.’ The forest will become what it was before the project. When 
they realized at the end of 2006 that the project started again with the 
implementation of the participatory management plan, they said ‘we 
will never leave.’ 
Source: Bantè’s PAMF office head, September 2008
And another PAMF staff member continued:
After the zoning of the forest, everybody agreed that it was not accept-
able for farmers to be scattered everywhere in the forest. So, they had to 
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be concentrated in the agro-forestry zones. However, at that time we 
did not know who had to leave the forest and who could stay. When 
the details of the Zoning Plan were demonstrated in the field, those 
who found their lands in production and protection zones of the for-
est, and who had to be displaced, started to complain that they didn’t 
agree with the zoning, nor would they leave.
Source: PAMF staff member in Bantè, September 2008
The PAMF staff members in these testimonies corroborated the idea that the 
local communities accepted the project at the beginning of the implementation 
of the plan without resistance because they did not feel their identity directly 
threatened by the project. Their frame shift was triggered by the imminence of 
the threat to their source of livelihood. 
The OSN forests case
The implementation of the participatory management plan in the OSN forests 
started without trouble, in contrast to the Agoua forest case. Indeed, this phase 
was not that different from the establishment phase because all the actors in-
volved in the former phase remained, and the activities undertaken during the 
previous phase continued. One difference between the two phases was that the 
implementation phase started without any project to support it as the end of 
the NRM project coincided with the end of the establishment phase in 1999. 
Notwithstanding this difference, the implementation phase started quite well, 
as articulated by the local communities’ representatives in the following utter-
ances:
At the beginning of the participatory management plan implementa-
tion, everything went alright. At that time, when the FRs wanted to go 
anywhere in the forest, we went together. They never entered the for-
est without some member of the VAFM board. When they caught il-
legal users in the forest, before deciding anything they called us. When 
they fined them, before going to make the payment in the state’s bank 
account, we used to collect what belonged to VAFM. They even gave 
us their permission to enter and carry out surveillances in the forests 
when they were away. If we caught illegal users, they only asked us to 
wait for them before deciding on the measures to be taken.
Source: Focus group discussion with Bétérou VAFM board members, January 2009
The facilitator from the NGO involved in the establishment of the participatory 
management plan confirmed this view and said:
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The early period of the participatory management plan’s implemen-
tation was great. We worked with both FRs and VAFM without any 
problem. It was because all those present at that point in time were 
trained together by the NRM project. We had worked together with 
them during the NRM project period.
Source: APIC facilitator at Bétérou village, February 2009
These statements show that, initially, the implementation phase proceeded 
without any complaint from the stakeholders. Both the FRs and VAFM members 
pointed out that they had known each other during the first phase and carried 
out the activities in the participatory management plan together, and that this 
was the source of the relative success. However, a few years later, new FRs were 
appointed in the villages surrounding the OSN forests. In fact, the forest depart-
ment developed the rotation system to avoid letting FRs spend a long time in 
any one place because they might develop corrupt and collusive behaviour. 
Conflict about the implementation of the participatory management plan for 
the OSN forests started when the new FRs arrived. The new FRs and the local 
communities disagreed on roles and responsibility sharing in carrying out the 
different activities and started accusing each other of misconduct. For the local 
communities:
The new FRs, when they came, had chosen to work with villagers who 
were not members of the VAFM board. Even when we complained to 
the higher level of the forest department hierarchy they said nothing. 
What could we do? As they are the FRs so they can manage the forests 
alone. When everything finishes in the forests, we will all stay quiet.
Source: Focus group discussion with Bétérou VAFM board members, January 2009
They also argued:
The FRs started considering us like their trackers or their workmen, and 
I told them that we are not like that. I told them that we are members 
of an organization with which they should work as partners. We then 
decided if it is like that they should manage the forest alone and we 
will just watch them.
Source: Focus group discussion with Bétérou VAFM board members, January 2009
In these interview excerpts, the representatives of the local communities ex-
pressed their opposition to the new FRs who wanted to change their status 
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co-constructed with the former FRs. Instead of considering them as partners 
like the former FRs, the new FRs wanted the VAFM members to serve them. The 
VAFM members in fact opposed changing their identity co-constructed with the 
former FRs during the establishment phase and which conferred on them some 
roles and responsibilities; but the FRs rangers believed that the conflict was 
caused by their behaviour in stopping the VAFM members from exceeding their 
remit. The following statement by an FR confirms this feeling of the new FRs:
The VAFM members who should work with the FRs transformed them-
selves into FRs. In the villages you could notice VAFM members were 
called ‘Bâ-Forêt’ [FR in local language]. When a logger came into the 
village, he was directly sent to the VAFM members who authorized 
him to log trees in the forests without referring to us. They even carry 
out surveillances and receive taxes from illegal loggers and herders 
without informing us, but this does not come within their remit.
Source: Head of N’Dali Municipality forest department office, February 2009
According to the FRs in this statement, the VAFM members embodied the FRs’ 
identity, which allowed them to take some actions that they should not. So, they 
tried to stop them but the VAFM members considered this unacceptable. 
The statements above show that both the FRs and the VAFM members were 
fighting for their new identity. The VAFM members believed that the new FRs did 
not want to honour their identity built with the former FRs, which conferred on 
them some roles and responsibilities. The new FRs as well were struggling for 
their identity, which they also considered threatened by the VAFM members who 
were using it. In this case, the identities of the stakeholders were more charac-
terized by their roles and responsibilities in the implementation of the plan. The 
conflict emerged because each stakeholder felt his new identity threatened by 
the other.
The PNP case
The implementation of the PNP participatory management plan started with 
much enthusiasm on the stakeholders’ part, like in the OSN case. Both the park 
direction and the local communities were satisfied because they acknowledged 
that they were all gaining from the process. The director of the park stated in 
this respect:
I can say that, for at least five years, we saw the impacts of the in-
volvement of local communities because of the positive improvement 
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in wildlife, which was perceptible. At the same time, we noticed an 
improvement in our relationship with them.
Source: Director of PNP, January 2010
This feeling of the park director was confirmed by the local communities, as in 
this testimony by one of them during a focus group discussion:
When we poach and kill an animal, we use only some of the meat and 
leave the rest in the park. This is not significant compared to what we 
receive from the park direction for working with it. We build schools, 
health centres, pay teachers and nurses with this money, which is good 
for us and for our children. Also nowadays it is more and more difficult 
to hunt without anybody else in the village noticing and telling the 
VAFM members or the park direction.
Source: Focus group discussion with local communities, November 2009
These interview excerpts show that the local communities considered that 
working with the park direction was better than continuing poaching. The park 
direction noticed this change in local communities’ behaviour through their 
collaboration in fighting against poaching and the results obtained. 
However, the park director’s statement also points to the fact that this situation 
lasted for only five years. Indeed, after five years, the park direction noticed an 
increase in poaching in the park and accused the eco-guards of being respon-
sible for it. The park director posited it in the following statement:
The eco-guards started behaving like in the public sector. You may 
know what is happening there. It is that once you become an agent of 
the public sector, your job is secure for 30 years. Whether you work or 
not, you will get your salary at the end of each month until you retire 
and start getting your retirement allowances.
Source: Director of PNP, January 2010
 
He explained this behaviour by the eco-guards, saying:
In the management of the park, we made a mistake in putting in 
place a remuneration system that is not linked to results; an auto-
matic remuneration like in the public sector.
Source: Director of PNP, January 2010
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The park director continued, arguing:
Because they thought they acquired a permanent job situation, they 
wanted to gain more by any means and even by using their position 
as eco-guards, someone who should protect the park, to be in cahoots 
with the poachers.
Source: Director of PNP, January 2010
These statements show that, for the park direction, poaching started to in-
crease in the park because the eco-guards became aware that their status had 
changed as their job was secure. So, they did not need to work to get their sal-
ary paid and even conspired with the poachers, according to the park direction. 
The park direction believed that it was the development of this new identity by 
the eco-guards that explained their strange behaviour. He was supported by the 
park direction’s technical advisor, who argued that:
The eco-guards developed a ‘spoiled child’ complex. As they had often 
succeeded in the past in getting some benefits through claiming and 
disobedience, finally it became a habit for them. They were asking for 
more and more benefits, threatening to stop working if they did not 
get satisfaction. As there were no more benefits to give them, they 
started working less and less. In my view, this could lead to the disap-
pearance of the eco-guards’ corps.
Source: PNP technical advisor, February 2010
This testimony of the technical advisor reveals that the park direction consid-
ered that the eco-guards were exaggerating their claims due to their status and 
started thinking about measures to be taken against them.
Although the eco-guards acknowledged the increase in poaching in the park 
due to the decrease in their motivation over time, to explain their behaviour 
they evoked the particularity of their job compared to how they were treated by 
the park direction. They expressed it in the following interview excerpts:
We have been doing this job for almost 10 years. Nobody could be 
active in this job after 10 years like he was at the beginning. In a few 
years, we will become unable to perform this job. Some young eco-
guards should be recruited to refresh the corps.
Source: Eco-guard informant, December 2009
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Another eco-guard added:
The important problem is our career, which is wrongly managed by 
the park direction. As our job is physically demanding, we should be 
strongly motivated to maintain our performance but the park direc-
tion did not do so. From the time we started, we got an annual salary 
raise until 2006. But since then, we have been getting the same salary. 
We did not get any promotion and in five years some of us will not be 
able to go on surveillance because they will become useless…it seems 
like we are like bananas that the park direction will eat the flesh and 
then throw away the peels later.
Source: Eco-guard informant, January 2010
These interview excerpts show that the eco-guards explained their behaviour as 
a response to the way the park direction considered and treated their corps of 
eco-guards. According to them, they were treated without considering the dif-
ficult aspect of their job and its consequences on their life. They felt their future 
in danger and preferred to take action as soon as possible. The eco-guards 
considered that their rights and the promises made to their corps had not been 
honoured by the park direction. 
The conflict in the management of the PNP was born from the mutual accu-
sations of the park direction and the eco-guards about the root cause of the 
increase in poaching in the park. The park direction considered that the eco-
guards had lost their motivation because they had become overconfident as 
their job was secure, whereas the eco-guards explained their loss of motivation 
as a result of the park direction not fulfilling its obligations towards them. The 
park direction pointed to the eco-guards’ identity shift as the explanation for 
their behaviour, whereas the eco-guards considered their behaviour as a re-
sponse to the threat to their eco-guard identity. 
The cases studied proved that several features contributed to the salience of 
social identities and highlighted some of them. Each of the cases informed us 
about a feature of social identity that may have led to conflict when threatened 
in a multi-stakeholder collaboration such as the participatory management 
of natural resources. In the Agoua forest conflict, the social identity feature 
that was made salient was the source of livelihood. Thus, people who shared 
the same source of livelihood considered themselves as having the same so-
cial identity when this source of livelihood was threatened. A similar situation 
was revealed in the case of the conflict in the management of the OSN forests 
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where people sharing the same roles and responsibilities claimed a similar so-
cial identity and reacted when it was threatened by those they considered as 
outsiders - the new FRs. In the case of the conflict in the PNP management, 
social identity was made salient through the eco-guards claiming rights and 
promises when they felt these rights and promises threatened by the park direc-
tion. In all three cases, the conflict was an identity conflict as groups polarized 
because their identities were threatened.
In the three cases, the forest department representatives took some measures 
to manage the situation. However, in all three, these measures led to escalation 
of the conflict.
5.6.3 Conflict management and escalation
The conflicts in the three cases studied evolved differently. In each case, the 
parties involved undertook some actions to cope with the situation. Different 
strategies were used by the parties according to the nature of the conflict they 
were facing. However, in all three cases, despite the management strategies 
deployed by the officials to resolve the conflicts, they escalated.
The Agoua forest case
The conflict became open in the case of the restoration of the Agoua forest 
when the farmers violently expressed their opposition to the decision of the 
PAMF project to implement the zoning plan at a meeting held by the forest 
department representatives, the PAMF staff members, the municipality staff 
members, and the local communities in Bantè municipality where the conflict 
was unfolding. At the meeting, the local communities contested their involve-
ment in the formulation of the zoning plan. They also denied the existence of 
enough land in the agro-forestry zones for the farmers who had to abandon 
their farms in the protection and production zones. For them, the lands des-
ignated by the forest department already belonged to farmers who would not 
agree to others settling there. 
Because they did not get satisfaction and the project destroyed a cashew 
plantation, the farmers wrote a letter to the president requesting his personal 
involvement in the management of the conflict and also organized a march, 
broadcast on national television, to publicize their protest against the project’s 
decision. They informed the president that the PAMF project was hindering 
their effort to contribute to increasing agricultural production. These actions 
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were meant to create a group effect amongst farmers and also to get support 
from others such as the president and national opinion. These actions paid off, 
as both farmers who were affected and others who were not directly affected by 
the conflict participated in the march, and the president reacted by sending the 
minister of the environment and nature conservation, and later an inter-min-
isterial commission, to solve the problem. These actions put the PAMF under 
pressure because it was warned by the president to solve the problem as fast as 
possible and also because the project was coming to an end. Thus, the forest 
department organized a meeting to resolve the conflict. The main outcomes of 
the meeting were that the farmers were allowed to harvest cashew plantations 
that were more than five years old for eight more years, after which they would 
be destroyed; the annual fees for forest land occupation were reduced; and a 
promise was made to the farmers to ask the government to compensate the 
departing farmers. 
However, these decisions escalated the conflict. Although the meeting ended 
with a report, which was signed by all the participants including the farmers’ 
representatives, the farmers decided henceforth not to abandon their farms in 
the forest under any conditions. After the meeting, the farmers’ representatives 
argued in this respect with the researcher: 
Researcher: What do you think about the outcomes of the meeting?
Farmers’ representative 1: All the solutions adopted there where pro-
posed by them. They did not accept any of our propositions. We asked 
them to compensate us and they said that they could not ask the 
president to give us compensation as many other villages are in the 
same situation. If they compensate us, they will have to do the same 
for these other villages. We told them that we were not asking for 
compensation for the land we are leaving but for our plantations, as 
we would need a lot of funding to start other ones. Many of us are 
old and weak and do not have the strength necessary to create a new 
plantation without funding.
Researcher: But why did you sign the report of the meeting?
Farmers’ representative 1: We just accepted keeping in mind that we 
will not leave unless the state pays us every year what we get from our 
cashew plantations. We know that it cannot do that, so we are sure 
that we will never leave. Even when we told this to the farmers, most 
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of them answered that they don’t want any kind of compensation but 
only to let them continue harvesting their cashew plantations. 
 
Farmers’ representative 2: First of all, they invited us to a city far from 
the place where the problem is taking place, and at the end of the meet-
ing they threatened us by saying that those parties who will not respect 
the agreements will be taken to court.
Source: Interview with farmers’ representatives, November 2007
This interview excerpt displays that, whereas the project managers believed that 
the conflict was resolved as the farmers’ representatives signed the final report 
of the meeting, the farmers did not agree with the project. By saying ‘… they [the 
farmers] don’t want any kind of compensation but only to let them continue harvest-
ing their cashew plantations,’ the farmers meant that they were not ready to accept 
any compromise if it meant that they had to leave their farms.
The reactions of the farmers’ representatives and their peers show that they 
considered the solutions adopted by the meeting as threatening their identity. 
Talking constantly in terms of ‘we’ versus ‘they’, shows that identities have been 
shifted again to the initial stage. The farmers’ representatives expressed their 
feeling that the decisions were made at the meeting by threatening them. Their 
peers considered that these decisions of the PAMF were still threatening their 
livelihood. 
Thus, instead of resolving the conflict, the outcomes of the meeting escalated 
the conflict as it pushed the farmers to reject any compensation that would be 
given to them to leave their farms. The project ended in an impasse, as the plan 
was not implemented by the time the project ended in June 2008. 
The OSN forests case
In the case of the conflict in the implementation of the OSN participatory man-
agement plan, no measure was immediately taken by the forest department in 
this regard although the VAFM board members complained about not being 
involved in the implementation of the activities foreseen in the plan. Thus, the 
activities were carried out by each of the parties separately at the expense of the 
forest users such as loggers and herders who grazed their cattle in these forests. 
Indeed, these stakeholders complained that they were often obliged to pay many 
times the taxes for any activity they carried out in the forests to either the FRs or 
the VAFM board members, or even both, and sometimes to other villagers who 
presented themselves as members of the VAFM board or sent by the FRs. 
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The management of the conflict started only after the FALM programme was 
launched in 2003 to support the implementation of the plan. The first measure 
undertaken by this programme to resolve the conflict was to take unilaterally 
the decision to stop logging in the OSN forests, the main activity in the imple-
mentation of the participatory management plan, because it was not being car-
ried out as it should be according to its managers. This measure was justified 
by the head of Borgou forest department who said:
Unfortunately, the money collected by the members of the VAFM 
boards is misappropriated. An audit of the management of the OSN’s 
VAFM from the introduction of co-management until now showed 
that up to 80% of the money collected has been misappropriated and 
the board members are not bothered. They know their job perfectly, 
but it is a lack of patriotism that has led to bad management of the 
resources.
Source: Head of Borgou’s forest department office, February 2009
 
He meant by this statement that the forest department stopped logging be-
cause the VAFM were misusing the money they collected in organizing it. How-
ever, instead of solving the problem, this measure escalated the conflict. As 
far as the local communities were concerned, the forest department took this 
measure to be able to organize logging alone as, although this measure was 
enacted, the FRs continued to send their sawyers into the forests to log, as in 
the following utterance: 
In the past, the loggers were allowed to get a licence and log only with 
hand saws and not the motor chain-saws. During this period, when 
the licensed loggers were in the forest and heard the motor chain-saw 
sound, they informed us because they knew that motor chain-sawyers 
were illegal. We informed the FRs and they were caught. So the legal 
loggers helped us arrest the illegal loggers because they were jealous. 
Suddenly in 2005, logging was forbidden by the forest department 
even for those who had a licence. They did it to be free to send their 
own sawyers into the forest; since then, illegal logging has increased 
anarchically.
Source: Focus group discussion with VAFM board members of Beterou, January 2009
The VAFM members also interpreted this measure as a way of pushing them 
out of the process, as in this statement:
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It seems like the forest department proclaimed publicly that local commu-
nities are managing the forests through the VAFM, while FRs are illegally 
exploiting forest resources. Then, they would be able to say later that it is 
local communities who are responsible of the degradation of the forests 
and conclude that the sustainable management of the forests using a par-
ticipatory approach failed.
Source: Focus group discussion with Beterou VAFM board members, January 2009
This testimony of the VAFM members shows that, as far as they were concerned, 
the intention of the new FRs in marginalizing them in the process, and of the forest 
department in stopping logging, was part of a hidden agenda of the forest depart-
ment that was trying to stop the participatory process itself and accused them of 
being responsible. For the VAFM members, it was a plot against them prepared 
by the forest department. So, instead of rebuilding between the new FRs and the 
VAFM members the cohesive relationship that had existed between the former FRs 
and VAFM members, the FALM programme escalated the conflict that brought 
them into opposition through its corrective measure, as the VAFM members con-
sidered it as a threat to their identity in the participatory process as a whole. This 
measure created more distance between the two parties who continued working 
separately and often undermined each other’s actions. 
The PNP case
To manage conflict in the PNP, the park direction decided in August 2009, instead 
of negotiating with the eco-guards to look for ways of improving their performance, 
to negotiate with the poachers and involve them in the surveillance of the park. 
The poachers were henceforth called local professional hunters (LPH) (Chasseurs 
Professionels Locaux) by the park direction, and they were told to form their own or-
ganization. Since then, they have been going on surveillance in the same teams as 
the eco-guards. The park direction justified its decision in the following statement 
by the park director:
We encourage the combination of actors for the surveillances to avoid col-
lusion and corruption. Because when you alone hold the power like it was 
with the eco-guards in the past, collusions start. But now that the LPHs - 
with whom the eco-guards used to collude - are also involved in the surveil-
lances, it complicates things for the eco-guards. We are even getting some 
good results. The LPHs started reporting the eco-guards’ behaviours to us. 
They told us that sometimes the eco-guards don’t want to go far into the 
park for surveillance. The LPHs want to show that they are trustworthy.
Source: Director of PNP, January 2010
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This piece of talk shows that the park direction distrusted the eco-guards and 
included the LPHs to counterbalance the impact of the eco-guards on park sur-
veillance. For the park direction, the presence of the LPHs in the surveillance 
teams was a guarantee that the behaviour of the eco-guards would change. 
However, the eco-guards complained about this decision, claiming that they 
did not trust the reconverted poachers and even feared them. They expressed it 
in the following statements:
Nothing proves to us that the LPHs are fully converted. Giving them 
guns and allowing them to go on surveillance is a danger as there is 
nothing to say that they won’t start their former behaviour again once 
they know all our surveillance strategies.
Source: Eco-guard informant, January 2010
 
And another eco-guard added:
The park direction is asking us to go on surveillance with the LPHs 
who we had tracked for many years. We found it difficult to work with 
our enemies as it is an opportunity that the park direction is giving 
them to pay back what we did to them.
Source: Eco-guard informant, January 2010
 
The eco-guards in the statements above rather considered the involvement of 
the LPHs as a threat to them because they were sceptical about the hunters’ 
change of heart and also because of their former relationship with them. The 
decision of the park direction also increased the eco-guards’ distrust of the 
park direction about its willingness to improve their working conditions. An 
eco-guard stated in that sense:
The eco-guards are frustrated as the park direction still owes them 
four years of bonuses, saying that there are not enough resources. But 
where do the resources that are used to pay the LPHs come from? 
Source: Eco-guard informant, December 2009
 
These statements show that the eco-guards considered their identity threat-
ened by the decision of the park direction to involve the poachers in the man-
agement of the PNP. Even though the LPHs were also part of the local commu-
nities, the eco-guards did not agree with their involvement in the surveillance 
of the park as they saw their inclusion as a way of reducing their importance in 
the process and as reflecting the unwillingness of the park direction to meet 
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their needs. Thus, this decision by the park direction escalated the conflict as 
the eco-guards perceived it as a threat to their identity, and their distrust of the 
park direction increased. As in the OSN forests case, the park direction in this 
case took the decision to involve the LPHs without involving the eco-guards 
in its decision-making process. This decision was taken by the park direction 
because it believed that it was the best way to counterbalance the influence of 
the eco-guards and fight against poaching. 
The outbreak of conflict in the management of the protected areas triggered 
each party’s reaction. In the three cases, the conflicts escalated because the fea-
tures that made salient the social identities of the parties were not addressed 
properly in the decisions made to resolve the conflicts. Rather, the actions un-
dertaken to manage the conflicts escalated the conflicts as they were perceived 
as threatening the identities of the local communities in the different cases. 
5.7 Discussion and conclusions
Participatory management of natural resources often involves different stake-
holder groups with different social identities (Haslam 2001). As the mere social 
categorization of stakeholders is an inevitable source of conflict, several strate-
gies are used to deal with differences in social identity in negotiation (Haslam 
2001; Tajfel et al. 1971; Tzeng and Jackson 1994). We revealed in this study that 
different negotiation models were adopted in the participatory management of 
the protected areas in Benin. The models adopted by the PAMF and the NRM 
project, respectively in the Agoua forest case and the OSN forests case, were 
close to the dual-identity model, whereas in the PNP case the model adopted 
by the park direction was close to the recategorization model. However, nei-
ther the recategorization nor the dual-identity model proposed for intergroup 
negotiation represents a panacea to deal with identity conflicts. The adoption 
of both models in different intergroup negotiation processes did not prevent 
conflicts from emerging in the management of these protected areas in Be-
nin. In both models, conflict emerged because the different identities of the 
subgroups of stakeholders involved became more salient than the superordi-
nate identity supposed to encompass all the members of the subgroups, which 
was downplayed. The salience of the subgroups’ identities was triggered by 
contextual factors that were framed as threats by the members of these sub-
groups (Dalton and Chrobot-Mason 2007; Fischer et al. 2010; Haslam 2001; 
Korostelina 2007). The decision of the PAMF to implement the participatory 
management plan was framed by the farmers in the Agoua forest as a threat to 
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their livelihood and triggered the salience of their identity. The VAFM members 
in the OSN forests interpreted the behaviour of the new FRs when they arrived 
as a threat to the roles and responsibilities that they had co-constructed with 
the former FRs, and their identity became salient. In the case of the PNP, the 
identity of the eco-guards became salient when they framed the behaviour of 
the park direction as a threat to their rights and promises to them because the 
park direction was not honouring these. 
The study also shows that new identity creation is a potential source of identity 
conflict as it offers room for new categorizations and claims. In the OSN and 
PNP cases, new identities were created - VAFM members in the case of the 
OSN and eco-guards and LPHs in the case of the PNP. Conflicts emerged in 
these cases as these new identities became salient when their members felt 
that their identities were threatened - their roles and responsibilities in the case 
of the VAFM members, and their rights and promises in the case of the eco-
guards. 
When the identity of a stakeholder group becomes salient, it affects the behav-
iour of its members and leads to conflict (Haslam 2001; Hogg and Reid 2006; 
Korostelina 2007; Stets and Burke 2000). The stakeholders undertake collec-
tive actions to react against the threat to their identity. These actions result 
in the strengthening of the cohesion among the group members, coalitions 
building, and fighting against the threat. The farmers in the Agoua forest man-
agement case organized a march and wrote to the president; the VAFM board 
members decided to withdraw from the process and continued carrying out 
activities on their own; and the eco-guards became demotivated, and this sig-
nificantly reduced their spirit in carrying out surveillance in the park - an occur-
rence that was noticeable in the increase in poaching. When conflict emerges, 
the different stakeholders involved undertake actions to deal with the situa-
tion. Nevertheless, conflicts often escalate. We found that the escalation of 
the identity conflicts in the management of the protected areas in Benin arose 
as a result of unilateral decision making and the outcomes of it as framed by 
the stakeholders. Although a participatory approach was ostensibly used in the 
management of these protected areas, the perception was that a top-down ap-
proach had been taken in making the decisions that were supposed to resolve 
the conflicts. Farmers’ representatives complained that none of their proposi-
tions was accepted and that they had been forced to accept the propositions 
made by the project at the meeting to resolve the Agoua forest conflict. The 
conflict escalated in the OSN forests case when the decision to stop logging 
was made by the FALM programme and the VAFM members were informed. 
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In the case of the PNP, the conflict escalated when the park direction decided to 
involve the LPHs and informed the eco-guards. In the three cases, the decisions 
were framed by the local communities as a threat to their identity and thus they 
adopted a harsher attitude. 
This study shows that the salience of identities is dynamic and relates to the 
emergence and escalation of conflict in a negotiation process (see Table 2). This 
dynamic is triggered by the framing of contextual factors that determine its inten-
sity. When stakeholders frame some decisions and actions as threatening their 
identity, this triggers the salience of their identity and leads to conflict. Thus, deal-
ing with social identity in negotiations is a continuous and permanent process. 
How the stakeholders frame the decisions and actions in the negotiation process 
needs to be continuously checked and the negotiation model redesigned accord-
ingly. This means that stakeholders must continuously listen and communicate.
Cases Before participatory 
management
Beginning of participatory 
management
Agoua forest
OSN forests
PNP
FRs LC
FRs LC
FRs LC
PD LCEGs
Table 5.2: Dynamic of identities and conflict emergence and escalation in the 
management of protected areas in Benin
FRs LC PAMF LC
Dual-identity model
Dual-identity model
Recategorization model
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Conflict emergence * Conflict escalation *
PAMF LC
FRs LC
PD EGs
PAMF LC
FRs LC
LPHs
EGs
PD
Acronyms
PAMF: Project of the Management of the Wari-Waro, Monts Kouffè and Agoua Forest Mas-
sifs, LC: Local Community; FR: Forest Ranger; PD: Park Direction; EG: Eco-Guard; LPH: Local 
Professional Hunter.
 * The distance between the groups shows the intensity of the conflict
Dual-identity model
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6.1 Introduction
The objective of this thesis was to understand why and how conflicts emerge 
and evolve in negotiation among the stakeholders involved in the participatory 
management of protected areas in Benin. Three cases were studied where par-
ticipatory protected areas management started with cooperation and ended in 
conflicts among the stakeholders involved. Frame analysis was used to investi-
gate how stakeholders involved built cooperation at the start of the process and 
why and how conflicts emerged and evolved. 
Building upon the individual case-studies and the comparative analysis con-
ducted in the previous chapter, this chapter starts with an identification of the 
cross-cutting conclusions and themes about the emergence and escalation of 
conflict in participatory processes. Subsequently, the chapter discusses the 
practical implications for participatory and community-based natural resourc-
es management. The chapter ends with the overall conclusion of the thesis, 
including a reflection on the usefulness of a frame analysis for understanding 
conflict dynamics in participatory processes. 
6.2 Discussion of cross-cutting issues and conclusions
When looking at the cases from a somewhat greater distance, several cross-
cutting themes can be discerned in relation to the emergence and escalation 
of conflict in the participatory management of protected areas. They relate to 
the central role of identity and context, the dynamics of trust and distrust, the 
relations between formal and informal institutions and the role of text and talk 
in the emergence of conflict. These themes are discussed below. 
6.2.1 The central role of identity and contextual dynamics in the emergence 
and escalation of conflict
Conflicts over natural resources are inevitable and ubiquitous (Desloges and 
Gauthier 1997; Buckles 1999; Yasmi 2003; Yasmi et al. 2009; Mola-Yudego and 
Gritten 2010). According to Glasl (1999) conflict occurs when an actor feels 
‘impairment’ from the behavior of another actor. In many studies, such impair-
ment and associated conflicts are seen to be connected to the natural resource 
itself. That is, people struggle over and compete for the ownership, access and 
use of, for example, the forest, the trees, the water, or the land (Ramirez 2001; 
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Wollenberg et al. 2001; Sneddon et al. 2002; Scholz and Stiften 2005; Fayse 
2006; Yasmi 2006; Sauer 2008; Warner 2009). In this line of thought, conflicts 
in the management of natural resources occur when there are disagreements 
and disputes regarding the access and management of the natural resources 
(Mola-Yudego and Gritten 2010). This study shows this is only one side of the 
story, and that conflicts about natural resource management are not only about 
bio-physical resources. The case studies in this thesis indicate that symbolic 
resources, including social status, moral values, trust and other identity-related 
issues play decisive roles as well (Shamir and Sagiv-Schifter 2006).
As we have seen in this thesis, participatory forest management involves dif-
ferent stakeholder groups who continuously cast and recast their identities in 
interaction with others through discursive practices (Ford 1999; Musson and 
Duberley 2007). This is not surprising, as social differentiation to in-groups 
and out-groups is a universal phenomenon. Individuals define themselves to a 
large extent in terms of group identities and aspire to a positive social identity 
(Shamir and Sagiv-Schifter 2006). Identity construction is an active and es-
sential process of sense making for our ‘selves’ (Musson and Duberley 2007). 
However, the existence of social differentiation leads almost inevitably to con-
flict and tension (Haslam 2001a).
In interaction, group members may develop conflicting relationships with out-
group members, in order to protect their positively valued social identities 
(Richter et al. 2005). As demonstrated in chapter 5, the conflicts in the dif-
ferent cases studied have developed in coherence with the co-construction of 
identities among the stakeholders involved in the participatory management of 
the protected areas. All the conflicts involved confrontation between the local 
communities living around the protected areas and the forest department rep-
resentatives. The cases show that the co-construction and the dynamics of the 
social identities of these stakeholders reinforced the conflicts in the different 
cases (see chapter 5). 
While perceived non-respect and threat to, and therewith the salience of, an 
identity played an important role in all conflicts, the cases also indicated that 
the salience of identities is not fixed and co-evolved with dynamics in the con-
text. At the beginning of the participatory processes in the different cases, the 
local communities positively framed the forest department representatives and 
welcomed their initiative, which comprised of an invitation of local commu-
nities to become involved in the management of the protected areas. Posi-
tive identity and characterization frames about each other were co-constructed 
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by the different stakeholder categories. The social context created by the for-
est department in involving the local communities significantly reduced the 
distance between the two stakeholder groups (local communities and forest 
department) and minimized the salience of different identities. This enabled 
cooperation among them at the beginning of the process in the different cases 
studied. However, progressively the change of the social context triggered the 
salience of the different groups’ identities (both ‘we’ and ‘they’) and led to 
conflict. In the Agoua forest case, the social context changed with the forest 
departments’ decision to implement a plan in which several farmers had to 
abandon their farms in the forest, which represented their core livelihood. In 
the Ouémé Supérieur and N’Dali (OSN) case the social context changed with 
the arrival of new forest rangers and their denial to acknowledge the informal 
institutions and co-management responsibilities/authorities articulated by the 
former forest rangers and the local communities. In the Pendjari National Park 
(PNP) case, the context changed as the identity frame of eco-guards evolved 
and they started to think that the park direction was not fulfilling the rights and 
promises made to them. Their identity as eco-guards became a topic, which re-
sulted in changed behavior vis-à-vis the park administration. These cases show 
differences in identity are not an issue or positively valued when actors collabo-
rate, but when contexts change and conflicts emerge the salience and perceived 
non-respect or threat of one’s identity often play a contributing role.
In all, the cases demonstrate the interplay between the context and the salience 
of social identities, and how this is associated with the emergence and escala-
tion of conflict. Social identities have particular content and meanings that are 
inextricably tied to the intergroup relations in specific contexts (Livingstone 
and Haslam 2008). The specific social context influences which categories of 
stakeholder become relevant and form the basis for social identity construc-
tion. Social context thus affects the salience or importance of social identities 
(Jackson 2002; Shamir and Sagiv-Schifter 2006). More specifically, the cases 
suggest that the emergence and escalation of conflict are related to the con-
textual expression of in-group bias (defined as the in-group being evaluated 
relatively more favourably than the out-group) which in turn influences and 
legitimizes courses of action that further aggravate tension (Jackson 2002). 
The emergence and escalation of conflict is thus associated with the salience 
of identities (Stets and Burke 2000; Haslam 2001a; Hogg and Reid 2006; 
Korostelina 2007). 
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6.2.2 Trust dynamics and conflict in participation
Given the often troublesome relations between stakeholders in natural resource 
management, it is not surprising that both scholars and practitioners have be-
come interested in issues of trust. Trust has become an important concept 
for scholars attempting to better understand the dynamics of cooperation and 
competition, conflict and conflict resolution, etc. (Eshuis and Van Woerkum 
2003; Lewicki and Tomlinson 2003; Kelman 2005; Lewicki 2006; Schumann 
2010). According to Lewicki (2006) trust is fundamental in intergroup rela-
tions as it is the glue that holds a relationship together. Thus, trust building 
and enhancing is a central requirement for the peaceful and effective manage-
ment of all relationships between individuals, groups, and between individuals 
or groups and the organizations and societies to which they belong (Kelman 
2005). When groups trust each other, they can work together and even work 
through conflict relatively easily whereas when they do not trust each other, 
conflict arises, becomes destructive, and its resolution is more difficult (Lewicki 
2006). In the different cases studied, the first endeavor of the forest depart-
ment was to build trust with the local communities - an effort which is in fact 
advocated as a first step in several handbooks on participatory processes (Slo-
cum 2005; Schuman 2006; Kanet et al. 2007; Mysiak 2010). Although it is rec-
ognized by many that the development of trust is not an easy process (Kumar 
and Paddison 2000; Mostert et al. 2007; Swain and Tait 2007; Tait 2011), the 
participatory forest management initiatives studied all succeeded to improve 
relationships between the various stakeholders in the early stages of the pro-
cess. This is in line with Schumann (2010) who argues that the mere organiza-
tion of intensified interaction between groups can lead to an increase in trust 
between stakeholder groups involved in a participatory process. The trust built 
enabled cooperation at the beginning of the participatory management of the 
protected areas between the forest department representatives and local com-
munities. However, in all three cases distrust among the local communities 
and the representatives of forest department re-emerged at a later stage, and 
went along with intensified conflict and counterproductive processes of identity 
co-construction (see the previous section).
Distrust emerged in the management of the Agoua forest case when the im-
plementation of the participatory management plan was stated by the forest 
department and triggered the conflict (see chapter 2). The local communities 
considered that through this decision, the forest department was not follow-
ing its words of the beginning of the process. Distrust is also associated to 
the emergence of the conflict in the Ouémé Supérieur and N’Dali (OSN) case. 
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The conflict started when the trust built at the beginning of the participatory 
process vanished with the arrival of the new forest rangers who ignored the 
informal rules co-constructed which were both the result and the enabling fac-
tor of increasing trust. For the local communities, the new forest rangers lacked 
knowledge on participation and were not even committed to this approach (see 
chapter 3). The emergence of the hidden conflict in the management of the 
Pendjari National Park is also associated with the development of distrust be-
tween the park administration and the eco-guards. They accused each other 
of being responsible of the increase of poaching in the park. The eco-guards 
distrusted the park administration in its willingness to satisfy the (assumed) 
rights of an eco-guard, whereas the park administration accused the eco-
guards of complicity with the poachers (see chapter 4). Since the stakeholders 
increasingly distrusted each other, subsequent interventions and interactions 
only led to further escalation. 
As is demonstrated in chapter 4 the apparently vulnerability of the trust build 
in the early stages of the participatory process seems to be associated with the 
type of trust involved. As shown in chapters 4 improved relations and trust 
were built essentially through the proposition of rewards and incentives to lo-
cal communities for their participation to the management of the natural re-
sources. In terms of Lewicki (2006) this means that the forest department in 
the different cases built calculus-based trust. That is: trust based on the assess-
ment that the overall anticipated benefits to be derived from the relationship 
outweigh the anticipated costs (Lewicky 2006: 100). However, it is argued by 
Lewicky (2006) that calculus-based trust is inherently instable, and easily turns 
into distrust when promises, rewards and expectations are not fulfilled. The 
case-studies presented in this thesis support that argument. 
The promises and expectations of rewards and incentives as perceived in the 
early stages of the processes enabled cooperation, and reduced the salience of 
the differential identities of the stakeholders involved in the intergroup relation. 
However, the trust built at the beginning of the processes vanished progres-
sively when the fulfilment of promises and incentives were seen to be under-
mined later in the process. Trust is thus a relationship that is not given, but is 
instead highly dynamic and constantly negotiated over time (Kelman 2005). 
Chapters 2 and 4 presenting respectively the Agoua Forest Restoration case 
and the Penjari National Park case also show that trust and distrust are dis-
cursively constructed social relations that depend on the fulfilling of the agree-
ments and the norm of reciprocity (see also Lewis 2008). As will be argued in 
the next section, dynamics of trust, distrust and conflict are also linked with 
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tensions that emerge between the formal and informal arenas that emerge 
within the participatory management of the protected areas. 
6.2.3 Formal and informal institutions and conflict in participation
The Summit in Rio de Janeiro, 1992, highlighting the ongoing degradation of 
environmental resources and the need to involve local communication in natu-
ral resource management, inspired many governments try more participatory 
approaches and invite local communities to participate in the elaboration and 
implementation of natural resource plans. Notwithstanding a great deal of 
bottom-up participatory rhetoric, our cases from Benin confirm that participa-
tory forest management projects can go along with considerable government 
control and disciplining of interaction (see also Cook and Kothari 2001). The 
participatory processes often started with the building of formal institutions 
in terms of formal projects, plans, rules and procedures that should enable 
and constrain the relationships and interactions between the stakeholders in-
volved in the management of the resources (Leskinen 2004; Ibarra and Hir-
akuri 2007). These institutions were typically agreed upon in formal meetings 
between the stakeholders in the framework of project implementation. How-
ever, our cases suggest that initial formal institutions are often re-negotiated 
and complemented by informal rules as the process enfolds and as personal 
relationships develop (Schumann 2010). As the cases demonstrate, the mere 
involvement of actors gives rise to a further articulation and contextualization 
of process rules to fit the local reality. In interaction, actors progressively re-
interpret and operationalize formal institutions into a framework of informal 
rules and routines, that pay respect to and can work in their (partly tacit) reality. 
In the cases presented in chapter 3 and 4 face-to-face communication and co-
construction of informal institutions led to social cohesion (Kearns and Forrest 
2000). That is: stakeholders developed shared ideas about the value and moral 
principles of the project, constructed an acceptable social order (e.g. in terms 
of the distribution of responsibilities and benefits) and built a network and so-
cial capital that further nurtured their feeling of territorial belonging and trust. 
At certain stages of the projects, such social cohesion provided support for 
the cooperative implementation of the management plans. Thus, while formal 
institutions provide the initial framework for legitimate action, they become 
intertwined with informal institutions that become decisive in the achievement 
of objectives. 
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Although we have seen that formal and informal institutions are both important 
and can reinforce each other (Torniainen and Saastamoinen 2007; Woodhill 
2008), we have also seen that the intertwining of formal and informal institu-
tions may result in problems and conflict, especially when there is discontinuity 
and turn-over with regard to participants. This is not surprising as participants 
tend to go through a social learning process, which is hard to explain or trans-
fer to non-involved actors and newcomers (Loeber 2004). Some issues might 
be explained but newly arriving participants have to go through an experiential 
learning period to grasp and master the (partly tacit) articulated informal insti-
tutions (Lave and Wenger 1991). The Ouémé Supérieur and N’Dali (OSN) case 
showed that newly arriving officers had a different interpretation of the concept 
‘participatory management’, and the distribution of responsibilities and ben-
efits amongst the different partners. Although the new forester’s interpreta-
tions might be in line with the more abstract formal policies, they did not fit 
the existing informal institutions co-constructed by the local communities and 
former forest rangers. Even so, the new forest rangers felt that it was legitimate 
for them to adhere to and impose their own management procedures, rather 
than to accept and take time to learn about the prevailing informal institutions. 
In a hard way, local communities learned that existing informal (but very real) 
locally adapted and highly valued principles and procedures were disregarded, 
and they subsequently lost trust in the whole exercise. This case shows the im-
portance to recognize the power of informal institutions. When the normative 
content of newly imposed procedures is at odds with the prevailing informal 
institutions, conflicts are likely to arise and hamper the achievement of formal 
plans (Ibarra and Hirakuri 2007; Woodhill 2008). 
The above discussion shows the relevance of inter-human processes for the 
emergence and escalation of conflicts in participatory processes. In particular 
we mention the role of perceived threats to one’s identity and the ignorance of 
articulated informal rules. Informal institutions are fundamental for the devel-
opment of social cohesion needed to successfully execute the joint enterprise. 
Inter-human processes contribute to the success or failure of a participatory 
management process. As discussed below, actors’ utterances reveal these in-
ter-human processes and discursively construct them. 
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6.2.4 The emergence and escalation of conflict via talk and text: frame 
construction in interaction 
The case-studies presented in this thesis show that conflicts are gradually co-
constructed by the stakeholders involved in the process through their everyday 
conversations in interactions. Conversations range from single speech acts 
to an extensive network of speech acts which form arguments, narratives and 
other forms of discourses, and the full conversational apparatus of symbols, 
artifacts, theatrics etc. that are used in conjunction with (or as substitutes for) 
what is spoken (Ford 1999). In the cases studied, the conversations consisted 
of talks and texts that were held and written by the stakeholders in formal and 
informal settings during the implementation of the participatory process. Con-
versations, thus are organized as well as organizing systems of meaning, which 
frame reality and influence the way people understand and act upon it (Tietze 
2005). 
At the start of the participatory process in the different cases studied, the stake-
holders seemed willing to collaborate and their conversations do not reveal any 
perceived threat to their identity. The stakeholders constructed positive frames 
about each other, and the text and talk at that time reflects trust and cohesion. 
This lasted until the discourses of the representatives of the forest department 
shifted and triggered the creation of a new reality. In the Agoua forest case, it 
was the decision of the Management Project for the Wari-Waro, Monts Kouffè 
and Agoua Forest Massifs (PAMF: Projet d’Aménagement des Massifs Forestiers 
d’Agoua, des Monts Kouffè et de Wari-Waro) to implement the participatory man-
agement plan that provoked the shift in conversations and triggered the conflict. 
The study shows that the stakeholders involved constructed different frames in 
different interaction contexts. These frames reflect what they perceived was go-
ing on, what they thought they were doing, and what they felt was strategically 
wise from their perspective (e.g. negotiation, cooperation, conflict, etc.) (Agne 
2007). Through conversations, a reality of conflict has thus been constructed 
(Ford 1999; Ford et al. 2002; Tietze 2005). In the Ouémé Supérieur and N’Dali 
(OSN) forests case too it became clear that participation of local people in the 
management of the forests was realized initially by constructing, interpreting, 
enacting and maintaining social cohesion through discourse. Via conversa-
tions formal rules were interpreted, extended and translated into informal rules 
that formed the glue for trust and cooperation. As these informal rules progres-
sively became more important than the formal rules, conflict arose from the 
moment these informal rules were ignored by newly arrived forest rangers that 
replaced the ones who were involved in the process from the beginning. The 
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Pendjari case has shown that hidden conflicts are the result of actors sharing 
their feelings of dissatisfaction in conversations with those with whom they 
already agree and who confirm their existing opinions. In other words, whereas 
conflict is often supposed to be the result of interactions between opponents, 
this case makes clear that conflicts often develop in the interactions among 
actors within ‘we’ groups. The fact that the conflict was not expressed in inter-
actions among the different stakeholders made it a hidden conflict, which was 
even more difficult to solve because it amplified serious problems of trust. In all 
cases we found that the salience of identities were constructed in interactions 
and triggered by the framing of contextual factors playing an important role in 
the emergence and escalation of conflict. 
The cases show that people actively engage in conversations and in doing so 
they dynamically (re)shape and develop them with a purpose to justify or legiti-
mate particular actions or outcomes (Kusztal 2002; Tietze 2005). The emer-
gence of conflict is thus not only expressed in the relations between individu-
als and resources but also in the way stakeholders construct realities in which 
they operate and that include interpretations of contexts as far as they consider 
these important (see Ford et al. 2002; Kusztal 2002). Stakeholders thus act and 
respond within a reality that is constructed in everyday conversation and talk. 
Within such a setting, emerging shifts in formal and informal conversations 
reflect the construction of new realities and offer opportunities for new actions 
and results, leading to either cooperation or conflict (Ford 1999). 
It can be concluded that conflict and escalation emerge from the everyday in-
teractions among stakeholders, and become visible in everyday conversation, 
text and talk. It is through such talking and framing before, after, between and 
during critical events that actors actively construe and give meaning to the situ-
ation, which may or may not lead to the emergence and escalation of conflicts 
(Schon and Rein 1994; Elliot et al. 2002; Prins 2005; Schweitzer et al. 2005; 
Dewulf et al. 2009). Therefore conflict and conflict development can be studied 
by investigating the frames that people co-construct in different interaction set-
tings, including how these change over time. 
6.3 Implications for participatory and community-based 
natural resources management
This section outlines several conceptual and practical implications that emerge 
from this dissertation.
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6.3.1 Limitations to planning: the significance of human relations and 
inter-human dynamics
Participatory and community-based natural resources management are re-
garded as processes through which management power is shared with or de-
volved to local communities living in and or around the natural resource areas 
(Lesknien 2004). In the operationalization of such processes there tends to 
be a lot of attention to methods, procedures and planning of separate meet-
ings and activities as well as for organizing the longer term process. Many 
handbooks, methods and guidelines exist on how to make joint diagnosis, pri-
oritize problems, reach agreement etc. in different participatory settings (e.g. 
Chambers 1994; Pretty et al. 1995; van Veldhuizen et al. 1997; Leeuwis 2004). 
In longer term process plans there tends to be considerable attention to the 
phasing of the trajectory, to defining who to involve and how, and to the roles 
and responsibilities of all the actors in different stages of the process (Turn-
hout et al. 2010; Leeuwis 2004). In the sphere of community-based natural 
resources management initial activities typically result in the elaboration of a 
‘management plan’ that should be ‘implemented’ and which contains goals 
and procedures at both material and process level, sometimes with particular 
emphasis on the management of power relations and accountability among the 
stakeholders involved (see Ribot 2003; Cornwall 2008; Nikkhah and Redzuan 
2009; Dworski-Riggs and Langhout 2010). In sum, most attention is given to 
the careful and rational planning and control of all activities deemed essential 
for a participatory trajectory such as learning, negotiation, decision-making, 
and implementation. In many ways this is understandable in view of the de-
mands that donors pose and the enormous challenges such processes face 
- indeed it would not be wise to confront complex situations such as those in 
forest management in Benin without proper preparation. However, this thesis 
points to the fact that accompanying, less obvious/more tacit inter-human pro-
cesses and dynamics (e.g. related to identity, relationships and trust) are criti-
cally important in the context of community-based forest management. In all 
three cases conflict escalated because negative inter-human dynamics took the 
upper hand. Such dynamics appeared to be highly emergent and contextual, 
and hence are inherently difficult to anticipate and deal with in a pre-planned 
manner. The cases suggest that the negative inter-human dynamics were only 
partially recognized by the forest management authorities, who tended to be 
part and parcel of these tensions rather than being in a position to somehow 
deal with them from a more distanced and neutral position. In all, it seems 
important that those involved in facilitating community-based forest manage-
ment develop better concepts and strategies to ‘manage’ inter-human process-
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es. This is a useful addition and specification to Leeuwis (2000, 2004) plea for 
developing a better language to deal with conflict in the context of participatory 
processes, and fits well within the more general realization that we need alter-
native planning models that are better suited for complex environments and for 
building on self-organizational dynamics in networks of interaction (Whitting-
ton, 2001; Stacey and Griffin, 2005; Stacey, 2001). Some further suggestions on 
how to enhance the capacity to deal with inter-human dynamics in participatory 
processes are outlined in the next section. 
6.3.2 Embedding monitoring of inter-human dynamics in the facilitation 
of participatory processes
Dealing effectively with inter-human dynamics and relationships requires first 
and foremost that participants and project staff have a general awareness that 
these kinds of issues are important and require actives strategies in the sphere 
of process facilitation and monitoring. 
Strengthening facilitation 
The general push for participatory management is driven by considerable op-
timism about its ability to improve the substantive and procedural quality of 
the decisions and execution. However, in line with the cases presented in this 
thesis it has been argued that -in the context of natural resource management- 
processes and procedures tend to pay limited attention to (a) the fact that natu-
ral resources management is rife of conflicts among competing interests, and 
(b) the synchronization of expertise-based management approach with values, 
opinions and risk concerns of the public (Beierle and Koninsky 2000; Giller et 
al. 2008). The proof of the pudding of a well-functioning management system 
is (a) whether stakeholder values are integrated into the decision making and 
execution; (b) whether conflicts among interests have been resolved (c) wheth-
er actors have trust in the management system (Beierle and Koninsky 2000; 
chapter 4). As has been suggested in the previous section, such outcomes are 
not likely to be achieved when participation is approached solely as a process 
of ‘participatory planning and implementation’ (see also Leeuwis 2000) as this 
ignores the significance of inter-human dynamics. In the broader literature of 
the facilitation of social learning and negotiation there are many useful insights 
regarding inter-human dynamics that could be taken into account in a more 
facilitative approach to participatory processes.
Research on group, team and network development, for example, shows that in 
interactive processes (potential) participants simultaneously explore and try to 
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solve questions related to substance (what is our overriding purpose and dis-
tributions of tasks, etc.), procedures (what style of decision making and conflict 
management do we want, etc.) and relationships (how is power and influence 
distributed; how can we collaborate, differ and disagree in a way that maintains 
respect and dignity of all identities; how to give and receive feedback, etc.) 
(Halveson 2008). Rather than assuming that stakeholders have clarity about 
such issues from the outset and/or that procedural matters can be decided be-
forehand, initiators of participatory processes may usefully support stakehold-
ers (including themselves) to come to terms with such substantive, procedural 
as well as relational dimensions of the process (Daniels and Walker 2001). 
Such support may be provided by ‘process leaders’ (who have relatively strong 
ideas regarding process matters) or by ‘process facilitators’ (who tend to give 
more space to participants). Tuckman (1977) identified four phases or process 
modes (forming, storming, norming and performing) and related levels of com-
mon rules, commitment and trust in the process and co-actors. ‘Leaders’ tend 
to guide the groups to mature performance via telling, selling, delegation and 
participation (Hersey and Blanchard 1972), while ‘facilitators’ rather enhance 
participants’ open communication, reflection and negotiation of substantive, 
procedural and relational questions-at-stake (Leeuwis 2004). A facilitated par-
ticipatory process seems most fruitful, because deliberation and inclusion of 
participants’ values, assumptions and concerns coupled with reciprocity tends 
to nurture the kind of engagement and trust needed to achieve productive co-
operation in the complex setting of natural resource management. In such a 
process participants may concentrate on the performance of their own and 
overall tasks and do not monitor each other’s activities as they trust others 
to perform as expected (Pretty 2003). Furthermore, collaborative deliberation 
puts the norm of open communication. In this way participants gain trust that 
others care for their identity and concerns, and are willing to reflect upon and 
satisfactorily solve dilemmas and conflict that emerge in the process.
Embedding monitoring 
To further strengthen the facilitation dimension of participatory processes, it 
is useful to think about an active and effective strategy to actually monitor and 
discover emergent tensions, unproductive dynamics and disturbed relation-
ships. As demonstrated in this thesis, participatory management processes 
take place in an ever changing context in which stakeholders develop new 
insights, strategies and behaviours. This can simultaneously create new di-
lemma’s, threats to identities, unproductive dynamics and/or disturbed rela-
tionships that project members need to deal with. It is important that such 
emergent dynamics are recognized in a timely fashion. However, monitoring 
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such tensions is far from easy for several reasons: (a) these kinds of problems 
can be highly invisible for interventionists as they are likely to emerge and hap-
pen outside (i.e. in-between) formal meetings, (b) actors may wish to conceal 
such problems and tensions in view of fear of harm, (c) actors themselves may 
not even be explicitly aware of collectively repressed or projected emotions and 
irritations that crop up, or (c) actors have blind spots and blocks as they are 
controlled by their beliefs, assumptions, values and paradigms (Halverson and 
Tirmizi 2008). 
Actors with considerable reflective capacities and skills may be able to ‘see’ 
blockages, express the issues and work towards a solution. However, as the 
cases in this thesis demonstrate, participating actors may well submerge in 
personal emotions and strategic behaviour rather than to act for the benefit of 
the overall group or process. To evade this trap, it may be beneficial to create 
deliberate monitoring capacity in the form of a relatively independent outsider 
who is respected and trusted by the stakeholders involved. This may be the 
appointed facilitator, but in conflictive settings it can be better to have an extra 
person who is less absorbed and has time to observe from a distance. Such a 
more neutral, respected ‘monitor’ could observe meetings, collaboration and 
have regular informal talks with various types of participants to capture the 
perspectives that are only displayed in we-groups and more private settings. As 
this thesis has shown, tensions and conflict are created through, and become 
visible in, the everyday conversations among stakeholders and within stake-
holder groups. This implies that a monitor could usefully document and anal-
yse formal and informal conversations to identify emerging tensions. This does 
not necessarily require sophisticated forms of framing analysis on the side of 
the monitor, but may be aided usefully by practical guidelines and a checklist 
with indicators for identifying relevant process issues (see e.g. Van Mierlo et al. 
2010a, 2010b) and emerging conflicts in everyday talk. 
Through the use of such a simplified methodology the monitor can get an un-
derstanding of relevant process variables such as: participants concerns and 
feeling of urgency about the issues-at-stake and their satisfaction with the re-
sults and ongoing process; the extent to which stakeholders feel dependent on 
each other in realizing positive outcomes; their commitment to the issue; the 
level of trust in other parties; the frequency and type of communication and 
interaction; the level of trust in the process; the mutual willingness to share 
information and express concerns, and the readiness to reflect on and solve 
emerging dilemmas and conflicts. The monitoring person acts as a ‘respon-
sive evaluator’ (Abma and Stake 2001) or ‘reflexive monitor’ (Van Mierlo et 
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al. 2010b), who analyses utterances and behaviour to get an idea of the in-
ter-human dynamics and either starts a dialogue or will advise the involved 
leaders, participants and/or facilitators. Facilitation and mediation may help 
participants to overcome deadlocks, re-establish trust and commitment. When 
conflicts have become too personal threatening and intractable, participants 
will not be able to unlock the situation and an outside leader or manager has to 
take action so as to save face and restore balance (Behfar et al. 2006). 
However, in addition to remedying conflicts, leaders and facilitators could build 
and cherish trustful relationships with all stakeholders involved. As discussed 
above, this requires their participation in informal settings, continuous com-
munication with stakeholders and deliberate efforts to not only invite stake-
holders to narrate their stories and concerns, but also to listen to them. It is 
important that these stories and concerns are shared in safe discussion set-
tings with relevant stakeholders. This prevents the construction of multiple and 
mutually excluding realities as constructed in conversations within ‘we’ groups. 
Facilitators and monitors then become boundary spanners of whom the main 
task is building bridges between the different stakeholders by ensuring that all 
parties are constantly heard, and organizing continuous interactions between 
them.
6.4 Conclusion 
This thesis has demonstrated that framing analysis helps to identify inter-
human processes and dynamics that are critically important in shaping the 
course and outcomes of participatory processes. In particular, such analysis 
has improved our understanding of how and why conflicts emerge and evolve 
in the context of participatory management of protected areas in Benin. The 
thesis has shown that conflict emerges contextually when actors experience a 
threat to existing or newly emerging identities, and that calculus-based trust 
alone provides an insufficient basis for inducing constructive conflict dynam-
ics. In addition, the thesis indicates that informal rules and agreements among 
stakeholders are critically important to the emergence of social cohesion. Such 
social cohesion, in turn, aids considerably in realizing a constructive dynamic 
among stakeholders. However, when authorities fail to recognize and honour 
the informal basis of social cohesion, escalation of conflict is likely to occur. 
The cases presented in this thesis suggest that conflict and tension are par-
tially created in discourse. In everyday conversation people create realities that 
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become a source of conflict, even if nothing is happening (yet) ‘on the ground’ 
(in the sense that people are physically denied access from a resource or so). 
And even without having access to financial or other material resources, com-
munities can derive power and influence through the mobilization of particular 
discourses and the creation of conflict in the right time and place (e.g. during 
the visit of a presidential delegation to the region in the Agoua case). In es-
sence, we see that conversations are both the source and the carrier of conflict.
In all, this thesis draws attention to less tangible dimensions of natural re-
source management and resource conflicts. Such conflicts are not only about 
bio-physical resources such as forest, land and water, but also about human 
identities, relationships and meanings created through discourse. The impor-
tance of these less tangible dimensions is so far insufficiently recognized in 
both theory and practice of participatory community-based forest manage-
ment. The cases presented in this thesis suggest that such management efforts 
tend to be informed by planning models that do not take changes in context, 
conflict and emergent inter-human dynamics within stakeholder networks seri-
ously enough. As this thesis demonstrates, frame analysis offers interesting 
possibilities to come to grips with inter-human dimensions of participatory 
resource management, and hence has considerable scope for enriching our 
scientific understanding of the more and less productive dynamics within such 
trajectories. Moreover, such kinds of analysis could - in a simplified form- be 
useful as part of a monitoring approach within participatory processes. 
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Summary
This thesis aims at contributing to a better understanding of the emergence 
and evolution of conflict in participatory natural resources management in Be-
nin, West Africa. 
Chapter one provides the background to the study. It starts with a description 
of protected areas management in Benin, which forms the context of the case 
studies on participatory forest management that are presented in this thesis. 
It sketches the creation of the protected areas between 1940 and 1960, and 
how these were initially managed by the government by means of force and 
repression vis-à-vis the local communities, until the idea of participatory man-
agement was introduced in the early 1990s. After a seemingly promising start 
of participatory management efforts, conflicts have re-emerged in many pro-
tected areas. This makes it relevant to gain a better understanding of why and 
how such conflicts emerge. Subsequently, the chapter discusses the conceptual 
background to participation and conflict in natural resources management, and 
proposes the use of a framing perspective in order to develop a better under-
standing of conflict in such settings. The choice of this perspective is justified 
by the starting point that realities are socially constructed in people’s conversa-
tions and discourses, in which framing (i.e. the selection of certain aspects of 
a perceived reality) plays an important role. This holds equally for processes 
of participation and negotiation in natural resources management. In order to 
better understand the emergence and evolution of conflict, the central question 
in a specific case setting then becomes: what frames do stakeholders construct 
and mobilize in participatory natural resources management, how do these 
frames change in interaction, and how do they affect the process and outcome 
of negotiation and conflict management? 
The chapter concludes with some notes on the interpretative research method-
ology used in the study, and on the selection of cases. This approach provides 
us with a variety of methods for data collection and data analysis, several of 
which were used in this study.
Chapter two presents a conflict that emerged during the participatory restora-
tion of the Agoua forest. An interactional framing perspective was used to ana-
lyze the emergence of the conflict that ended in an impasse. The Agoua forest 
conflict revealed the role of discourse in the emergence and evolution of con-
flict in participatory management of protected areas. The participatory manage-
ment of Agoua forest started without a major clash among the stakeholders 
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involved. Farmers thanked the Management Project for building infrastructures 
in their region and even praised the government for choosing to implement the 
project in their region. However, conflict emerged when the Management Project 
started talking about implementing a zoning plan that would deprive some farm-
ers of their lands. They framed the decision to implement the plan as a threat, and 
this triggered a framing shift on their part. Their new frames consisted of blam-
ing, stereotyping and stigmatizing, resulting in divergence and distancing from 
the project management. These frames were constructed and expressed in we-
groups, whereas in we-versus-they interactions the stakeholders used denial and 
disapproval to attack one another or to start bargaining, depending on their fram-
ing of power positions and interdependence. The conflict was thus constructed, 
interpreted, enacted and maintained in stakeholders’ discourses through which 
they emphasized different realities and developed a different sense of themselves 
and their world. The conflict was constructed in conversations between the stake-
holders both in we-groups and in negotiation with all the stakeholders. Despite 
the negotiation meetings organized to resolve the conflict, no reframing hap-
pened. The conflict resulted in distrust, accusations and even threats, with the 
project ending in an impasse. 
Chapter three examines a conflict in the participatory management of the Ouémé 
Supérieur and N’Dali forests. The results of this study show the importance of so-
cial cohesion and institutions in such a process. At the beginning of the process, 
the local communities and the forest rangers had built social cohesion through 
the development of informal institutions on which interactions and relationships 
were based. Conflict emerged when the forest rangers in the villages were re-
placed by new ones who had a different interpretation of participatory manage-
ment and rejected the informal institutions built by their predecessors. In par-
ticipatory management, formal institutions are often set up at the beginning of 
the process that enable and constrain the interactions and relationships among 
the stakeholders. However, these formal institutions were in this case gradually 
transformed into informal institutions that became more important than the ini-
tial formal rules. The co-construction of informal rules went together with the 
gradual development of social cohesion among the stakeholders, and this con-
tributed to the implementation of participatory natural resources management. 
Conflict emerged when an attempt was made to break some of these informal 
institutions. This study shows that participatory natural resources management 
is a process of building social cohesion in terms of trust and constructive rela-
tionships as this motivates stakeholders to collaborate and to develop informal 
institutions for effective cooperation and organization. 
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Chapter four examines the conflict in the participatory management of the 
Pendjari National Park (PNP) in Benin. The objective of the study was to under-
stand how and why the issue of trust building between the park direction and 
the local communities gave way to conflict in the participatory management of 
the PNP, and how it was resolved. The study shows that conflicts over natural 
resources are not always open confrontations among the stakeholders that at-
tract public attention and that they sometimes require the involvement of third 
party for their management. Conflicts in this management process were silently 
embedded in the everyday activities and routine of the work setting. The study 
shows the importance and role of trust and distrust in such conflicts. We dis-
covered that trust building in this management process started with calculus-
based trust, characterized by different parties weighing the costs and benefits 
associated with their trusting behavior before making their decision. However, 
the study confirms that calculus-based trust is inherently unstable and vulner-
able to erosion in the changing context. As it is instrumental and built with 
rewards, such trust needs to be constantly sustained through the supply of 
promises. The interpretations of calculus-based trust by the parties involved in 
its building evolved over time. Dysfunctional trust developed when one party 
became overconfident about his position, asking for more rewards and threat-
ening to break the relationship. It is therefore concluded that calculus-based 
trust needs to be counterbalanced with deterrence-based trust that enables the 
different parties to set the boundaries of their relationships and the punish-
ments in the event of the trust being broken. Functional distrust is thus needed 
to monitor calculus-based trust as it motivates actors to put deterrents in place 
that support calculus-based trust. However, dysfunctional distrust is liable to 
emerge. The rise of dysfunctional distrust is the manifestation of conflict be-
tween parties. When it arises, the parties involved start to develop strategies 
to protect themselves and reduce their vulnerability, instead of considering the 
interests of the other parties. In other words, each party in conflict uses dys-
functional distrust as a form of agency to protect themselves and act against 
the behavioral strategies of the other party. 
In chapter five, a cross-study of the three cases is presented. Here the role of 
identity construction in the emergence and escalation of conflict in the partici-
patory management of the three areas is highlighted. The study revealed that 
participatory management of natural resources often involved different stake-
holder groups with different social identities. The mere social categorization of 
stakeholders is an inevitable source of conflict. De-categorization, re-categori-
zation and dual-identity models were used to analyze the role of the social iden-
tities of the different stakeholders involved in negotiations. The study shows 
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that conflicts emerged in the three cases studied because the identities of the 
subgroups became salient due to the stakeholders framing contextual factors 
as a threat to their identity. The salience of the identity of a stakeholder group 
affected the behavior of the group members and triggered collective action to 
react against the threat to their identity. The group members thus strength-
ened the cohesion among them, built coalitions and struggled against the per-
ceived threat. The analysis shows that identity conflicts often escalate when the 
stakeholders frame the decisions made to resolve the conflict as unilateral. It 
is concluded that the salience of social identity is dynamic and relates to the 
emergence and escalation of conflict in negotiation processes. This dynamic is 
triggered by the stakeholders’ framing of the contextual factors, which affects 
the intensity of the conflict. When decisions and actions are framed as threat-
ening the identity of the stakeholders, it triggers social identity salience and 
leads to conflict. It becomes clear that dealing with social identity in negotia-
tion is a continuous and permanent endeavor.
In chapter six the cross-cutting conclusions of the thesis are presented and 
discussed with regard to their contribution to understanding the emergence 
and escalation of conflicts in participatory processes. In addition, the chapter 
discusses practical implications for participatory and community-based natural 
resources management. The various cases studied show that the idea that con-
flicts in natural resources management occur when there are disagreements 
and disputes regarding access to, and management of, the natural reet al.s 
is only one side of the story. The thesis indicates that conflict about natural 
resources management are not only about bio-physical resources; symbolic re-
sources, including social status, moral values, trust and other identity-related 
issues, play decisive roles as well. In this line of thought, the thesis shows that 
the co-construction and the dynamics of the social identities of the stakehold-
ers involved in natural resources management tended to reinforce conflicts in 
the different cases. In addition, the thesis demonstrates that trust is an impor-
tant variable in the participatory management of natural resources. It makes 
clear that trust is not a static state or a given characteristic of a relationship, 
but must be regarded as highly dynamic and constantly negotiated over time. 
In all the cases studied, trust was built at the beginning of the process. How-
ever, this trust was calculus-based and thus vanished progressively when the 
fulfillment of promises and incentives was seen to be undermined later in the 
process. The thesis also makes clear that formal institutions provide the initial 
framework for legitimate action and become intertwined with informal institu-
tions that become decisive in the achievement of the objectives of the process. 
However, although formal and informal institutions are both important and 
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can reinforce each other, the intertwining of formal and informal institutions 
may result in problems and conflict, especially when there is discontinuity and 
turn-over with regard to participants. A final cross-cutting conclusion is that 
conflicts are gradually co-constructed by stakeholders in discourse. In everyday 
conversation, people create realities that become a source of conflict. 
An important practical implication of the study is that those involved in facili-
tating community-based forest management should develop better concepts 
and strategies to ‘manage’ and facilitate inter-human processes. To strengthen 
this facilitation dimension of participatory processes, it is useful to think about 
an active and effective strategy to actually monitor and discover emergent ten-
sions, unproductive dynamics and disturbed relationships by carefully listening 
to the formal and informal conversations between actors involved, especially 
those of the different ‘we’ groups. The thesis ends with the conclusion that 
framing analysis helps to identify inter-human processes and dynamics that 
are easily overlooked but are critically important in shaping the course and 
outcomes of participatory processes. 
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Samenvatting
De doelstelling van deze thesis is een bijdrage leveren aan een beter begrip van 
het ontstaan en de ontwikkeling van conflict in participatief beheer van natuur-
lijke hulpbronnen in Benin, West Afrika.
Hoofdstuk één biedt de achtergrond van het onderzoek. Het begint met een 
omschrijving van het beheer van beschermde gebieden in Benin, tevens de 
context van de casusstudies over participatief bosbeheer die worden gepre-
senteerd in deze thesis. Het schetst de aanwijzing van beschermde gebieden 
tussen 1940 en 1960 en hoe deze aanvankelijk werden beheerd door de rege-
ring middels druk en repressie jegens de lokale gemeenschappen, totdat het 
idee van participatief beheer werd geïntroduceerd in de vroege jaren ‘90. Na 
een ogenschijnlijk veelbelovende start van inspanningen ten bate van partici-
patief beheer zijn in veel beschermde gebieden opnieuw conflicten opgelaaid. 
Dit maakt het relevant om beter inzicht te verkrijgen in het waarom en hoe van 
het ontstaan en het verloop van dergelijke conflicten. Vervolgens wordt de con-
ceptuele achtergrond behandeld van participatie en conflict in het beheer van 
natuurlijke hulpbronnen en stellen we een framing analyse voor om inzicht te 
verkrijgen in het ontstaan en het verloop van conflicten in dergelijke situaties. 
Het startpunt van een framing perspectief is de gedachte dat realiteiten worden 
geconstrueerd in de gesprekken die mensen met elkaar voeren, waarin framing 
(d.w.z. de selectie van bepaalde aspecten van een subjectief waargenomen re-
aliteit) een belangrijke rol speelt. Dit geldt ook voor processen van participatie 
en onderhandeling in het beheer van natuurlijke hulpbronnen. Om te komen 
tot een beter begrip van het ontstaan en de ontwikkeling van conflict is de 
volgende de centrale vraagstelling geformuleerd: welke frames worden door be-
langhebbenden (stakeholders) geconstrueerd en gemobiliseerd in participatief 
beheer van natuurlijke hulpbronnen, hoe veranderen deze frames in interactie 
en hoe beïnvloeden zij het proces en de uitkomst van conflicthantering en on-
derhandeling?
Het hoofdstuk eindigt met enkele aantekeningen over de in het onderzoek ge-
bruikte interpretatieve onderzoeksmethodiek en over de selectie van casussen. 
Deze benadering biedt ons een variëteit aan methodieken voor dataverzame-
ling en data-analyse, waarvan meerdere in dit onderzoek zijn gebruikt.
In hoofdstuk twee wordt een conflict gepresenteerd dat ontstond tijdens de 
participatieve restauratie van het Agoua-bos. Een interactief framing perspec-
tief werd gebruikt om het ontstaan van het conflict, dat eindigde in een impas-
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se, te analyseren. Het participatieve beheer van het Agoua-bos begon met een 
aanzienlijke confrontatie tussen de verschillende belanghebbenden. Boeren 
dankten het projectmanagement voor de bouw van infrastructuur in hun regio 
en prezen zelfs de regering voor hun keuze om het project juist in hun regio 
uit te voeren. Desondanks ontstond er conflict toen het management begon 
over de implementatie van een zôneplan, waardoor sommige boeren hun land 
zouden verliezen. De beslissing om het plan te implementeren werd opgevat 
als een dreiging en dit veroorzaakte een verschuiving van de framing van de 
boeren. Hun nieuwe frames bestonden uit beschuldiging, stereotypering en 
stigmatisering wat leidde tot een verwijdering ten opzichte van het projectma-
nagement. De frames waren geconstrueerd en verwoord in wij-groepen, terwijl 
in wij-versus-zij-interacties gebruik gemaakt werd van ontkenning en afkeuring 
om ofwel aan te vallen ofwel een onderhandeling te initiëren, afhankelijk van 
de wijze waarop machtsposities en wederzijdse afhankelijkheden werden ge-
framed. Het conflict werd geconstrueerd, geïnterpreteerd, uitgevoerd en on-
derhouden in de discourses van belanghebbenden die verschillende realiteiten 
benadrukten en een verschillend gevoel ontwikkelden van hun eigen betrok-
kenheid en van de wereld om hen heen. En zo werd conflict geconstrueerd in 
gesprekken tussen de belanghebbenden onderling, zowel in wij-groepen alsook 
in onderhandelingen met alle verdere belanghebbenden. Ondanks de onder-
handelingsbijeenkomsten, georganiseerd om het conflict op te lossen, vond 
geen reframing plaats. In plaats daarvan leidde het conflict tot wantrouwen, 
beschuldigingen en zelfs dreigingen en mondde het project als geheel uit in 
een impasse.
In hoofdstuk drie wordt een conflict in het participatief beheer van de Ouémé 
Supérieur en N’Dali bossen geanalyseerd. De resultaten van dit onderzoek to-
nen het belang van sociale cohesie en instituties in dergelijk processen. Aan 
het begin van het proces hadden de lokale gemeenschappen en de boswach-
ters sociale cohesie opgebouwd die gepaard ging met de ontwikkeling van in-
formele instituties die een belangrijke rol speelden in interacties en relaties. 
Conflict ontstond toen de boswachters in de dorpen vervangen werden door 
nieuwe boswachters, die een andere interpretatie hadden van participatief be-
heer en die bovendien de informele instituties die met hun voorgangers waren 
opgebouwd verwierpen. In participatief beheer worden aan het begin van het 
proces formele instituties geformuleerd, die de interacties en relaties tussen 
de belanghebbenden faciliteren, maar ook beperken, opgezet aan het begin 
van het proces. Deze formele instituties waren in dit geval geleidelijk aan ge-
transformeerd in informele instituties dies belangrijker werden dan de aanvan-
kelijke formele regels. De co-constructie van informele regels ging samen met 
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de geleidelijke ontwikkeling van sociale cohesie tussen belanghebbenden en 
dit droeg bij aan de implementatie van het participatief beheer. Conflict ont-
stond toen een poging werd gedaan om enkele van deze belangrijke informele 
instituties te breken. Deze studie onderzoek toont aan dat participatief beheer 
van natuurlijke hulpbronnen een proces is van bouwen aan sociale cohesie in 
termen van vertrouwen en constructieve relaties aangezien dit belanghebben-
den motiveert tot samenwerken en tot het ontwikkelen van informele instituties 
voor effectieve samenwerking en organisatie.
Hoofdstuk vier gaat over een conflict in het participatief beheer van het Pend-
jari Nationaal Park (PNP) in Benin. Het beoogde doel van het onderzoek was 
beter inzicht te verkrijgen in hoe en waarom de kwestie van het bouwen aan 
vertrouwen tussen de directie van het park en de lokale gemeenschappen uit-
mondde in conflict hoe dit werd opgelost. Het onderzoek toont aan dat het bij 
conflicten over natuurlijke hulpbronnen niet enkel gaat over openlijke, publieke 
en waarneembare confrontaties die soms inmenging van derden vereisen voor 
hun beheer. In dit beheerproces waren conflicten impliciet en onzichtbaar inge-
bed in de dagelijkse activiteiten en routine van het werkterrein. Het onderzoek 
toont het belang en de rol van vertrouwen en wantrouwen in dergelijke conflic-
ten. Wij ontdekten dat vertrouwen bouwen in dit beheerproces begon met een 
berekenend soort vertrouwen, gekenmerkt door een afwegen van de kosten en 
baten die verbonden zijn aan het vertrouwensgedrag alvorens een besluit daar-
over te nemen. Het onderzoek laat zien dat dat berekenend vertrouwen inhe-
rent onstabiel is en kwetsbaar voor erosie in een veranderlijke context. Dergelijk 
vertrouwen wordt gebouwd middels beloningen en moet dus tevens worden 
onderhouden door de levering van beloftes. De interpretaties van berekenend 
vertrouwen van betrokken partijen ontwikkelden zich met de tijd. Disfunctio-
neel vertrouwen ontwikkelde zich toen één van de partijen overmoedig werd 
over diens positie, om meer beloningen vroeg en dreigde met het breken van de 
relatie. Om die reden is geconcludeerd dat berekenend vertrouwen bij wijze van 
tegenwicht moet worden gecompenseerd met duidelijke regels die het mogelijk 
maken grenzen stellen aan relaties en de daaraan verbonden bestraffingen in 
het geval het vertrouwen wordt verbroken. Functioneel wantrouwen is dus no-
dig om berekenend vertrouwen te controleren aangezien dit actoren motiveert 
om regels te stellen die berekenend vertrouwen in goede banen leidt. Het ligt 
echter in de lijn der verwachting dat disfunctioneel wantrouwen ontstaat. Het 
ontstaan van disfunctioneel wantrouwen manifesteert zich als conflict tussen 
partijen. Wanneer het ontstaat beginnen de betrokken partijen strategieën te 
ontwikkelen om zich te beschermen en hun kwetsbaarheid te verminderen. Met 
andere woorden, elke partij in conflict gebruikt disfunctioneel wantrouwen als 
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een vorm van bemiddeling om zich te verdedigen tegen de gedragsstrategieën 
van de andere partij. 
In hoofdstuk vijf wordt een vergelijkend onderzoek van de drie casussen gepre-
senteerd. Hierin wordt de rol van identiteitsconstructie belicht in het ontstaan 
en het escaleren van conflict in het participatief beheer van de drie gebieden. 
Het onderzoek onthult dat participatief beheer van natuurlijk hulpbronnen 
vaak verschillende stakeholder-groepen omvat met verschillende sociale iden-
titeiten. De sociale categorisering van stakeholders vormt op zichzelf al een 
onvermijdelijke bron van conflict. De-categoriseren, re-categoriseren en duale-
identiteitsmodellen werden gebruikt om de betekenis te analyseren van sociale 
identiteiten van de verschillende belanghebbenden die betrokken waren bij de 
onderhandelingen. 
Het onderzoek toont aan dat, in de drie onderzochte casussen, conflict ont-
stond omdat de identiteiten van de subgroepen in deze context een belangrijk 
issue werden omdat specifieke contextuele factoren door de belanghebbenden 
werden beschouwd als zijnde een bedreiging van hun identiteit. De verhoogde 
relevantie van de identiteit van een stakeholder-groep beïnvloedde het gedrag 
van de groepsleden en leidde tot collectieve actie tegen de vermeende bedrei-
ging van hun identiteit. Zo versterkten de groepsleden de onderlinge sociale 
cohesie, bouwden zij coalities en worstelden tegen de waargenomen dreiging. 
De analyse toont aan dat conflicten vaak escaleren omdat de betrokkenen al 
gauw het gevoel hebben dat hun bestaande identiteit wordt bedreigd wanneer 
het conflict, vanuit hun perceptie, unilateraal wordt opgelost. Geconstateerd 
wordt dat de relevantie van sociale identiteit dynamisch is en tevens gerela-
teerd aan het ontstaan en escaleren van conflict in onderhandelingsprocessen. 
Deze dynamiek wordt aangewakkerd door de manier waarop belanghebbenden 
de contextuele factoren bezien, wat de intensiteit van het conflict beïnvloedt. 
Kortom, wanneer beslissingen en acties worden opgevat als een bedreiging van 
de identiteit van de belanghebbenden, dan wordt daarmee de relevantie van 
sociale identiteit aangewakkerd en dat leidt dus gemakkelijk tot een conflict. 
Het omgaan met sociale identiteit in onderhandeling is dus een doorlopende 
en permanente inspanning. 
In hoofdstuk zes worden de integrale conclusies van de thesis gepresenteerd 
en besproken tegen het licht van hun bijdrage aan een beter begrip van het 
ontstaan en de escalatie van conflicten in participatieve processen. Voorts wor-
den in dit hoofdstuk de praktische implicaties belicht voor participatief en col-
lectief beheer van natuurlijke hulpbronnen. De verschillende casussen die zijn 
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onderzocht laten zien dat de gedachte dat conflicten rondom het beheer van 
natuurlijke hulpbronnen voortkomen uit onenigheid over de toegang tot de na-
tuurlijke hulpbronnen slechts één kant is van het verhaal. In deze thesis wordt 
aangetoond dat conflict over beheer van natuurlijke hulpbronnen niet alleen 
gaat over bio-fysieke bronnen; symbolische bronnen, inclusief sociale status, 
morele waarden, vertrouwen en andere identiteit-gerelateerde kwesties spelen 
eveneens een doorslaggevende rol. In het verlengde hiervan laten de verschil-
lende studies zien dat de co-constructie en dynamiek van de sociale identiteiten 
van de belanghebbenden betrokken bij het beheer van natuurlijke hulpbronnen 
de conflicten in de verschillende casussen neigen te versterken. Bovendien is 
aangetoond dat vertrouwen een belangrijke variabele is in het participatief be-
heer van natuurlijke hulpbronnen. Het maakt helder dat vertrouwen niet een 
statisch gegeven is of een eigenschap van een relatie, maar dat moet worden 
bezien als hoogst dynamisch en voortdurend in onderhandeling. De thesis 
maakt ook helder dat formele instituties aanvankelijk een kader bieden voor 
legitieme actie en gaandeweg verbonden raken met informele instituties die 
vervolgens doorslaggevend zijn voor het behalen van de doelstellingen van het 
project. Zowel formele als informele instituties zijn belangrijk en kunnen elkaar 
ook versterken. Echter, wanneer informele regels die organisch en in onderlinge 
overeenstemming zijn ontstaan waardoor zij haast als vanzelf functioneel zijn, 
worden genegeerd, ontstaan problemen. Een laatste integrale conclusie is dat 
conflicten geleidelijk aan mede worden geconstrueerd in de gesprekken tus-
sen belanghebbenden en met name in de gesprekken die mensen voeren bin-
nen zogenoemde wij-groepen. vooral ook onder de betrokkenen binnen een en 
dezelfde belangengroep. in discours. Met andere woorden, de realiteiten die 
mensen met elkaar in gesprekken construeren kunnen verworden tot bronnen 
van conflict. 
Een belangrijke praktische implicatie van het onderzoek, ten slotte, is dat de-
genen die betrokken zijn bij de facilitering van participatief bosbeheer betere 
concepten en strategieën zouden kunnen ontwikkelen voor het ‘beheren’ en fa-
ciliteren van intermenselijke processen. Om deze dimensie van participatieve 
processen te versterken is het zinvol na te denken over een actieve en effec-
tieve strategie om indicaties te ontdekken voor het ontstaan van spanningen, 
onproductieve dynamieken en verstoorde relaties. Een dergelijke strategie zal 
gebaseerd moeten zijn op zorgvuldig luisteren naar formele en informele ge-
sprekken tussen verschillende betrokkenen, met name binnen de verschillende 
‘wij’-groepen. 
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De thesis eindigt met de conclusie dat framing-analyse een belangrijk onder-
zoeksperspectief is om intermenselijke processen en dynamieken te identifice-
ren die gemakkelijk over het hoofd worden gezien, maar die van wezenlijk be-
lang zijn bij het verloop van participatieve processen voor effectief bosbeheer.
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